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Abstract 
This dissertation’s contribution consists in providing a novel interpretation of 
the role time plays in Kant’s transcendental idealism. A significant part of Kant 
scholarship on the Critiques tends to assume that time, as understood in 
transcendental philosophy, is solely a formal property of intuition. This assumption 
has led several commentators to overlook a fundamental feature of transcendental 
idealism, namely, that in being the most basic form of intuition time is, also, a 
provider of content in and for experience. In looking attentively at such feature this 
dissertation shows that time is the activity of the self that grounds the possibility of 
objectivity and explores the philosophical implications of such an interpretation. 
 
In the first Chapter I conduct a comprehensive survey of relevant literature 
and show that it is impossible to separate general metaphysics from transcendental 
logic in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy without making serious 
philosophical sacrifices. I then argue, in the second Chapter, that time is not merely a 
formal property of intuition but is, rather, the fundamental form of intuition and that, 
even if space is in no way reducible to, or derivable from it, time has nonetheless 
primacy over space on both logical and ontological grounds. From this I argue that by 
time, or self-affection, Kant understands the activity of subjectivity that brings about 
the possibility of relating to objects through the power of imagination. In the third 
Chapter, I show that such relation is not left wholly undetermined and that, instead, it 
occurs in accordance with the layout presented by Kant in the Table of Judgments, 
the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding, the Schemata and, importantly, in 
the System of Principles of the Understanding. I show that only an interpretation that 
acknowledges the systematicity found in the Analytic section of the Critique of Pure 
Reason can justify the distinction drawn by Kant between the mathematical and the 
dynamical and conclude, from that, that time does indeed provide a specific content 
in and for experience to be found in the Schematism doctrine. Finally, in the fourth 
Chapter I broaden the philosophical scope and inquire as to whether Kant has the 
theoretical means to articulate something like an uncategorized schema or time-
determination. I conclude that, although in the Critical period Kant can do so only 
problematically, in the post-Critical period there are means to do so categorically: 
system, as such, is a time-determination for which the understanding lacks a pure 
concept. 
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Introduction 
 
In Kant’s Theory of Experience, Hermann Cohen warns against a possible 
circularity that lies at the heart of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. If transcendental 
philosophy in its theoretical guise, asks Cohen, is understood as a propaedeutic 
science, then what exactly could it mean that such a propaedeutic will ‘securely 
ground’ science in the first place? If, that is, one conceives of transcendental 
philosophy as itself a science, then it is clearly circular to appeal to transcendental 
philosophy as grounding science insofar as that which is supposed to be doing the 
grounding is, itself, presupposing that which it is supposed to ground. Furthermore, to 
the extent that transcendental philosophy is defined not solely in terms of its domain 
[Gebiet], but also in terms of its method, the circularity danger becomes all the more 
pressing. After all, Cohen thinks, “[t]he originality and the mission of Kant consists 
especially in this method”1. This method, one learns, is the transcendental method and 
it “arose in reflection on the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica”2.  In 
using a ‘scientific’ method to ground ‘science’ Kant’s circulus becomes even more 
obvious. Specifically, Cohen invites the reader to think of the issue in the following, 
strictly critical terms: since Kant derives the forms of intuition, space and time, and 
the categories, the pure concepts of the understanding, from Newton’s system of 
principles, what is it that prevents Kant from simply lapsing back in justifying the 
validity of that system of principles onto their already proved status?
3
 Is Kant not 
trapped in a circle where he seems to be assuming the validity and legitimacy of 
precisely what he is trying to prove? 
 
The way out of the circle –and into transcendental philosophy–, for Cohen, 
resides in the following two considerations. It resides, first, in properly recognising 
the propaedeutic and provisory character of the science in question. Indeed, 
metaphysics alone cannot answer the question of whether the general validity of 
scientific principles needs to be presupposed or proved in the first place. Instead, a 
transcendental and propaedeutic science should complement metaphysics so as for the 
two of them, taken together, to be able to address the task. Since metaphysics “has 
                                                            
1 Cohen, Hermann. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, Berlin, 1885, p. 63. 
2 Ibid. p. 67. 
3 “Space, time, motion, mass, cause, force and inertia are named and explained by Newton, and the 
foundations of physics are indicated in these terms” Ibid. p. 67. 
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only a relative, provisory value insofar as its results are concerned” 4 , it needs 
transcendental philosophy because only the latter shows that the “elements of 
consciousness are elements of cognising consciousness, which are sufficient and 
necessary to establish and ground the fact of science” 5 . Thus, metaphysics 
necessarily leads to transcendental inquiry since the grounding task of metaphysics 
can only realise itself in transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy, in 
turn, ought to be recognised as merely paving the way for a metaphysics of 
experience qua science. Cohen would probably say that this is what Kant had in mind 
when, in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, he somewhat ominously 
announced that “a complete reform or rather rebirth [eine neue Geburt] of 
metaphysics, according to a plan completely unknown before now, is inevitably 
approaching” 6 . In having provided the transcendental propaedeutic and having 
recognised its provisory character, that is, one should see that the metaphysical way 
lies ahead. 
 
The way out of the circle, however, resides also in being able to identify the 
presuppositions that motivate the transcendental endeavour. Recognising 
transcendental philosophy’s propaedeutic character is without a doubt fundamental if 
one is to understand the aim and the scope of Kant’s critical project and a lot more 
will be said about this later. But it is equally as fundamental to recognise the 
presuppositions that led Kant to formulate such a project if it will be understood 
systematically. Cohen states this second consideration, in fact, by opening Kant’s 
Theory of Experience thus:  “The study of Kant requires knowledge of its 
presuppositions”7 . The statement, undoubtedly correct as to its form, is Cohen’s 
succinct way of saying that understanding Kant’s ambitions in the transcendental 
project, especially as it is constructed in the first Critique, requires that one be 
familiar with the ‘the fixed point’ from which the project departs. The ‘fixed point’ 
for Cohen is, as briefly mentioned before, Newton’s system of principles. According 
to Cohen, if one is to understand Kant systematically, then one “must determine this 
stable point from which Kant departs more specifically and with which the 
                                                            
4 And Cohen goes on saying “The metaphysical discussion cannot contain the answer as to whether, 
for instance, causation suffices, or whether it has to be assumed that consciousness possesses a 
purposive element” Ibid. p. 77. 
5 Ibid. p. 77. 
6 (AA 4:257) Kant’s works will be referenced using the standard Akademieausgabe pagination of the 
Prussian Academy of Sciences. The only exception is the Critique of Pure Reason that will be 
referenced using the conventional A- and B- pagination. For a complete list of Kant’s works cited, see 
list of Kant’s works referenced at the end. For translations used, see Bibliography. 
7 Cohen, Hermann. Op. Cit. p.1. 
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reconstruction of his thoughts is to begin. This fixed point is the fact [Tatsache] of the 
science founded by Newton”8. Kant’s presupposition as to what nature is, and nature 
is nothing but a system of principles on Cohen’s account9, provides the fixed point 
from which one can depart in the reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental project. 
 
Although Cohen is correct that transcendental philosophy ought to be 
understood as propaedeutic, and although he is further correct in stating that one 
ought to know the presuppositions of that propaedeutic in order to understand Kant’s 
general endeavour, there is nonetheless a different way of understanding the content 
of these two desiderata that does not necessarily overlap with that of Cohen. This is to 
say, in other words, that there is a way of meeting these two demands that does not 
necessarily entail one’s commitment to Cohen’s reading of Kant unreservedly. It can 
be argued, as an example that would meet the first desideratum, that transcendental 
philosophy ought indeed to be understood as a propaedeutic, but that such a 
propaedeutic is not necessarily indexed to any special metaphysical domain. It can 
likewise be argued, as an example that would meet the second desideratum, that the 
presuppositions one must be familiar with have less to do with Newton’s system of 
principles and more to do with the limits of a Leibnizian physical monadology. In 
sum, one can acknowledge the demands brought forward by Cohen as legitimate, 
while nonetheless rejecting Cohen’s way of meeting those demands.  
 
Regarding the first point, or whether transcendental philosophy should be 
understood as a propaedeutic, it helps to think of the distinction Kant draws, in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, between general and special 
metaphysics
10
. General metaphysics concerns itself with the most abstract level of 
synthetic a priori knowledge and with the general propositions of pure reason. 
Special metaphysics, in contrast, concerns itself with the realisation of synthetic a 
priori propositions in that it furnishes, by means of examples, those propositions as 
they are applied to, e.g. a doctrine of body. If general metaphysics deals with the 
general problem of pure reason, namely, the possibility of synthetic a priori 
                                                            
8 Ibid. p. 55. 
9  Cohen thinks ‘experience’ [Erfahrung] does exactly that: “experience must count as the total 
expression of every fact and method of scientific cognition, with the exclusion of ethics, to which the 
philosophical question has to be directed. Kant sets out from the word experience in this 
encompassing, as it were encyclopaedic sense: he seeks to determine the concept of it as the concept of 
the cognition of nature” Ibid. p. 59. 
10 (AA 4:478) 
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judgments
11
, special metaphysics deals with the application of these judgments to 
specific domains of reason. Unlike general metaphysics, the ground of which is pure 
reason, “[m]etaphysica specialis has as its ground either sensation or feeling”12. If 
that ground is sensation, then the result is a metaphysics of nature; but if that ground 
is feeling, then the result is a metaphysics of morals. This implies that constraining 
the domain of general metaphysics, or transcendental philosophy, to solely one of the 
(relatively) restricted domains of each of the aforementioned special metaphysics is 
simply not possible
13
. But, to the extent that philosophy is concerned not only with 
pure concepts, but also with their application, general metaphysics or transcendental 
philosophy must have the preparatory character mentioned by Cohen. Hence, 
although it is true that transcendental philosophy has a provisory character, it is also 
true that it need not be dependent on any given special metaphysics –natural or 
otherwise. 
 
This leads to the second point –as to whether knowledge of Kant’s 
presuppositions means solely knowledge of the ‘fixed point’ provided by Newton’s 
system of principles–. The problematic nature of the relation Kant had to Newton’s 
system has been noted before with respect to Kant’s rejection of the law of inertia14 
and the further rejection of absolute space
15
. Concerning the latter, the relation 
between Kant and Newton is problematic not only because Kant’s arguments against 
both Newtonian absolute space and Leibnizian relational space shifted through time, 
but also because of Kant’s position on the matter is radically different from Newton’s 
(and Leibniz’s). Thus, while in the 1768 essay On the Ultimate Ground for the 
Differentiation of Directions in Space Kant uses the incongruent counterparts 
argument to show the non-relationality of space
16
, by the time of the 1770 
Dissertation he attacks the Newtonian notion of absolute space as being merely an 
                                                            
11 (B19); (A10-16/B24-30); (AA 4:276) 
12 (AA 18:11) 
13 It is interesting to note, also, that to the extent the general metaphysics concerns itself with pure 
reason, it cannot be said that its domain is reducible to the Analytic of the Critique. An argument for 
this can be found in (Ch. IV, intro, pp. 136-146). 
14 Watkins, Eric. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2005, pp. 104-111.See also: (AA 1:139ff) 
15 Earman, John. World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space and 
Time. MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1989, pp. 137-153 (viz. pp. 150-152). 
16 (AA 2:377ff) The incongruent counterparts argument states, basically, that one would be unable to 
determine a right from a left hand if one were to think of space as relational simply because the two 
mirror each other. Since it is obvious to all, however, that there is a difference between a right and a 
left hand, claims Kant, then space must not be relational. Any two equal and overall similar shapes that 
cannot be enclosed in the same limits serve to prove the point that their differentiation will only be 
possible in reference to an absolute framework and not, as Leibniz would want it, a relational one. 
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‘empty fabrication of reason that pertains to fable’17. One might then think that in the 
1768 essay Kant could then have been presupposing absolute space as a departure 
point, as perhaps Cohen does, but this seems to be directly contradicted by the closing 
remarks of the text where Kant claims that “(…) absolute space is not an object of 
external sensations, but rather a fundamental concept, which makes all these 
sensations possible in the first place”18. All this comes to show is that, in some way, 
the so-called ‘fixed point’ of Newton’s system of principles is not necessarily fixed 
and is not necessarily a point, either. Of course this does not mean Kant was in the 
business of rejecting Newtonian physics altogether, for there is overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, but it does mean that the presuppositions one should be 
familiar with when engaging with Kant are not reducible to the Principia. 
 
What the previous considerations amount to should be clear: one may very 
well grant that transcendental philosophy ought to be understood as a propaedeutic 
and that knowledge of that propaedeutic’s presuppositions are indispensable 
requirements for understanding the critical project systematically. But granting these 
two demands should not be committing eo ipso to the specific content Cohen attaches 
to them. Instead, these two desiderata can be kept in view only enough as to orientate 
one’s thought in a slightly different direction. Thus, granting both, i.e. the 
propaedeutic nature of Kant’s meta-philosophy, or what is also called Architectonic19, 
and knowledge of the presuppositions that lie at its basis, should in this sense shed 
light on the main motivations for this investigation. The first motivation for the 
present investigation is not to ask how, or in what way, time is related to any given 
special metaphysics but rather how, or in what way, time is related to general 
metaphysics or transcendental philosophy
20
. The second motivation for this 
investigation, likewise, is to ask about the presuppositions that allowed Kant to 
articulate a robust theory of time in relation to cognition. Stated differently, the 
following inquiry will not only try to clarify the role of time in transcendental 
                                                            
17 (AA 2:404) 
18 (AA 2:383) 
19 “In all sciences, especially of reason, the idea of the science, its universal synopsis, its outline of the 
extent of all cognitions, and consequently the whole thereof, is the first thing that must be sought. This 
is architectonic” (AA 16:537). Kant is not the first one to identify general metaphysics and 
architectonic: “Ontology (ontosophia, metaphysics, universal metaphysics, architectonic, first 
philosophy) is the science of the more general predicates of a being” (Baumgarten, Metaphysics, I.i. 
§4). 
20 The myriad ways in which Kant refers to what has hitherto been called a ‘propaedeutic’ should not 
cloud this important point: pure philosophy, transcendental philosophy, critique, general metaphysics, 
and ontology are in what follows taken to signify more or less the same thing, i.e. the science that 
concerns itself with the possibility and limits of synthetic a priori knowledge (Vid. Ch. I. pp. 44-45). 
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philosophy but also try to justify why it is time, and not something else, that must 
have that specific role. It will therefore not come as a surprise if this investigation is 
characterised as an attempt to answer to a Heideggerian challenge. Formulated at its 
most overarching level, formulation that will be developed shortly, the challenge 
consists in that Heidegger rightly claims, initially, that Kant makes way for a general 
metaphysics the likes of which cannot be found before (or after)
21
. But Heidegger 
claims, further, that Kant was unable to carry the general metaphysical project 
through because of a commitment to special metaphysics of the Newtonian kind that 
prevented him from realising the depth of his own philosophy. 
 
 Kant and Plato, exclusively according to Heidegger, saw and understood that 
‘being’ (in the first designated as ‘reason’, in the second designated as ‘what is’) is 
that which must be given beforehand for the given to arise as what it is
22
. This put 
Kant, in Heidegger’s reading, at the centre of the problem of transcendence, namely, 
at the centre of the problem of justifying the possibility of there being an a priori 
contentful correlate to the forms of the understanding
23
. What Kant calls the matter of 
appearance, Heidegger calls the ‘content’ [Wasgehalt] or the ‘real’ [das Reale] of 
appearance
24
. Unlike in the case of the Marburg School, for Heidegger’s Kant this 
‘real’, however, is not something to which one attaches the orderability of the forms 
of intuition a posteriori
25
. In fact, what makes Kant (and Plato) unique, in a way, is 
the soundly demonstrated thesis of the first Critique: that thinking can think a priori 
contentful thoughts. But if this is going to be upheld by Kant, by Heidegger’s 
standards, then intuition in itself must entail an a priori content. To Heidegger it is 
clear that the pure forms of intuition are not merely the modes in which intuition 
intuits but are, also, that which is intuited
26
. If this is the case, then Kant’s general 
metaphysical endeavour at the very least manages to get off the ground: if general 
metaphysics should concern itself with anything, it should first and foremost concern 
itself with the problem of transcendence or the question of how is object-relatedness 
possible. 
 
                                                            
21 (GA 2, p.23) Heidegger’s Works will be referenced using the standard Gesamtausgabe edition. For a 
list of Heidegger’s references see Bibliography at the end. 
22 (GA 25, p.45) 
23 (GA 25, p. 106) 
24 (GA 25, p. 102) 
25 (GA 25, p. 105) 
26 (GA 25, pp.110-111) Cf. “Absolute time is empty intuition” (Reflexionen, II, 413) cited in Dietrich, 
Albert J. Kants Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum-Zeitlehre und das Verhältnis zu Leibniz Olms 
Verlag, Zurich, 1997, p. 6 and (AA 2:401-402). 
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 This is no small endeavour, in Heidegger’s view, but it is not sufficient either. 
The ‘answer’ to this problem came in the form of a ‘deduction’ for Kant: “The 
explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I call 
a transcendental deduction”27. But the issue Heidegger sees here is that the framing 
of the question is inadequate. Kant asks how concepts completely pertaining to the 
understanding can relate a priori to objects instead of asking, more adequately, about 
the categories’ innermost possibility in their object-relatedness. Kant misses in this 
sense the problem of transcendence because he severs the categories’ relation to the 
forms of intuition –especially to time 28 . In other words the problem resides, in 
Heidegger’s view, in Kant’s conception of the a priori insofar as the latter resides 
absolutely within an assumed subject as completely detached from objects: “a 
transcendence-free conception [Auffassung] of the a priori”29. This, in turn, forced 
Kant to pursue the problem in juridical terms:  a quaestio juris, Heidegger thinks, that 
ends up yielding a single form of validity justifiable only within the one science that 
is ‘general’ only nominally30. Famously, in treading the path of the quaestio juris as 
opposed to the path of the innermost possibility of object-relatedness, Kant had to 
drop the idea that the two sources of knowledge, intuition and understanding, might 
stem from a common rhizome, that is to say, “Kant recoiled from the unknown 
root”31. 
 
 Conceiving of transcendence thus has for Heidegger a further problematic 
implication apart from missing a sufficient justification for object-relatedness: if 
metaphysics is ‘science’ then it must reduce itself to one sole domain of being. In 
Heideggerian terms, through objectification, scientific comportment as such is 
constituted
32
 because through objectification beings become objects. This means that 
science will have no option but to reduce itself to beings without paying due heed for 
being as such: “Bringing entities [Seiende] as entities to the light becomes the sole 
                                                            
27 (A85/B117) 
28 (GA 25, pp. 309-313) This is not an accusation that occurs in isolation. Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, A Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, and Logic: The Question of Truth, all bear numerous claims that 
Heidegger makes in the same lines. 
29 (GA 25, p. 315) 
30 Since, Heidegger cites Kant, only general metaphysics or ontology is “that science which makes out 
a system of all concepts of understanding and principles but only insofar as they relate to objects, to 
which a sense can be given and which thus can be confirmed by experience” (AA 20:260). 
31 (GA 3, p. 161) 
32 (GA 25, p. 19). 
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and proper task”33. This is to say that science originates in the objectification of a 
domain of entities or in the unfolding of an understanding of the constitution of the 
being of each one of the entities in question
34
. What Kant had in mind when speaking 
of ‘objects’, according to Heidegger, is that and nothing more: in order for something 
to become the object of science, even if such an object is being itself, for Kant it must 
be determined and be thought of in advance as the kind of something that can be 
disclosed, and perhaps even constituted, within the bounds of calculation and 
computation. Nature must, therefore, be circumscribed as what it is in advance, i.e. a 
closed system of locomotion of matter in time: “From here on, nature must be 
projected in its mathematical constitution” 35 . In Heidegger’s notoriously laconic 
words, Kant thereby confines himself to a scientific metaphysics of presence
36
. 
 
The answer to this challenge, as will be made manifest in the following 
investigation, is that although Heidegger is right in the departing premise, he is 
nonetheless wrong in what he derives from it. It will be argued, that is, that the 
critical project as a whole is indeed concerned with developing a general metaphysics 
of the transcendental kind that works as a propaedeutic to any possible special 
metaphysics. It will be argued further, however, that from this it does not follow that 
Kant must have therefore been committed to elaborating a general metaphysics that 
would only come to fruition in justifying a specific special metaphysics –Newtonian 
or otherwise. Heidegger’s claim that Kant’s commitment to a determinate, paradigm-
dependent special metaphysics led him to substantialise every thing
37
 (including what 
could not and should not be substantialised) will be contested by taking Heidegger’s 
objections seriously and bringing them into question. It will be argued that the only 
reason why Kant can ask about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is, 
precisely, because he thinks that natural entities are an insufficient ground for 
                                                            
33 (GA 25, p. 28) “Being” Heidegger had claimed in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology “is not 
itself a being” but, rather, “Being is always the being of beings” (GA 24, p. 22). This means, as 
Heidegger goes on to make clear, that being itself is not reducible to any one entity including, but not 
limited to, the most general predicate attributable to entities overall (GA 2, pp. 2-8). 
34 (GA 25, p. 20) 
35 (GA 25, p. 31) 
36 (GA 21, p. 356) 
37 Because there is no representation of time as a whole, Heidegger thinks, Kant must claim that the 
sensible depiction of substance, persistence, is itself the representation of time. Cf. (A182/B226). One 
must, in other words, highlight that what, via synthesis, has been determined as substratum 
(ὑποκείμενον). Formulated in a summarised, and yet technical way, the synthesis speciosa is for 
Heidegger an allowing oneself to be encountered by that what remains against the backdrop ‘pre-
viewed basis on which’ as the ‘what’ that it is: ”Die Zeit als vorgängig-ständiges Begegnenlassen läßt, 
weil sie sich un-thematisch zu sich selbst verhält, das Das als selbiges zu jeder Zeit begegnen“ (GA 
21:400). This in turn yields that whatever may be represented, is represented only inasmuch as it 
persists. 
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deriving the validity of objectivity. Kant must, and indeed does, appeal to a prior 
something that must be in place in order for experience to take place at all. The prior 
something is, as the Aesthetic and the Analytic show, the pure concepts of the 
understanding and the forms of intuition. The categorial is, in fact, sufficient ground 
for deriving the validity of objectivity but only once it has been set in relation to the 
Principles by means of the Schematism (and therefore set in relation to time, as the 
basic form of intuition). In this regard, this investigation’s focus on time as the 
primary form of intuition is far from accidental. It answers, instead, to the fact that 
only in being able to understand the whole range of implications of Kant’s theses on 
time, does one come to understand the scope of Kant’s general metaphysical project. 
For experience to be possible at all, intuition as well as judgments, categories, 
schemata, and principles must be articulated as delimiting a field of objectivity. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that if enough attention is paid to the second and third 
Critiques and the role time plays in both of these, one realises that Kant did not 
narrow ‘general validity’ to natural entities as understood in the first Critique but, 
rather, opened up the general validity to other modes of being that do not necessarily 
overlap with what Heidegger calls ‘presence’38. The argument elaborated in what 
follows will conclude positively by stating that Kant’s general metaphysics are indeed 
wide enough to accommodate other modes of being that are, in turn, irreducible to 
mere substance but only wide enough as to do so problematically. 
  
To this end, Chapter I of this dissertation will be concerned with adequately 
locating and understanding the unity of the Kantian project understood as general 
metaphysics and transcendental logic. Briefly and concretely, in this chapter it will be 
argued that no coherent philosophical interpretation of Kant’s critical project can be 
constructed that does not have object-relatedness, or the problem of transcendence, as 
one of its central themes. In light of the general thesis of this chapter, the first part 
will be concerned with addressing some of the contemporary readings of Kant that 
tend to focus on, sometimes solely on, the epistemological aspects of the Critique of 
                                                            
38 “’Being equals perception’, when interpreted in original phenomenological terms, means: being 
equals presence, praesens. At the same time, it thus turns out that Kant interprets being and being-
existent exactly as ancient philosophy does, for which that which is, is the hypokeimenon [substratum], 
which has the character of ousia” (GA 24, p. 448). There is a dear price to be paid for equating the 
horizon of intelligibility of Being in general with the temporal present, Heidegger thinks. This is why 
Taylor Carman states: “For although Kant may have succeeded in overcoming the traditional 
theocentric conception of knowledge, Heidegger insists that he never abandoned the ancient 
metaphysical interpretation of being as presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Prasenz)” (Carman, Taylor.  
Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, Cambridge UP, 
Cambridge, 2008, pp. 33-34) where ‘presence’ is understood as “the horizon of the present” (Carman, 
Taylor “Heidegger’s Concept of Presence” in Inquiry, 1995, 38:4, 431-453, p. 444). 
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Pure Reason and the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Perhaps Butts’ dictum 
exemplifies this best: “Metaphysicians used to delude themselves that they could tell 
us what is worth seeking to know by telling us first what is. After Kant, 
epistemologists and methodologists tell us what is a consequence of what is worth 
seeking to know. Thus the norms of knowing define the norms of being. Ontology 
follows epistemology”39. Against the tendency to read Kant in a way that seems to 
leave important philosophical insights completely untouched it will be shown that, by 
overemphasising Kant’s theory of knowledge, some commentators are unable to 
account for the possibility of a transcendental logic –logic, that is, that cannot 
sacrifice its relation to objects–. 
 
This will be complemented, in the second part, by arguing in favour of the 
continuity and cohesion of Kant’s critical project. If the case is that the worry about a 
transcendental logic, and with it a general metaphysics, is not one that can be 
dispensed with without thereby threatening to collapse the entirety of Kant’s critical 
project, then it must also be the case that Kant must have explicitly addressed the 
problem of object-relatedness. By looking at several writings, some Critical, some 
pre-Critical, the need to inquire into the possibility of a general metaphysics will 
become obvious. The argument in this regard will not only show that constructing a 
propaedeutic, understood as transcendental philosophy, is a theme common to the 
writings of mid-1770s, 1780s, and early 1790s, it will further show that such 
endeavour is the essential one in this period of Kant’s thinking –especially in relation 
to the way in which Kant’s theses about time and the temporal evolved. But to the 
extent that constructing a logic that is transcendental cannot dispense with object-
relatedness, it will be concluded, such transcendental effort cannot under any 
circumstance dispense with intuition, especially temporal intuition, and the role the 
latter plays in the constitution of experience. 
 
Following from this, Chapter II will narrow down on the priority and essence 
of time. The previous chapter’s conclusion states that transcendental philosophy 
cannot get off the ground unless intuition, as such, is factored into the apparatus of 
experience. In the current chapter, however, it is argued more narrowly that not 
intuition in general, but the form of inner sense, specifically, is the primary conditio 
sine que non of experience in general and is that which cannot be forfeited in tackling 
                                                            
39 Butts, Robert E. Kant and the Double Government Methodology. Reidel Publishing Co, Boston, 
1984, p. 14. 
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the problem of transcendence. The first section is therefore devoted to arguing in 
favour of the priority of time as the most fundamental form of intuition. There is little 
doubt in that Kant states unequivocally that there are two forms of intuition and that 
they are mutually irreducible to each other. This section’s aim nonetheless is not to 
argue in favour of space, or spatial properties, to be reducible to time. Instead, the aim 
is to show that time, and not space, accounts for the entirety of intuition and, 
moreover, that time provides the self with a manifold in intuition a priori. In response 
to an early Maimon criticism, the echo of which has re-emerged under several 
different guises in contemporary Kantian literature (e.g. Arthur Collins or Markos 
Valaris), it will be concluded that the manifold of inner sense, simply put, is richer 
than the manifold of outer sense
40
. Thus, the first section is divided in turn into two 
subsections. The first subsection presents an argument in favour of the logical priority 
of inner sense: Time is logically prior to space insofar as it is the form of all 
representation whatsoever. Since space itself must be represented prior to any 
particular representations which emerge within it, then, it must be the case that the 
intuition of time logically precedes that of space. The second subsection is concerned 
with presenting yet another argument, at a separate level, concerning the ontological 
priority of inner sense: Time is also ontologically prior to space insofar as it is the 
immediate product of the activity of the subject. Since the receptivity of anything in 
space presupposes the subject’s capacity of being affected somehow, then, it must be 
the case that time is prior to space insofar as it time enables that subject’s affectivity. 
It will be concluded from this that, to be affected even by space itself, time must have 
taken a hold of the subject. 
 
The second section of this second chapter builds on the previous conclusion 
by asking what the essence of time is. When speaking of ‘essence’ in the context of 
Kantian philosophy, though, one needs to tread carefully since, building on a 
distinction that is drawn in several different writings
41
, Kant explicitly denies that the 
‘real’ essence of time can be known. Instead, Kant claims in a letter to Reinhold from 
1789 that only the ‘logical’ essence of time can be known42. Asking about the logical 
                                                            
40 Solomon Maimon denies this, in a letter to Kant from the 30th of November, 1792, on several 
grounds one of which is that “The diversity of outer appearances is represented in time only if it is not 
represented in space, and vice versa” (AA 11:393). For a contemporary version of Maimon’s point 
see: Collins, Arthur. Possible Experience. University of California Press, L.A., 1999, pp. 107-120. And 
Valaris, Markos. “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason” in Philosophers’ Imprint, Volume 8, No.4, May, 2008.  
41 Vid. (AA 28:49); (AA 24: 116 [Logik Blomberg]); (AA 29:820)  
42 (AA 11:37) 
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essence of time will entail looking closely at the arguments Kant presents in the 
Aesthetic and how these arguments further articulate with the various elements at 
stake in cognition. The logical essence of time, its primitive constitutiva and 
attributes, will be found in the analysis
43
 of time itself and its relation to experience. 
The role time plays in Kant’s transcendental deduction will, therefore, be examined 
closely. It will be argued that for experience to be such, a unity of experience needs to 
be posited. Time, insofar as it is a unitary and pure indeterminate intuition, operates 
as the warrant for the possibility of the unity of experience through the various 
subjective faculties in general and through the transcendental power of imagination in 
particular. It will be derived from this that the power of imagination provides the 
subject with the possibility of merging the past-ness of the past with the future-ness 
of the future as to allow representations to endure –and thus allows the subject to 
bring the heterogeneous together: concepts and intuitions. Following from that, it will 
be argued that the transition from the unity of consciousness to the consciousness of 
unity occurs, first and foremost, as the emergence of the possibility of being affected 
by oneself. If the transcendental unity of apperception is understood in its ad-
[p]perceptive character, that is, in its relation to objects, then, the pure intuition of 
time can be nothing but the unity against which individual temporal states are 
outlined and through which the subject generates its own affectivity (following from 
the argument in the previous section).  
 
Since the previous discussion on the essence of time brings about several 
questions –chief amongst which is the question about the role of time in the 
constitution of objectivity, Chapter III, in turn, will look at time determination in 
considerable detail. It is argued here, generally, that in answer to the problem of how 
objectivity comes to be constituted, Kant responds displaying the general structure of 
sensibilisation of pure concepts i.e. the structure of the processes of sensibilisation 
that make up the whole within which objectivity arises. In the first section it is seen 
that, although Kant would abandon the terminology associated with affinity that 
occurs in the A-Edition of the Transcendental Deduction by the time the B-Edition 
was published, there are nonetheless good reasons to avoid disregarding the affinity 
argument. By looking into affinity, association, and combination, it will be seen that 
Kant sought to provide a justification for the regularity of appearances. The transition 
from the unity of consciousness to the consciousness of unity involves three 
                                                            
43 Kant associates real essence to synthetic judgment and logical essence to analytic judgment (AA 
11:36-38). 
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differentiable conditions that are nonetheless related one to the other. These are: first, 
that the unity of apperception be able to bestow its own identity upon appearances; 
second, that those appearances be relatable to one another; and third, that a subjective 
link amongst them be possible. It will be concluded here that the power of 
imagination provides the self with the possibility of conducting all of the former 
inasmuch as it is the only faculty that partakes in the receptivity of sensibility and the 
spontaneity of the understanding.  
 
Although the affinity doctrine is not given much continuity by Kant, the rules 
in accordance with which the transcendental power of the imagination provides the 
three conditions mentioned above for relating an object to itself, an object to other 
objects, and an object to thought, are the pure concepts of the understanding. But if 
these rules are going to achieve objective validity, then they need to be provided with 
a sensible condition in intuition for their application. It needs to be shown, in 
Novalis’ words, that “The actual objects [Gegenstände] only fasten the endless 
variations in the shapes [Gestaltungen] of space and time through the power of 
imagination. They fasten the schemata through ‘filling’ with reluctant, abiding mass 
in a synthesis of the I and the not-I”44. The second section of this chapter is therefore 
concerned with the sensibilisation and determination of the categories to the extent 
that they require a sensible condition that will constrain their applicability to specific 
objects. It is argued here, in what is perhaps the main section of this Dissertation, that 
not only the sensibilised portrayal of the pure concepts of the understanding in the 
Schematism and the Principles secures the provision of sensibilised content in virtue 
of the schemata being time determinations; it is argued, furthermore, that the 
‘architectonic’ division that Kant adopts in order to present them answers to the same 
mathematical/dynamical distinction that guided the metaphysical deduction. An 
extremely important consequence of the argument developed in this chapter is that a 
justification can be provided for the numerical disparity, or structural asymmetry, 
between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories and the Doctrine of 
Schematism and the Analytic of Principles. The literature has missed, with the 
notable exception of Monck (and to a lesser extent Caird), that whereas the 
metaphysical deduction of the categories from the four kinds of judgments yields 
twelve concepts of the understanding, there are only eight schemata and only as many 
                                                            
44 (Novalis, Werke, II:220) 
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explicitly stated principles
45
. The reading elaborated here has the advantage of not 
only allowing one to raise the question as to why there is this asymmetry, but of 
answering the question. I propose that the Schematism and the Principles, just as 
much as judgments and categories, answer to a division between the mathematical 
and the dynamical: for mathematical judgments and categories only one schema and 
one principle is necessary because they are constitutive of experience overall; for 
dynamical judgments and categories, however, a specification is needed of three 
schemata and three more principles each because, here, no constitution at all, but 
regulation of the existence of objects of experience takes place. 
 
Finally, after the somewhat minute analyses of the Schematism doctrine 
carried out before, in Chapter IV the philosophical question will be significantly 
broadened and the opening up of the validity entailed by the conception of time 
developed throughout this investigation will be addressed. It will be seen that, when 
facing the question of whether there is such a thing as an uncategorised schema, Kant 
must adopt either one –but not both, of two possible answers. In this limited sense, 
and to the extent that the question about an uncategorised schema is legitimate for 
Kantian philosophy, the structure of this chapter can be thought of as a dilemma: 
either Kant agrees with the possibility of an uncategorised schema or he renounces 
the thesis that time is radically subjective and universal. The path that takes the first 
horn of the dilemma is characterised as the weaker of the two insofar as it concludes 
affirmatively as to the possibility of an uncategorised time determination but it claims 
for it a constitutive status only for reflective judgment. The first section of this 
chapter is devoted to reconstructing this option by attending to the role that time plays 
in the second and third Critiques. Summarily, the argument there states that in virtue 
of time being primarily self-affection, and in virtue of the fact that to appear means to 
be an object of sensible intuition
46
, no appearance whatsoever can occur exempt from 
the condition of time
47
. This claim in itself would, after the preceding chapters, be 
somewhat trivial if it were not complemented by the fact that “appearances can 
certainly [allerdings] be given in intuition independently of functions of the 
                                                            
45 Kant himself seems to hint explicitly at this division in a letter to Schulz from November, 1788, 
when he says: “But insofar as specific magnitudes (quanta) are to be determined in accordance with 
this [pure intellectual synthesis], they must be given to us in such a way that we can apprehend their 
intuition successively; and this this apprehension is subject to the condition of time” (AA 10:557). 
46 (Bxxvi) 
47 Perhaps clearer still in Metaphysik L: “Every appearance is, as representation in the mind, under the 
form of inner sense, which is time. Every representation is so constituted that the mind goes through it 
in time; that is, the mind expounds the appearance, thus, every appearance is expoundable” (AA 28: 
202 [Metaphysik L]). 
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understanding”48. From this it is inferred that although all appearances are in time, 
not all are subordinated to the rules of the pure concepts of the understanding. So, if 
appearances can appear independently of the functions of judgment, but all 
appearances are in time, then there must be some things present to the mind that 
although being temporal, are nonetheless uncategorised. The question elaborated 
here, in discussion with Franks and Tuschling, is whether Kant can then produce a 
principle that would govern the appearing of these, temporal but undetermined 
appearances. According to the weaker path, the answer to this is affirmative in that 
such representations may be judged in regulative terms only and in accordance with a 
principle that exhibits the pure image of future orientation: purposiveness. The first 
path therefore suggests that the principle is indeed possible –and actual, as a 
constitutive principle but only for reflective judgment; that the principle is the law-
likeness of nature’s behaviour in the diversity of its laws manifest in purposiveness; 
and that the principle’s relation to time just is that of a quasi-schematic exhibition 
[Darstellung] of the latter’s futural orientation. The imagination, in this case, 
hypotypically provides the form of the sought-for principle by exhibiting time 
symbolically. 
 
In the second section of this last chapter, however, the second horn of the 
dilemma is elaborated by looking into the Opus Postumum. There seem to be good 
reasons for avoiding the first, weaker path: the principle of purposiveness, although 
constitutive, is only so for reflective and not for determining judgment
49
. This means 
that the use of the principle of purposiveness will be limited to instances where the 
theoretical means of cognition fail to suffice in accounting for the object in question. 
But this poses a serious problem for transcendental philosophy: it is impossible to 
determine a priori when the principle of purposiveness will be adequate for judgment 
and this jeopardises in the best case, or completely undermines in the worst, any 
special metaphysics that will want to be based on it. In answer to a question such as 
                                                            
48  (A90/B122) The whole fragment, in different translation, reads: “Appearances could … be so 
constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and 
everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would 
offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, 
so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. 
Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the 
functions of thinking” (A90-91). 
49 (AA 5:169); (AA 5:181-186) There is, of course, an important question concerning the kind of 
relation that determining and reflective judgment have to each other. This will be addressed in Chapter 
IV and, to an extent, in the Conclusions. For further reading see Hughes, Fiona. Kant’s Aesthetic 
Epistemology: Form and World. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007, and Guyer, Paul. Kant 
and the Claims of Taste, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1997. 
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when is one supposed to grasp an object according to the principle of purposiveness, 
the reply can go no further than ‘when the object thus demands it’. But this is not 
satisfactory by Transcendental Philosophy’s standards. In the previous answer 
nothing prevents the diversity of empirical laws that should become unified under one 
purposive principle from multiplying endlessly –and this would imply the 
impossibility of a unified system of philosophy in the first place
50
. In response to this, 
the second horn of the dilemma, i.e. renouncing the subjectivity and universality of 
time, is presented. Indeed, the second path that can be taken will state that the 
principle is not only possible but necessary –and therefore actual, too, that the 
principle is the articulation of motions of forces in a world-system, and that the 
principle’s relation to time is given by the unity of the empirical laws that constitute 
the entirety of the world-system
51
 as stemming from the unity of subjectivity. It will 
be argued, with Förster and Mathieu, that the schema of the world-system 
presupposes abandoning the subjectivity of time and even the notion that time is 
constrained to being a form of intuition. Instead, in tilting, if not eradicating 
altogether, the distinction between what is ‘in us’ and ‘out of us’, between the 
intellectual and the sensible, Kant confirms his commitment to an objective becoming 
the nature of which hardly seems justifiable within transcendental philosophy. 
 
In Book XV of the Metamorphoses, Ovid wrote that “[a]ll things flow, and 
are formed as a fleeting image (…) for what was before is left behind; what was not 
comes to be; and each moment is renewed”52. The lines seem to capture relatively 
well Kant’s general philosophical conception of time and temporality: in forming or 
imagining –what is an image if not a product of the imagination? –, activity at the 
very root of thinking, one commits to transience. This means, in turn, that the activity 
of affecting oneself opens up, for our faculty of representation, temporal variations in 
connection to past, present, and future horizons that, although ultimately coming to be 
unified in time’s uni-dimensionality, justify nonetheless that the subject be an object 
for itself and that things be objects for the subject. If that holds, then a secure ground 
for transcending solipsism must have been found –and, thus, a secure ground for 
constructing a transcendental propaedeutic. In relation to this last point, it will 
                                                            
50 Because one would end up not with a ‘system’, properly speaking, but only with what Kant calls in 
the Metaphysik Mrongovius an ‘aggregate’ of laws (AA 29:805-806). See also: (AA 18:284); 
(AA18:286). 
51 Lichtenberg had stated, perhaps ironically, that “Da der Mensch toll werden kann, so sehe ich nicht 
ein, warum es ein Welsystem nicht auch werden kann” [J854].  
52 “Cuncta fluunt, omnisque vagans formatur imago (…)/nam quod fuit ante, relictum est,/fitque quod 
haud fuerat, momentaque cuncta novantur” (Ovid. Metamorphoses 15.178-185). 
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become clear in the course of this investigation that the greatest effort will be devoted 
to two questions that answer to Cohen’s demands as reconstructed above: what 
exactly is the role of time in Kant’s general metaphysics when the latter is understood 
as a propaedeutic? And, can general metaphysics be ‘general’ in any meaningful 
sense if it fails to account for all that may be provided as representation in intuition? 
It will be seen, in answering these, that the presupposition that grounds daring to ask 
the questions is not foreign to critical philosophy itself, but rather internal to it –that, 
perhaps following the letter too closely, “[w]hat reason produces entirely out of 
itself”, as Kant writes in the Preface to the first edition of the first Critique, “cannot 
be concealed, but is brought to light through reason itself”53. 
 
                                                            
53 “(…) weil, was Vernunft gänzlich aus sich selbst hervorbringt, sich nicht verstecken kann, sondern 
selbst durch Vernunft ans licht gebracht wird (…)” (AAxx). 
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Chapter I 
  
Acknowledging the fundamental role time plays in Kant’s critical philosophy 
is indispensable for understanding transcendental idealism. Conversely, 
understanding the nature of Kant’s critical project, if not simple, is likewise an 
indispensable task if one is to delve into Kant’s conception of time. Locating, even, 
the exact position ‘critique’ adopts, and the role it plays, in light of Kant’s general 
architectonic becomes immediately problematic when one fails to consider the origin 
and development of such a vast endeavour. Inquiring as to whether the Critique of 
Pure Reason, for example, is supposed to be some kind of foundational project that 
deals with the origins of knowledge, and if so, what it is foundational of, remain, to a 
large extent, questions in need of an answer. Furthermore, that Kant insists on the 
‘propaedeutic’ character of the Critique does not come to simplify matters in any 
way. Instead, it poses serious problems for any attempt at addressing the Critique 
itself as a whole and it poses other problems, perhaps less serious, for any attempt at 
engaging with atomised parts of that whole. Yet, scholarship on Kant often insists 
that it is possible to focus solely on what it considers useful and is content to simply 
discard the rest
1 . This is noticeable in scholarship dealing with Kant’s practical 
philosophy but it is even more noticeable in scholarship working on Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy. It is, perhaps, somewhat of a truism for Anglophone 
scholarship to claim that Kant’s ‘transcendental psychology’ is the product of some 
outdated rationalist presuppositions or to claim that Kant’s metaphysics breach the 
very standards that made it possible. This chapter, which should work as a general 
survey on the status of relevant Kantian scholarship and the reasons there are for not 
agreeing with it uncritically, will therefore be concerned with the question of whether 
it is possible to understand Kant’s critical philosophy, its queries and its concerns, 
without paying due heed to the way in which Kant articulates critique, transcendental 
philosophy, transcendental logic, and metaphysics. 
 
Concretely, in this chapter it will be defended that Kant’s metaphysics cannot 
be disentangled from the broader critical project and that doing so results in a 
                                                            
1 There are, of course, many exceptions to this complacency: Frederick Beiser and Sebastian Gardner 
will be discussed in what follows. But Gerd Buchdahl, Béatrice Longuenesse, Michael Friedman, 
Eckart Förster, Lucy Allais, Paul Franks, and, more recently, Fiona Hughes, Rae Langton, Sebastian 
Rand, and Nicholas Stang have also made way for better understanding Kant. This investigation is 
indebted to their insightful readings to varying degrees. 
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philosophically bastardised version of transcendental philosophy. To this end, this 
chapter will begin by discussing a tendency, originally noted by Sebastian Gardner 
and Frederick Beiser, towards interpreting Kant in a radically anti-metaphysical way. 
Indeed, recent Anglophone scholarship on Kant displays a marked propensity towards 
stressing epistemological nuances in Kant’s arguments at the expense of metaphysical 
claims and ambitions at the heart of those arguments. Although there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with paying attention to Kant’s insights into the nature of 
cognitive processes, there is something intrinsically wrong with limiting one’s 
understanding of Kant to whatever it yields solely in terms of those processes. It will 
be argued, in fact, that readings of Kant that subscribe to this tendency depart from 
the assumption that Kant was solely concerned with some kind of theory of 
perception the nature of which precludes metaphysics. Thus, Strawson, Guyer, 
Pippin, and Allison will be discussed as pertaining to this anti-metaphysical tendency. 
It will be noted that, although these interpretations vary greatly, and although they 
differ significantly as to their many virtues, they all nonetheless partake in a 
fundamental commitment to deflate Kant’s metaphysical claims and inflate Kant’s 
epistemological claims.  
 
It will then be argued that reading Kant anti-metaphysically presents a series 
of problems that are not easily overcome. Following Gardner, first, it will be argued 
against the deflationary tendency by pointing out that no amount of meta-
philosophical reflection, and likewise no amount of perspective-shifting, will be able 
to justify robustly enough, by Kant’s standards, a difference between appearances and 
things in themselves and, importantly, the relation between the two. It will then be 
argued, following Beiser, that deflationary understandings of Kant fail to do justice to 
the broader philosophical context within which Kant’s transcendental project 
emerged and miss, therefore, important aspects of that transcendental project 
including, but not limited to, Kant’s relation to his contemporaries. The third criticism 
addressed at the deflationary readings of Kant will be the most elaborate and will 
make up the second part of the chapter. It will be seen that a fundamental portion of 
the critical project has to do with Kant’s general metaphysical ambitions and, 
furthermore, with Kant’s relentless pursuit for integrating metaphysics, as such, into a 
broader philosophical project. Thus, in tracing back, as it were, Kant’s reflections on 
the nature of intuition in general, and of time as form of intuition in particular, it will 
be seen that the very origin of transcendental philosophy owes much to the way in 
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which Kant thought of metaphysics and the a priori. In this sense, ‘architectonic’ –as 
understood by Kant– will figure prominently. The final criticism enunciated above, as 
will be seen, will open the door to seeing that Kant’s critical project will simply not 
get off the ground unless it has the problem of transcendence or object-relatedness at 
its core, i.e. unless it is conceived as transcendental philosophy or transcendental 
logic. 
  
∵ 
 
 The tendency towards deflationary readings of idealism has been noted 
recently with remarkable acuteness. Sebastian Gardner, for example, has pointed out 
that Anglophone literature of the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear 
tendency towards, first, minimising the relevance of metaphysical claims and, second, 
increasing the relevance of epistemological claims that could, ultimately, stand in for 
the first ones. Along the same lines, Frederick Beiser has also pointed out that current 
Anglophone scholarship on Kant has failed to do justice to Kant’s metaphysics in the 
sense that it has shunned the metaphysical or ontological content it entails.  
 
 In “The Limits of Naturalism”, Gardner notes that current Anglophone 
scholarship is not, not obviously at least, receptive to some of the fundamental 
insights of German Idealism. This is so because in his view Anglophone scholarship 
views German Idealism as relevant only to the extent that it is a resource for 
‘progressive and non-metaphysical contemporary philosophical developments’. Thus, 
Gardner thinks, claims like the following, to name but a few, are not uncommon 
amongst the literature: that ontological commitments of German Idealism are no 
different from those other naturalist positions of the time and perhaps even 
compatible with a full-blown physicalism; that normativity is irreducible and should 
work as that in accordance with which explanations should hold; that German 
Idealism sought to validate a modern conception of autonomy; or that German 
Idealism is only aiming to expand on Kant’s epistemological turn understood as a 
correction to naïve empiricism
2
. 
 
 Following Kemp Smith, Gardner opposes idealism to naturalism and 
differentiates two main variants within the latter: hard naturalism and soft naturalism. 
                                                            
2 Gardner, Sebastian. “The Limits of Naturalism” in German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. 
Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 19-20. 
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What is common to both these variants of naturalism is that they both conceive of the 
natural order, broadly understood, as having some sort of epistemological or 
metaphysical priority in philosophical inquiry. According to his account, both hard 
and soft naturalists will think that what there is, is natural in the sense that it belongs 
to what Kemp Smith calls ‘the terrestrial environment’3, i.e. all that exists, including 
the explanations one might give of the existence of things, is subordinated to natural 
forces and therefore eventually justifiable in terms of natural science. But there are 
also important differences between the two. Hard naturalism, for example, is 
comfortable in transforming the epistemological prerogatives of modern natural 
science into a philosophical position that, if not fully metaphysical, is ‘as good as’ the 
latter
4
, simply because it conceives of the totality of its objects as belonging to one 
and the same order. Soft naturalism, in contrast, cannot grant that and, instead, will 
claim that even if a natural order exists, it must nonetheless be complemented by 
adding elements that were initially foreign to it. For the soft naturalist hard, physical 
reality does not encompass all of what can be thought and one must, or so their 
narrative goes, aggregate elements to that physical reality so as to reach the totality 
conceivable in thought. In this sense, the soft naturalist will, according to Gardner, 
think of him or herself as correcting or improving the unsophisticated position of the 
hard naturalist in such a way that the austere and overly simplistic conception of 
nature of this one will be enriched by adding meaningful statements to its repertoire. 
 
 Because the soft naturalist, in the sense mentioned above, wants a nuanced 
reality with nuanced claims as to its justification that will sound feasible to 
contemporary ears, Gardner goes on, it will necessarily have to interpret away, flatten 
out, or deflate, metaphysical claims
5
 –no matter how central these might seem to the 
philosophical account discussed. The way to do this is by an appeal to ‘perspective’ 
or ‘standpoint’ from which to interpret claims that would otherwise sound overly 
ontological or metaphysical. Because the soft naturalist is in no position to challenge 
the completeness or elegance of the natural system that the hard naturalist appeals to, 
he or she instead refuses to engage the hard naturalist in its own terms and seeks 
refuge in a meta-philosophical position that introduces a ‘view’, ‘perspective’, or 
‘standpoint’,  from  which to carry out complex phenomenological descriptions. 
Thus, the soft naturalist can invoke a perspective from which entities, entities that 
                                                            
3 Kemp Smith, Norman. “The present situation of philosophy” in Philosophical Review 29, 1920, 1–
26, p. 25. 
4 Gardner, Sebastian. Op. Cit. p. 30. 
5 Ibid. p. 36. 
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would be mere fancy for the hard naturalist, can be called ‘real’. In Gardner’s words, 
this is simply another way of saying that soft naturalism subscribes to the idea that 
“philosophical vindication of phenomena can be provided by something other than 
ontological grounding and which instead involves essential reference to the subject 
or to a ‘perspective’ relative to which internal, perspectival reality can be claimed for 
the phenomena”6. In this sense it seems as if soft naturalism would want to preserve 
two not obviously compatible things: agreeing, on the one hand, with the traditional 
conception that philosophy is supposed to provide sufficient legitimating grounds for 
the phenomena it addresses, and, on the other hand, withdrawing from that by 
appealing to the ‘perspective’ one has on things as furnishing those grounds. The 
question for the soft naturalist will be, of course, how ‘perspective’ can fulfil such 
demand without lapsing back onto hard naturalism. 
 
 Not only Gardner, but Frederick Beiser, too, has voiced serious concern about 
what he calls the ‘sanitisation’ of German Idealism –especially of Kant and Hegel–. 
Beiser claims that Anglophone scholarship has domesticated, or read metaphysics 
‘out of’ German Idealism to the extent that it now offers but one ‘advantage’, namely, 
not challenging contemporary ways of thinking. Beiser rightly points out that this 
‘philosophical ventriloquism’, where one uses a historical thinker merely as a puppet 
for voicing one’s own views, is nowhere as noticeable as it is in Anglophone 
scholarship about Kant
7
. Although Beiser agrees with Gardner in that “(…) 
revisionist readings of German idealism arise from a reluctance to face metaphysical 
issues”8, the reasons he gives for that being the case are somewhat different. Beiser is 
more concerned with the poverty of interpretative tools available to the analytic 
method of Anglophone scholarship. First, understanding Kant as if he were a 
contemporary thinker, answering solely to contemporary issues of common sense 
philosophy, Beiser thinks, will at most be able to yield what Kant ought to have said 
and not what Kant did in fact say
9
. But, second, transforming any historical thinker 
into a contemporary interlocutor limits the philosophical scope of the themes that 
                                                            
6 Ibid. p. 32. 
7 “Nowhere has ventriloquism been pursued with more vigour and rigour than with contemporary 
interpretations of Kant and Hegel”. Beiser, Frederick. “Darks Days: Anglophone Scholarship Since 
the 1960s” in Hammer, Espen (Ed.) German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge, 
London, 2007, p. 70. 
8 Ibid. p. 79. There is something important to remark about this point. Although in what follows it will 
be wholly agreed with Beiser’s diagnosis of current Kantian scholarship, it will be later disagreed with 
him on what Kant meant by ‘metaphysics’ since, Beiser thinks, “Kant would not have regarded his 
transcendental idealism as metaphysics” (Ibid. p.87fn). 
9 Ibid.  p. 72. 
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thinker might engage with. Historical thinkers are philosophically relevant in Beiser’s 
view because of how they differ from contemporary thinkers. Only in acknowledging, 
therefore, that Kant might have had concerns beyond contemporary ones is Kant’s 
philosophy worth looking at. 
 
 To the extent that its aim is kept in mind, however, the analytic method is not 
altogether mistaken. Being able to reconstruct and appraise an argument is just as 
important for proper philosophical inquiry, according to Beiser, as is being familiar 
with the historical context of a specific work and, importantly for present purposes, as 
important as being able to recognise the metaphysical commitments of specific 
philosophical projects
10
. In this regard, Anglophone scholarship on Kant has more or 
less fulfilled the first demand but failed at accomplishing the last two: neither the 
historical context nor Kant’s metaphysical ambitions are recognised in sufficient 
detail for transcendental idealism to be able to challenge current deflationary 
philosophical convictions. In this regard Beiser’s hermeneutic point is no doubt right: 
cherry-picking around the Critical project by ‘taking what is relevant and dumping 
the rest’ has done more harm than good for contemporary interpretations of Kant 
simply because it has created an echo chamber for deflationists’ own prejudices11.  
 
 An example of a ‘soft naturalist’ reading of Kant, following Gardner, or ‘anti-
metaphysical’ Kant interpretation, following Beiser, is found in Peter Strawson’s The 
Bounds of Sense. There, Strawson claims that the whole Kantian endeavour is 
directed by a ‘principle of significance’, i.e. the principle that “there can be no 
legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not 
relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application” 12 . This 
‘reduction’ of the application of ideas and concepts signifies that the doctrine of 
transcendental idealism is, accordingly, not merely that one can have no knowledge 
of a supersensible reality but “that reality is supersensible and we can have no 
knowledge of it” 13 . The principle of significance has many implications, but an 
important one is that which leads Strawson to claim that Kant breached the very 
                                                            
10 Ibid. pp. 84-87. 
11 This is particularly poignant with the Schematism section of the first Critique. Thus, Wilkerson 
claims that “the Schematism serves no useful purpose and can be ignored without loss” (Wilkerson, 
T.E. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1976, p.95) while Bennett claims that “the 
incoherence of Kant's problem [in the Schematism] is matched by the vacuity of its supposed solution” 
(Bennett, J. Kant’s Analytic. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1966, p. 151). 
12 Strawson, Peter F. The Bounds of Sense: An essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge, 
London, 1975, p. 16.  
13 Ibid. p. 38. 
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limits of intelligibility, the bounds of sense, he had originally posited. Indeed, if one 
looks at Kant’s theory of synthesis, Strawson claims, it is easy to see that Kant is 
simply constructing an essay in transcendental psychology: in Kant’s view, synthesis 
is held to be the antecedent condition of empirical knowledge, but synthesis itself is 
not empirical. By the principle of significance, however, if synthesis is not empirical 
then it is, strictly speaking, meaningless and it would be best to regard this as one of 
the ‘aberrations’ into which Kant’s explanatory model led him14. 
 
 In spite of its virtues, amongst which one may count his detailed analyses of 
some of Kant’s arguments and the clarity with which he presents some Kantian 
themes, what makes Strawson’s reading of Kant anti-metaphysical is the former’s 
belief in the possibility of constructing an argument simply by repudiating what he 
calls ‘Kant’s transcendent metaphysics’. The problem, according to Strawson, begins 
with Kant’s affirmation of the ideality of space and time. Kant, just as much as the 
scientist, wants to contrast things as they appear and things as they are in themselves 
by means of affectivity. Kant, just as much as the scientist, will find it useful to be 
able to distinguish, for example, something appearing a certain colour under a setting 
sun from that same thing actually being that colour. The difference between the 
scientist and Kant, however, is that unlike the scientist, Kant’s way of drawing the 
distinction is by means of linking things as they appear to the subjective forms of 
sensibility, i.e. space and time. Things as they appear are such because they affect the 
subject and because the subject can grasp them in specific spatio-temporal relations. 
Thus, if Strawson’s Kant is going to make sense, by which Strawson means 
respecting the principle of significance, then it needs to renounce any metaphysical 
claims about things as they are in themselves and, instead, limit itself merely to 
claims about things as they appear. In other words, Strawson’s Kant is in fact 
embodying what was called, with Gardner, the perspectival move: the vindication of 
philosophical (and perhaps scientific) claims need not fall on any kind of 
metaphysical or ontological grounding but can, instead, simply rely on the 
perspective of a given subject
15
. It is, in fact, because of this that Strawson thinks not 
only that Kant’s metaphysics and transcendent psychology16 are out of the bounds of 
                                                            
14 Ibid. p. 32. 
15 Interestingly in Strawson’s reading, this ‘given subject’ need not be identified with any one subject 
in particular and can, instead, simply be identified with whatever has the specific modes of 
representation that we do, i.e. the human perspective, as it were. See: (Ibid. pp. 271ff; pp 241ff).  
16 Ibid. p. 32.This does not mean that Strawson repudiates the term ‘metaphysics’ altogether, for he 
does not. Indeed, he thinks a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ is possible. Vid. Strawson, Peter. Individuals: 
An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Routledge, London, 1959. 
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intelligibility but, also, that the artificial and ‘baroque’ structure of the Critique itself 
is something one can “(...) in the end discount without anxiety”17. 
  
 Yet Strawson is far from alone in reading Kant thus. Further examples can be 
found in Paul Guyer, Robert Pippin, or Henry Allison. In a similar vein to Strawson, 
Guyer also takes as a starting point the assertion that space and time are, for Kant, 
nothing but the forms of sensibility
18
. But this led Kant, in Guyer’s view, to a 
“fundamental ambivalence about the conception of experience to be assumed”19. The 
ambivalence resides in that, on the one hand, one could take Kant’s assertion that 
‘experience contains a concept of an object as being given’ as an analytic definition –
evident from the very concept of experience itself. But one could also take Kant’s 
assertion that ‘experience contains a concept of an object as being given’ as the 
synthetic conclusion at which one arrives if the departure was from experience 
understood as a purely subjective activity that does not necessarily require the 
representation of objects
20
. Both of these options are equally viable because, Guyer 
says, the forms of sensibility are that which we ourselves ‘impose’ on the raw 
material given in intuition. 
 
 The ambivalence remarked on by Guyer is harmful at two levels –one general 
and one technical. It is harmful at the general level insofar as it fails to clarify 
                                                            
17 Ibid. p. 24. Although the problem of ‘system’ will reappear much later in this investigation (cf. Ch. 
IV, §I, pp. 146-165) there is something else that should be noted about Strawson’s reading of Kant in 
relation to ‘system’: Strawson Believes the first Critique contains the whole system of transcendental 
philosophy (Strawson, Op. Cit. p. 11). This investigation, however, will understand by the ‘system of 
transcendental philosophy’ or simply by ‘transcendental philosophy’ all that is encompassed by Kant’s 
three Critiques. 
18 In Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Guyer departs from the assumption that transcendental 
idealism’s underlying and fundamental presupposition is that appearances are, with the mediation of 
space and time, the rendering into experience of an ‘independent reality’ that works as the first’s raw 
material (Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  
1987, pp. 2-7). From the claim that space and time are only forms of sensibility, presented in the 
Preface to the B edition of the first Critique, Kant concludes that “we can therefore have no knowledge 
of any object as thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an 
appearance” (Bxxvi). Guyer takes this to mean that, although this in fact suggests a reduction of the 
scope of the validity we derive from our indispensable modes of cognition (i.e. that of space and time 
“we may assert that they hold of all objects we are capable of experiencing, but not of whatever other 
objects there might be, if there are any others” [Ibid. p. 4.]), Kant failed to prove why these very 
conditions do not apply to an independent reality beyond the one already given in cognition. Up to here, 
however, Guyer would be adding nothing to the well-known Trendelenburg alternative in which the 
latter accuses Kant for failing to prove that the ideality of space and time excludes their reality. But 
Guyer does indeed go further than that. According to him, the ideality of space and time, and the not-
so evident conclusion that that excludes their reality, is maintained by Kant in order to be able to 
justify synthetic a priori knowledge as pertaining to a world of representations (Ibid. pp. 37-40) –and 
only to a world of representations, whereby space and time must be thought of as the subjective 
conditions for the possibility of any representation whatsoever. 
19 Ibid. p. 73. 
20 Ibid.  p. 79. 
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whether Kant is replying to the empiricist, who grants the validity of judgments about 
objects but questions the necessity of a priori concepts, or to the sceptic, who grants 
the validity of judgments about one’s own inner states but questions their validity 
concerning an independent reality. But the ambivalence is also harmful at a more 
technical level in that it prevented Kant from making an analytic connection between 
the concept of ‘self-ascription of experiences’ and the existence of ‘synthetic unity 
among experiences so ascribed’. Instead, the ambivalence in the concept of 
experience forced Kant into making a synthetic connection between consciousness 
and the self-ascription of experience (self-consciousness)
21
. The technical difficulty 
that Guyer describes will be addressed later in more detail
22
, but it should suffice to 
say that this point leads Guyer to conclude that Kant’s mistake resides in the 
following: instead of limiting himself to the analytically valid claim that “whatever 
representations I can ascribe to myself as my own are subject to whatever conditions 
govern such ascription”23, Kant overreaches the limits he had set in the Aesthetic by 
making the synthetically invalid claim that “I cannot have a representation which is 
not subject to these conditions [the conditions that govern the ascription]”24.  In so 
doing Kant thus commits to having to provide an account of how it is that one comes 
to know that no representation is possible that is not subject to self-consciousness and 
commits, therefore, to having to develop a ‘faulty transcendental psychology’25. 
 
 In a somewhat similar vein to Strawson, Guyer, too, suggests a deeply anti-
metaphysical reading of Kant. “Kant’s own transcendental idealism”, writes Guyer, 
“(…) was thought to require the ontological assertion that the objects represented by 
means of these forms [space and time], namely objects as appearances, ‘are to be 
regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves 
(A369)’”26. But, Guyer thinks, Kant needed only to drop this metaphysical claim in 
order to achieve a ‘convincing’ account of experience. If only no ontological claim 
had been made regarding the status of representation as such, then Kant’s 
epistemological argument about the conditions of possible experience would have 
proved solid enough: the ideality of space and time should amount only to the ideality 
of the forms of things and not of things as such. In Guyer’s reading, Kant had the 
                                                            
21 Guyer, Paul. “Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis” in American Philosophical Quarterly, 
Volume 17, No. 3, July 1980, p. 205. 
22 (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 65-82) 
23 Guyer, Paul. Op. Cit. 1980, p.209. 
24 Ibid. p.209. 
25 Ibid. p. 205. 
26 Guyer, Paul. Op. Cit. 1987, p. 413. 
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tools to build a thoroughly epistemological theory of experience devoid of ontological 
claims –a way of reading Kant as being a ‘formal idealist’, but not a ‘real’ one27–, 
but, alas, failed to use them. 
 
Robert Pippin, too, reads Kant in an anti-metaphysical way. Although 
Pippin’s reading of Kant is complex, the following brief remarks should suffice to 
show in what way Pippin advocates in favour of a deflationary reading of Kant. In 
Kant’s Theory of Form, Pippin unequivocally states that any metaphysical 
interpretation of Kant must abandon what he thinks is a central tenet of Kantianism: 
the claim that “all a priori knowledge [is] exclusively formal, and not directly about 
any object of knowledge”28. He thinks, furthermore, that in abandoning such a claim, 
metaphysical interpretations inflate Kant to a degree where no recognisable theory of 
knowledge is identifiable. Now, there is little doubt in that Pippin is very much aware 
of the difficulties that interpreting Kant in a purely epistemological way raises when 
he says, for example, that a “problem in opting for one alternative to the exclusion of 
the other is clearly evident in recent works which attempt a wholly epistemological 
interpretation, (…) which encourage us to jettison the ‘metaphysics of transcendental 
idealism’”29. But, of course, in light of the fact that Kant is presenting “an analysis of 
human knowledge and then trying to draw some substantive conclusions from it”30 
the question is whether the middle ground between the epistemological and 
metaphysical readings will work in the first place. Although Pippin’s response to this 
last question is clearly in the affirmative
31
, the lack of a direct relation between the a 
priori and objectivity jeopardises the possibility of being able to safely tread this 
supposed middle ground. 
 
Unlike for Strawson or Guyer, it is possible to think that for Pippin the 
difference between an epistemological and a metaphysical reading of Kant is more a 
distinction in stress, or emphasis, than in substance. Pippin does recognise, for 
example, that “Kant quite clearly did intend to establish in this transcendental 
philosophy an ‘a priori relation to objects’”32. The way Kant does this is, in Pippin’s 
view, by withdrawing from straightforwardly metaphysical claims and instead 
                                                            
27 Ibid. p. 414. 
28 Pippin, Robert. Kant’s Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1982, p. 23. 
29 Ibid. p. 21. 
30 Ibid. p. 23. 
31 Ibid. pp. 16-25; 218-222. 
32 Ibid. p. 22. 
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characterising the general endeavour undertaken in the Critique of Pure Reason as 
strictly methodological
33. Kant’s predecessors had also been concerned with synthetic 
a priori knowledge, but only Kant managed to show the close interdependence of the 
finite being’s modes of cognition and the way things ‘are’ sensu stricto. Because 
“[w]e do not know why our forms of experience are as they are, but we do know that 
understanding such a formal structure is what accounts for such reality (again ‘for 
us’)”34 it can be argued that for Pippin, then, the emphasis on ‘form’ might count as 
metaphysical. If this is the case, however, it will only be the case in a weak sense: 
after all, Pippin thinks Kant is short of an explanation for why ‘intuitability’ and 
‘constructability’ would be prior to experience and for why they determine things in 
the way they do
35
.  
 
There is, finally, one last example of an anti-metaphysical reading of Kant 
worth discussing in virtue of how influential it has been: Henry Allison’s. In Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism, Allison suggests an understanding of the Kantian project 
which fits the soft naturalist or deflationary description by attempting to back away 
from a two-object world view and advocate, instead, for a two-aspect world view 
reading of Kant. Allison is careful in distinguishing his position from that of what he 
calls ‘separabilitists’ (e.g. Strawson, Prichard, Guyer, etc.): against these, who 
advocate in favour of drawing a sharp separation between the real and what appears, 
Allison proposes a compound argument. The first part of the argument states that 
epistemic conditions of thought must be distinguished from both psychological and 
ontological conditions of thought. Epistemic conditions of thought are different from 
psychological conditions insofar as, although both subjective, only epistemic 
conditions tend to objectivising. But epistemic conditions of thought differ from 
ontological conditions, too, insofar as, although both are objective, the former do not 
condition the very existence of things, but rather the objectivity of our representations 
of such things
36. The second part of Allison’s argument states that these epistemic 
conditions of thought must be divided in accordance with a discursivity thesis, 
namely, that cognition requires concepts and sensible intuitions to operate
37
. 
                                                            
33 Ibid. p. 223. 
34 Ibid. p. 225. The emphasis is Pippin’s. 
35 Ibid. pp. 77-78, 84ff; 226ff. 
36 The whole problem for transcendental idealism is, following Allison, determining how is it precisely 
that epistemic conditions can be subjective and objective at once. Allison, Henry. Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Yale University Press, New York, 2004, p. 
11. 
37 Ibid. p. 13. 
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Cognition, put differently, needs both that an object be given to the mind and that it 
be given in sensibility “capable of being ordered”38 . Both of these parts of the 
argument, rejecting the separability thesis and postulating a discursivity thesis, 
constitute in Allison’s reading “the basis of Kant’s idealism”39.  
 
The departure point opens an important question, however, for the Allisonian 
reading of Kant. If there is no metaphysical separation between appearances and 
things in themselves, what then does the distinction really amount to? For Allison, the 
question is best answered by reading Kant’s transcendental idealism in opposition to 
transcendental realism. The latter conceives of space and time as things given in 
themselves and irremediably derives, in Kant’s view, into empirical idealism. 
Because it lacks a criterion for clearly distinguishing between what is subjective and 
what is objective, transcendental realism transforms what is mere appearance into a 
thing in itself. But in doing so, transcendental realism becomes entirely untenable as a 
philosophical position since it will have to posit a conditioning ground for things 
beyond us that will be, at best, indemonstrable
40
. With this in mind, for Allison, to 
consider things as they appear is to consider them ‘in uns’ in the transcendental sense, 
and to consider them as they are in themselves is to consider them ‘außer uns’ also in 
the transcendental sense –i.e. regardless of their relation to the subject’s epistemic 
conditions of thought
41
. It is, in other words, a distinction best understood in terms of 
the standpoint one adopts
42
: if one views things taking epistemic conditions into 
consideration, then those things will be as they appear; if, however, one views things 
independently of those very conditions, then those things will be in themselves. 
Interestingly, though, since Kant repeatedly says that one can think things apart from 
the conditions of sensibility, so long, that is, as one does not relate them to schemata 
but only to the pure categories, the consideration of things in themselves will then 
yield nothing but analytic judgments about the concepts of those very things
43
. In 
other words, to the extent that we can think of things in themselves, even if only 
analytically, for Allison the distinction between considering things as they appear and 
considering them in themselves is methodological and not metaphysical
44
. This, in 
                                                            
38 (A29/B34) 
39 Allison, Henry. Op. Cit. p. 14. 
40 Kant certainly agrees with this. Vid. (A369); (A490-91/B518-19) and (A543/B571). 
41 Allison, Henry. Op. Cit. p. 56. 
42 Ibid. p. 39ff. 
43 Ibid. p. 56. 
44 Ibid. p. 57. 
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turn, puts Allison’s reading of Kant neatly in the soft naturalist, deflationary side of 
the fence. 
 
 Hopefully the previous remarks, even if brief, convey with enough generality 
and clarity the ‘spirit’, as it were, of much of Anglophone scholarship on Kant. It is 
true, of course, that not all of Kantian scholarship subscribes to the deflationary, anti-
metaphysical tendency. Exceptions exist and they are significant not so much because 
of their number, but because of their insight. Sebastian Gardner and Fredewrick 
Beiser, who were just discussed, Béatrice Longuenesse, who will be discussed later, 
Michael Friedman, who will also be discussed later, Rae Langton, Paul Franks, Jane 
Kneller (mostly concerning Kant’s relation to Novalis and the wider context of 
Romanticism), and Eckart Förster (mostly in relation to Kant’s post-Critical work), to 
name but a few, all have sophisticated readings of Kant that would hardly fit the 
description of ‘anti-metaphysical’. For the time being, however, it is important to 
remark on some of the issues that face deflationary Kant interpretations in the hope of 
bringing the problem addressed in the rest of this work to the fore. 
 
There are several issues with the anti-metaphysical, deflationary readings of 
Kant but here, only three will be mentioned. The first two should be easy to grasp in 
light of the opening discussion of Gardner and Beiser. As Gardner points out, the first 
problem has to do with soft naturalist readings of Kant, German Idealism, or with soft 
naturalism generally speaking, being between a rock and a hard place, as it were: it 
wants to follow traditional philosophy in providing not just necessary but sufficient 
legitimising grounds for phenomena, but it wants to maintain, at the same time, that 
one’s standpoint may furnish those grounds while renouncing the standpoint’s 
metaphysical status. In this sense, Gardner’s worry is strictly philosophical. Unlike 
the hard naturalist interpretation that will reduce the ontological order to the 
‘terrestrial environment’, and unlike the metaphysical interpretation that will 
categorically affirm such order but at a different level, the soft naturalist approach 
must supply validating grounds for why things are perceived or judged the way they 
are in some other, derivative way. It does this by pointing towards the standpoint 
adopted by philosophy. Allison’s reading of Kant illustrates this neatly: the 
distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves is 
solely a distinction between ways of considering things (as dependent or independent 
of epistemic conditions of thought, respectively). The problem facing this kind of 
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reading, however, resides in that it will find it impossible to justify just why one is 
able to abstract from the conditions of thought or, even further, whether one can 
actually do so in the first place. Perhaps the soft naturalist could retort that this is 
precisely the worry that a meta-philosophical perspective addresses: after all, one 
might want to call such meta-philosophical perspective ‘transcendental’ or 
‘ontological’ in an epistemologically based idealism45. But such a move would mean, 
as Gardner puts it in relation to Pinkard, that “the deflationist wishes to treat the 
distinction between thought and being as merely a further distinction within thought, 
something which, Kant and the German idealists are clear, it cannot be”46. 
 
The second problem is related to what Beiser terms the sanitisation of 
idealism –transcendental or otherwise–. This problem is philosophical, too, but to a 
lesser extent than the problem pointed out by Gardner. It is, in fact, more of a 
historico-hermeneutical issue. There is, of course, copious textual evidence that 
suggests Kant was engaged in seriously criticising metaphysics –not least in Kant’s 
famous dictum that “the proud name of an ontology, that presumptuously claims to 
supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general 
(for instance, the principle of causality) must, therefore, give place to the modest title 
of a mere Analytic of pure understanding”47. But one should be extremely careful 
when uncovering what exactly is it that Kant had in mind when speaking of 
metaphysics or ontology and not simply assume that it was what, say, Strawson, 
believes metaphysics to be. As Beiser rightly points out, Anglophone scholarship on 
Kant was heavily influenced by positivism and ordinary language philosophy. As 
such, these interpretations are incapable of taking Kant’s transcendental analytic too 
seriously. Strawson claims repeatedly through The Bounds of Sense that what is worth 
preserving from the first Critique is its analysis of the structures of possible 
experience, but not its transcendental psychology
48
. This sort of attitude requires that 
one ask whether it is Kant that is being interpreted in the first place or whether it is 
someone else. Beiser shows, by means of a clear example, what the difficulty 
amounts to: the Critique of Pure Reason departs from distinguishing between the two 
                                                            
45 Allison, Henry. Op. Cit. p. 16. 
46  Gardner, Sebastian. Op. Cit. p. 44. Interestingly, Gardner’s criticism can also be constructed 
differently. Gardner could be thought of as saying that with soft naturalist readings of idealism the 
issue resides in that, in spite of having a ‘richer’ reality, as it were, than hard naturalists, soft naturalists 
and their interpretations of idealism will fall short from fulfilling a need internal to idealism, namely, 
that ‘reality’ as such be predicable of the ideal meaningfully. 
47 (A247/B303) 
48 Strawson, Peter. Op. Cit. pp. 11; 32; 51; 70-71; 97. 
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stems of human knowledge, sensibility and understanding. The distinction itself, 
however, did not emerge out of nowhere. A quick glimpse into Kant’s handwritten 
notes to Baumgarten’s Metaphysics corroborates that the division between sensibility 
and understanding was already being thought of, albeit in a precarious way, since at 
least 1769-1771
49
. If Kant is going to be interpreted, Beiser suggests, then the 
historical and philosophical context of Kant’s ideas should be taken into account50. 
Not only is not doing it intellectually unchallenging, it is also risks being 
philosophically irrelevant.  
 
 There is yet a third difficulty that, although related to both of the previous 
ones, goes beyond what either Gardner or Beiser state and that will be extensively 
elaborated in what follows. The difficulty, in short, resides in that deflationary or anti-
metaphysical readings of Kant will be unable to understand the depth of Kant’s 
insights into the nature of time because of their departure point. Failing to understand, 
in other words, how closely intertwined time, general metaphysics, special 
metaphysics, and transcendental philosophy are, precludes deflationary readings from 
grasping Kant’s original insight into the forms of intuition ab initio. Whether that 
alone warrants the conclusion that Kant is a metaphysician in the full-blooded sense 
is something that will remain to be seen. What will be clearly shown, however, is that 
it is illusory, at best, to try and disentangle metaphysics from Kant’s critical project 
and that it is dangerous, at worst, to the extent that in doing so one would risk missing 
some crucial aspects of that very philosophy. The discussion below will begin to 
shape, in fact, the orientation of this investigation since it will show how Kant’s 
concept of time is related to his broader philosophical concerns. In relation to this last 
point, two things will be remarked on: that it is simply unwise to try to shun Kant’s 
metaphysics in light of his iterating invitations not to do so; and that, for an inquiry 
that seeks to understand Kant’s conception of time and its role in the constitution of 
objectivity, the explanatory power of transcendental philosophy, with its metaphysics 
included, should not be simply set aside. After tracing back Kant’s shifting position 
on the role of sensibility in general, and of time in particular, it will be seen not only 
that disentangling the forms of intuition from the rest of Kant’s architectonic is 
impossible but that, moreover, acknowledging the forms of intuition’s fundamental 
                                                            
49 e.g. (AA17:552); (AA 17:563) 
50 Beiser, Frederick. Op. Cit. pp. 84-87. 
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role in the constitution of objectivity is necessary for understanding the genesis
51
, 
development, and eventual solidification of transcendental idealism.  
 
 Kant’s original formulation of the thesis on the subjectivity and ideality of 
time was not, not immediately at least, easy to agree with. In a letter dated from the 
13
th
 of October, 1770, a few months after the thesis appeared in Kant’s inaugural 
dissertation on De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis, Johann 
Heinrich Lambert claimed to agree wholeheartedly with the first four propositions of 
§14, Section 3 of the Dissertation, but found the fifth proposition extremely 
problematic. Indeed, Lambert writes to Kant, one can perfectly well grant that the 
idea of time does not originate in sensibility but that, instead, sensibility presupposes 
time; one might further agree with the claim that the idea of time is singular and not 
general; that the idea of time is an intuition; and that time itself is a continuous 
magnitude. But, even if these four propositions are granted, it does not seem to 
Lambert to follow that one can deny time’s reality and objectivity52. In fact, not only 
do the first four propositions not entail the fifth in any way, but admitting that they 
did would have catastrophic consequences for any metaphysical system that tries to 
account for the reality of change: “All changes are bound to time and are 
inconceivable without time. If changes are real, then time is real, whatever its 
definition may be. If time is unreal, then no change can be real”53. ‘Even an idealist’, 
it seems to Lambert, would have to grant that changes occur –even if the only 
changes the idealist is willing to acknowledge are those of representations beginning 
and ending in one’s own consciousness. 
 
 Lambert’s commitment to the reality of time is deep-rooted: in the Neues 
Organon’s last section, famously entitled ‘Phänomenologie’, specifically in 
proposition 54 he claims that “If a change occurs in appearance, a change also 
happens in reality. It remains indeterminate, however, whether the change occurs in 
the object, in sense, in the relation of the two, or in both of them”54. This is the case 
because of one of the presuppositions that Lambert shares with Wolffians, namely, 
that change is fundamentally intertwined with duration. For something to change, that 
                                                            
51 For an illuminating piece on the role inner sense plays in the initial sketches of transcendental 
idealism see Dyck, Corey “The Scope of Inner Sense: The Development of Kant’s Psychology in the 
Silent Decade” in Con-textos Kantianos, No. 3, June 2016, pp. 326-344. 
52 (AA 10:106) 
53 (AA 10:107) 
54 (NO, II: Phänomenologie, II, §54) 
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is, for anything to transition from one state to another, a definite duration must be 
given
55
. Since time is, by definition, definite duration, then it follows that change is 
predicated on the basis of time. From this alone it does not follow that one must 
predicate ‘reality’ to time. But once a further proposition is added, namely that ‘the 
reality of the condition is equal to or greater than the reality of the conditioned or that 
the conditioned cannot have greater reality than the condition’56, one can derive the 
reality of time: if duration is a condition for time, and time a condition for change, 
and change is phenomenologically real, then it follows that the conditions of change 
and time are themselves real –in accordance with the rationalist presupposition 
enunciated above. 
 
 The concept of time is, in Lambert’s view, more determinate than the concept 
of duration for the simple reason that whatever is in time has some duration but not 
the reverse: eternity, for example, has infinite duration but is not itself in time. This 
reasoning leads Lambert to affirm that the indeterminate concept of duration is 
indissolubly bound with the concept of existence and that the two are, to some extent, 
coextensive
57
 (it leads him, likewise, to draw an analogy where time is to duration 
what a specific location is to space). What is important here, however, is one of the 
many implications that can be drawn from Lambert’s objection. If indeed duration 
and existence are necessarily bound, then, Kant’s general effort in the Dissertation, 
seems to be jeopardised. If, that is, duration is an indeterminate concept that is, in 
spite of its indeterminacy, necessarily linked with existence, then Kant’s 
differentiation between the sensible and the intellectual must be mistaken: “For, in 
addition to the fact that constant appearance is for us truth, though the foundations 
are never discovered or only at some future time; it is also useful in ontology to take 
up concepts borrowed from appearance [Schein], since theory must finally be applied 
to phenomena again”58. 
 
To this objection, Kant responded in two ways: the first is found in a letter to 
Marcus Herz, a mutual friend of Lambert and Kant, from 1772; the second is found in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, from 1781. Lambert’s objection, as Kant’s phrases it in 
                                                            
55 (Wolff, Christian. Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, §554) 
56 This is one of the many different implications that Wolff derives from the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason that, in §70 of the Ontologia, reads as follows: “Nothing exists without a sufficient reason for 
why it exists rather than does not exist” (Wolff, Christian. Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, §70) 
57 (AA 10:107-108) 
58 (AA 10:108) 
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1772, is that “Changes are something real (according to the testimony of inner 
sense). Now, they are possible only if time is presupposed; therefore, time is 
something real that is involved in the determinations of things in themselves”59. But, 
to this, Kant first counter-argues that nobody would derive the reality of objects in 
space from the reality of the representations of those objects. If anybody were to do 
that, no criterion whatsoever could be provided for distinguishing between, say, a 
dream or fantastic contrivance and something actually taking place before one’s eyes. 
The same, in a way, is true for time: nobody would derive the reality of alterations in 
time from the reality of the representations of those alterations (or from the reality of 
the alteration of representations, for that matter). In keeping with the same example, if 
anyone were to derive the reality of the changes that some specific object undergoes 
from one’s own imagined possible variations of that object, once again no criterion 
could be provided for distinguishing the contrived alterations and those actually 
taking place. This line of argument, Kant admits, presupposes that one avoid thinking 
of one’s self as subordinated to the condition of time (for otherwise, the self that is 
doing the thinking would itself change and, thus, no stability would be gained for one 
to pin representations to). But so long as what one is thinking of is any other object 
that is not the self, the point should hold: time cannot be objectively real for, if it 
were, it would be impossible for us to distinguish an objective succession that occurs 
in the world from the subjective succession that occurs in our representations of that 
world. 
 
The second and more elaborate response to the objection would have to wait 
another nine years to appear. Indeed, it was not until the publication of the first 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant would rebut Lambert conclusively 
and, importantly, in a slightly different way. In Section II of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, specifically in the Elucidation to the Expositions of the Concept of Time, 
Kant reconstitutes Lambert’s criticism as follows:  
 
“Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but disputes its 
absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so unanimously 
proposed one objection that I conclude that it must naturally occur to every 
reader […]. It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of 
our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances 
                                                            
59 (AA 10: 134) 
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together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in time, 
therefore time is something real”60. 
 
To the objection reconstructed thus, Kant responds somewhat differently than 
nine years before by stating that transcendental philosophy does not deny the reality 
of time altogether. Time is indeed real –it is without a doubt the real form of inner 
intuition. What transcendental philosophy does deny is the absolute reality of time, 
i.e. that the predicate ‘real’ could be applied to time abstracting from the 
consciousness for which change is present in the first place. In classical terms, 
transcendental philosophy would say that the concept of time does not, and cannot, 
inhere in the objects but rather it inheres solely in the subjects’ intuitions of those 
objects. Differently to what Kant had questioned in the 1772 letter to Herz, what is at 
stake in the counterargument of 1781 is not Kant’s scepticism regarding the principle 
of sufficient reason. Instead, what is at stake is slightly different in that Kant shows 
that proceeding, as Lambert does, to derive the absolute reality of anything external to 
us from the reality of something internal to us is, properly speaking, a fallacy of 
subreption
61
. 
 
In other words, if in 1772 Kant responded to Lambert by questioning the 
validity and applicability of the principle of sufficient reason, in 1781, more 
committed to the transcendental ideality of time than before, he responded by saying 
the ‘absolute’ qualification of the predicate ‘real’ is a misapplication62. Although the 
difference between the two answers elaborated by Kant is somewhat subtle, it is 
nonetheless worth asking what justifies it: why would Kant first argue that the reality 
of time cannot be derived from the reality of alterations in our representations but 
then argue a few year later, slightly differently, that time’s empirical reality indeed 
holds but its absolute reality does not? 
 
There are several reasons for Kant’s slight change of argumentative strategy. 
The first has to do with the predicate
63
 ‘reality’ only being conceived as a pure 
concept of the understanding towards the mid-1770s. Although the Dissertation 
                                                            
60 (A36/B53) 
61 (A643/B671) 
62  A different way of formulating the same point is as follows: in 1770, when delivering the 
Dissertation, Kant was still unclear about the meaning of the word ‘real’. It was not until the mid-
1770s that Kant gained enough clarity on the concept as to be able to state whether time and space 
were ‘real’ or not. 
63 Recall that predicate, or category (κατηγορία), will acquire a technical meaning in the critical period. 
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specifies in a lot of detail what the principles of sensibility are, and what their 
properties amount to, it leaves the principles of the intelligible somewhat less clear. 
The principle that governs the understanding amounts to little more than intelligence 
being a faculty in the subject through which it represents that which cannot be met 
with in the senses
64
. More specificity would have to wait until 1775 when, in the 
Duisburg Nachlaß, the first mention of ‘reality’ as a concept of the understanding 
appears: “The absolute predicate in general is ‘reality’ and whence [wovon]”65. The 
second reason for the argumentative change has to do with difficulties inherent to the 
strict separation Kant had drawn between the sensible and the intellectual. After 
having separated neatly the provenance and applicability of the principles of each 
‘world’ in the Dissertation, Kant seems to have become aware of a need to allow for 
at least some intelligible concepts to dominate in the sensible world too.  And 
precisely this leads to the third, and final reason, for Kant’s argumentative change 
that will be the focus of what follows and it has to do with a shift in Kant’s general 
perspective as to the scope and limits of ‘phenomenology’ and ‘metaphysics’. 
 
In the concluding remarks to the Dissertation there is a section devoted to 
‘method’ in metaphysics. There, Kant claims that for pure philosophy, unlike for 
other sciences, the use of the understanding is ‘real’ and not merely logical. For this 
reason, metaphysics or pure philosophy must address first and foremost its own 
method: “Here, in pure philosophy, method precedes all science”66. The mention of 
‘method’ in the Dissertation, as Laywine has pointed out, answers to Kant primarily 
being concerned with carving a niche for two branches of special metaphysics: 
rational theology and pneumatology
67
. Both of these sciences would need to be 
purged from any sensible content that could contaminate them and that meant, for 
Kant at that time, purging them from anything sensible that was provided in 
accordance with the principles of space and time. This is to say that the intellectual 
concepts discussed in the Dissertation, i.e. ‘existence’, ‘necessity’, ‘substance’, and 
‘cause’, had all been stripped away from any sensible content and had been left, 
instead, as pertaining solely to an intellectual domain. This, however, becomes 
increasingly problematic: if these concepts bear no relation whatsoever to sensibility 
                                                            
64 (AA 2:392) 
65 (AA 17:657) 
66 (AA 2:411) 
67 Laywine, Alison. “Kant on the Self as Model of Experience” in Kantian Review, Vol. 9,  2005, pp. 
1-29. Henry Allison, too, has pointed this out. See Allison, Henry. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: 
An Analytical Historical Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 49-54. 
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and its principles, how is it then that one is entitled to use them in relation to sensible 
objects? In answer to this, Kant withdraws to a meta-metaphysical discussion on 
‘method’. The ‘method’ in question is a ‘propaedeutic’, a general metaphysics or 
ontology
68
 that would first and foremost determine in advance what the limits of 
cognition –sensible or intellectual–, are. General metaphysics or ontology would, 
insofar as they are a propaedeutic, delineate the contours of what could become a 
science. General metaphysics or ontology would, in sum, show whether and how 
those concepts relate to sensibility –the problem of transcendental philosophy thus 
began taking shape–. 
 
It is clear that if the concepts of existence, necessity, substance, and cause are 
going to pertain to a propaedeutic, to a general metaphysics or ontology, then it must 
be the case that they are applicable in the intellectual domains of special metaphysics 
and, also, in the sensible domain of special metaphysics (for whatever one predicates 
of being in general must in turn be predicated of any particular being). This is to say, 
in Kant’s terminology of the early 1770s, that these concepts need to hold equally 
well for a rational theology and a pneumatology as for a discipline occupied with 
sensible representations, i.e. general phenomenology. To make the point clear perhaps 
it is worth considering the context within which Kant’s first answer emerged. 
Lambert’s letter just discussed came partly in response to Kant’s inaugural 
Dissertation but partly, also, in response to a letter Kant had addressed to him a few 
months earlier. In the earlier correspondence, dated September 1770, Kant hinted at 
the importance of acknowledging the principles that govern sensibility if one is to 
undertake any kind of metaphysical endeavour:  
 
“The most universal laws of sensibility play a deceptively large role in 
metaphysics, where, after all, it is merely concepts and principles of pure 
reason that are at issue. A quite special, though purely negative science, 
general phenomenology (phaenomenologia generalis), seems to me to be 
presupposed by metaphysics. In it, the principles of sensibility, their validity 
and their limitations, would be determined, so that these principles could not 
be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason, as has heretofore almost 
always happened”69. 
                                                            
68 In a loose note from 1783 or 1784 Kant writes: “Metaphysica pura. Ontologia is the system of pure 
principles a priori” (AA 18:284). 
69 (AA 10:98) 
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It would be tempting to think that Kant’s reference to a ‘general 
phenomenology’ in this quote was due more to seeking a common ground with its 
recipient –Lambert– on which to discuss the findings of the Dissertation than to any 
serious commitment with a ‘phenomenological’ discipline. Evidence, however, 
speaks to the contrary. In a letter to his friend Marcus Herz from February 21
st
, 1772, 
almost two years after having engaged with Lambert and in the midst of the ‘silent 
decade’ Kant’s reiterates his ambition for a titanic ‘critical’ project. There again Kant 
claims to be working on a new piece, that would bear the title The Limits of 
Sensibility and Reason, and that would consist of two main parts, i.e.  theoretical and  
practical. The first, theoretical part would in turn consist of a ‘general 
phenomenology’ and a metaphysics70 and only in the possible transition from the first 
to the second, claims Kant, does the key to the secret of all possible metaphysics 
become available through the question of “[w]hat is the ground [Grund] of the 
relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object [Gegenstand]?”71 
Only once the ‘general principles of sensibility’ have been established, that is, can a 
critical metaphysical inquiry take place. General phenomenology, in this sense, is the 
name Kant gave to the discipline that would establish the origins and limits of 
sensible cognition so as to prevent metaphysics from being contaminated with 
elements that are foreign to it
72
. 
 
 But this leaves an important question untouched: is this ‘general 
phenomenology’ suited to act as the propaedeutic that would prepare the ground for 
all of metaphysics? According to what Kant wrote to Lambert in 1770 and then again 
to Herz in 1772 it would seem the answer is clearly affirmative. General 
phenomenology, along with logic, and noology, is in fact the science that, without 
appealing to experience, will prepare the ground for future metaphysical 
investigation:  
 
“All sciences of pure reason are either those that consider the rules of 
universal cognition in general through pure reason or the particular rules of 
pure reason themselves. Logica. Phaenomenologia generalis, Noologia 
                                                            
70 (AA 10:130) 
71 (AA 10:131) 
72 (AA 10:108) 
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generali have as their end merely the rules of universal cognitions that are not 
given through any experience”73.  
 
Although little is said about what the ‘particular rules of pure reason’ might 
be, there is little doubt that, in this fragment dated from around 1769 or 1770, Kant 
thinks general phenomenology can carry out the work of expounding the universal 
laws governing experience without presupposing experience in the first place. 
 
 By the mid-1770s, however, the answer is different. It is not a general 
phenomenology that as propaedeutic will prepare the ground for metaphysics. In its 
place, something different emerges: transcendental philosophy. It became 
increasingly unclear to Kant the extent to which a discipline under the heading of 
‘general phenomenology’ could answer, and even ask, the question about the ground 
of the relation between representations and objects. The reason for this loss of 
confidence resides in that general phenomenology is suited, at best, for scrutinising 
the principles governing sensibility and the way in which they articulate natural laws: 
phenomenology is the science of ‘phainein’, after all74. In other words, a general 
phenomenology can do nothing but presuppose that there is a factual connection 
between representation and object but is wholly unsuited to evaluate its possibility 
critically or, one learns later, transcendentally. As the Duisburg Nachlaß testifies, 
Kant’s disappointment with general phenomenology and his newly found enthusiasm 
for general metaphysics, and perhaps even ontology, led him to start thinking of the 
problem about the connection between the sensuous and the intellectual in different 
ways.  Thus, in this somewhat embryonic piece, a very rudimentary exposition of the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments appears as well as the first 
mention ever of apperception understood as intuition of the self that thinks
75
.  
 
 By 1781 Kant’s suspicions about general phenomenology are no longer 
merely embryonic. Instead, Kant writes that “Philosophy stands in need of a science 
which shall determine the possibility, the principles, and the extent of all a priori 
knowledge”76 and explicitly identifies such science, in the Preface to the Critique of 
                                                            
73 (AA 17:440) 
74  Vid. Lambert’s description of phenomenology as doctrine of ‘Schein’ (φαίνειν) in (NO-II: 
Phänomenologie, II, 217) 
75 “Intuition is either of the object (apprehensio) or of our self; the latter (apperceptio) pertains to all 
cognitions, even those of the understanding and reason” (AA 17:651) 
76 (A2) 
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Pure Reason, to ‘critique’, the task of which is to “discover the sources and 
conditions of the possibility”77 of all of metaphysics in the first place. Critique, thus 
understood, overlaps almost neatly with transcendental philosophy except in one 
regard: critique will not limit itself to dealing with a priori synthetic knowledge, but 
will also have to elucidate analytic a priori knowledge. This is, to some extent, why 
Kant excuses himself in the Introduction to the first Critique from not presenting the 
entirety of a priori knowledge systematically
78 . But insofar as “Transcendental 
philosophy is the propaedeutic to metaphysics proper”79, the domain of both critique 
and transcendental philosophy seems to be the same. Thus, since the mid-1770s and 
onwards, Kant thinks that the task of preparing the way for metaphysics belongs not 
to general phenomenology but to critique, transcendental philosophy, or even 
transcendental logic insofar as “[t]ranscendental philosophy could also be called 
transcendental logic. It occupies itself with the sources, extent, and the boundaries of 
pure reason, without busying itself with objects”80. Perhaps this is why, in the series 
of logic lectures Kant was giving at the time, he explicitly identifies logic, in the 
abstract, with the aforementioned ‘propaedeutic’81  since logic itself “considers in 
everything only the form of concepts, judgments, and inferences. In short, it prepares 
us for other sciences”82. If this is the case, it would seem as if this were something 
that would get further specified in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the latter, Kant 
carefully distinguishes between general and transcendental logic: general logic 
abstracts from any content that its rules could possibly have and instead manipulates 
concepts and the relations they have to one another –but not to intuition. 
Transcendental logic, on the other hand, acknowledges the lessons taught by an 
Aesthetic doctrine. It acknowledges that there are pure intuitions and, even if 
bracketing empirical content, thinks of the rules of the understanding always, without 
exception, in relation to those pure intuitions. Transcendental logic, echoing the need 
for a science announced in the Introduction, “determines the origin, the scope, and 
the objective validity of [pure a priori] knowledge”83. 
                                                            
77 (Axxi) 
78 “We have to carry the analysis so far only as is indispensably necessary in order to comprehend, in 
their whole extent, the principles of a priori synthesis” (A12/B25). 
79 (AA 29:752 [Metaphysik Mrongovius]) 
80 (AA 29:756) 
81 Προπαιδευτχή understood as preparatory doctrine. 
82 (AA 24:791 [Logik Wien]) 
83 (A57/B81) Also: Clinton Tolley has addressed the point of the difference between general and 
transcendental logic with remarkable clarity in a recent article entitled “The Generality of Kant’s 
Transcendental Logic”. Although Tolley is right about the good reasons there are not to draw a 
distinction between general and transcendental logic in terms of scope or domain, and although he is 
right, further, in his attempt at constructing the distinction between these in terms of ‘aspect’, he is 
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Thus, knowing that “Above all, transcendental philosophy requires 
critique”84, leaves matters in the following way: the propaedeutic that was named at 
some point ‘general phenomenology’ gives way to ‘critique’, ‘transcendental 
philosophy’, or ‘transcendental logic’. Insofar as critique and transcendental 
philosophy bring into question the nature of the relation between the understanding, 
its representations, and what they represent they will also go by the name of 
transcendental logic. Viewed in this light, many of the Reflexionen from the mid-
1770s on architectonic and system gain in clarity
85
. Kant writes, for example that 
“Metaphysics is preceded by transcendental philosophy, which like logic does not 
deal with objects but with the possibility, the sum-total and the boundaries of all 
cognition of pure reason (also of pure mathematics). It is the logic of pure rational 
cognition. Prior to transcendental philosophy, the critique of reason in general”86. 
But, importantly, the reasons Kant had for changing his argumentative strategy in 
answering to Lambert also become clearer: Kant seems to have realised somewhere 
between 1772 and 1776 that phenomenology, as the science of ‘Schein’, was unable 
to account for the ground of the relation of objects to their representations. At most, 
the phenomenology appealed to earlier on, phenomenology understood in Lambert’s 
sense, would have been able to justify the subjective associations of representations, 
but without being able to justify their objectivity. On this basis, the 1781 accusation 
of Lambert’s making a fallacy of subreption, an accusation Kant could not have 
upheld in 1772, would seem thoroughly justified: only once the ground of object-
relatedness is brought into question does Kant have the tools to criticise, from the 
newly developed transcendental standpoint, phenomenology’s misconception of the 
nature of intuition. 
 
It is precisely this last point that leads back to Kant’s propaedeutic project: 
how is Kant’s counter-objection to Lambert linked to the broader ambitions of 
transcendental idealism?  Perhaps it is important to dwell, for a brief moment, on this: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
nonetheless mistaken in arguing that ‘transcendental content’, of which Kant speaks in (B105) as 
pertaining to the pure concepts of the understanding, is detached from intuition or ‘unschematised’ 
(Tolley’s expression, not Kant’s). See Tolley, Clinton. “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental 
Logic” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 50-3, 2012, pp. 417-446 
84 (R4558) This fragment was found on the margins of Kant’s copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics. 
85 See, for example, “(…) all philosophy of pure reason is either critique or the organon thereof. The 
former is transcendental philosophy, the latter metaphysics” (AA 18:22 [R4897]) or “Metaphysics is a 
priori cognition of nature, the object of which is at least given by the senses; transcendental 
philosophy is pure a priori cognition” (AA 18:20 [R4889]). 
86 (AA 18:285 [R5644]) 
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what hangs on either holding on to or discarding ‘metaphysics’? Is this not a simple 
semantic discussion as to whether one is comfortable in characterising Kant’s project 
as ‘metaphysical’? Why exactly is it important to keep metaphysics? These are 
important questions and they need to be answered as clearly as possible. In this 
regard, an answer is already in sight and will be further developed in what follows: it 
is fundamental that one acknowledge the Kantian project as ‘metaphysical’ because 
only in so doing does one keep an eye on the problem of transcendence
87
 or object-
relatedness, i.e. on the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge. This does not 
amount, of course, to saying that Kant offers a solution to that problem, but it does 
amount to saying that at the very least it is a problem that plays a crucial role in the 
construction of transcendental philosophy. 
 
 This point can be further specified by means of yet another relevant 
distinction (albeit one that would only appear later, in the mid-1780s) that will speak 
directly to Gardner and Beiser. Critique, pure philosophy, transcendental philosophy, 
and transcendental logic, are all metaphysics to the extent that they are concerned 
with a priori knowledge
88. Furthermore, they are ‘metaphysics’ in an even more 
precise sense since their aim is to answer how synthetic a priori judgments are 
possible, and  “[t]he purpose of metaphysics is to make out the origin of synthetic a 
priori cognition”89. But there are two levels of metaphysics, as was mentioned in the 
Introduction: there is general metaphysics that occupies itself with nature in general, 
and many special metaphysics that occupy themselves with narrower domains within 
that ‘nature in general’. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason this 
distinction between general and special metaphysics still echoes the terminology of 
Kant’s predecessors (especially Wolff90 and Baumgarten):  
 
                                                            
87 Kant would have been justifiably reticent to identify without provisos, the problem of synthetic a 
priori knowledge with the problem of transcendence. The two reasons for this reticence, one can 
speculate, would have to do with the historico-philosophical background of the Latin transcendere and 
its Mediaeval connotations, and with Kant’s somewhat special conception of what the transcendental 
and the transcendent are. What entitles the usage above, however, is today’s use of ‘transcendence’ as 
signalling the relation between things other than the self and the processes for the constitution of the 
objectivity of those things. 
88 In spite of Kant’s criticism of Baumgarten’s definition of ‘metaphysics’ in (A843/A871) on the 
grounds of such definition’s lack of specificity, the similarity between their respective definitions is 
striking. For Baumgarten “Metaphysics is the science of the first principles in human knowledge. To 
metaphysics belong ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology” (Met. Prol. §§1-2). 
89 (AA 18:5 [R4849]) The note is from between 1776 and 1779. 
90 Wolff opens the Ontology as follows “Ontologia seu Philosophia prima est scientia entis in genere, 
seu quatenus ens est” (Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, Prol. §1) 
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“Metaphysics in the narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and 
the physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understanding 
and reason itself in a system of concepts and principles that relate to objects 
in general, without assuming objects that may be given (Ontologia). The latter 
considers nature – i.e., the totality of given objects (...) and is therefore 
physiology (although only rationalis)”91.  
 
Metaphysics, here, if dealing with the system of concepts and principles of the 
understanding and reason, is ontology. If dealing with the application to some 
specific domain of science is something else (depending on the domain itself). In the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, this distinction stops echoing 
Kant’s predecessors and instead goes for a differentiation in scope or levels of 
generality:  
 
“And so a separated [special] metaphysics of corporeal nature does excellent 
and indispensable service for general metaphysics, in that the former 
furnishes examples (instances in concreto) in which to realise the concepts 
and propositions of the latter (properly speaking, transcendental philosophy), 
that is, to give a mere form of thought sense and meaning”92.  
 
That which considers all of synthetic a priori knowledge, one finds, is general 
metaphysics; that which considers the application of a priori knowledge to specific 
domains of cognition, is special metaphysics. In this sense, the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science and the Metaphysics of Morals are special 
metaphysical treatises, but the Critiques are treatises in general metaphysics. 
 
 The point to take away from the preceding discussion is the following: 
separating or disentangling Kant’s broad metaphysics from his conception of critical 
philosophy –be it in relation to time, specifically, or in relation to the nature of 
cognition, generally– is simply not possible. In light of the origin, development, and 
ultimate goal of Kant’s critical project, it can be conclusively maintained that any 
attempt at stripping metaphysical claims away, or reading metaphysics out of, such 
critical project is not only bound to miss its target, but will ultimately do more harm 
than good if the effort is to understand Kant. The 1770s and 1780s Reflexions, 
                                                            
91 (A845/B873) 
92 (AA 4:478) 
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Metaphysics lectures, Logic lectures, Letters, Critiques, and Metaphysical writings, 
all seem to point towards an indissoluble bond between Kant’s critical ambitions and 
his attempts at criticising metaphysics from within. Failing to acknowledge this is 
bound to overlook some key philosophical insights Kant provided philosophy with. 
Take the opening paragraphs of the Analogies, for example, where Kant claims that 
“since experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation in the 
existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it is com-posed 
in time [wie es in der Zeit zusammengestellt ist], but as it objectively exists in time 
[modified]”93. What will a thoroughly epistemological reading of Kant, one that shies 
away from metaphysical claims, be able to say about the contrast between com-
posing in time and objectively existing in time? It will say, and indeed has said, that 
the Analogies should be read as an attempted solution to the problem of the 
possibility for the cognition of an objective temporal order (one apprehends the parts 
of a house successively, yet judges them to be coexisting parts of an enduring object –
how then is such a judgment possible?
94
). It will necessarily take this to mean, 
wrongly, that the question with which Kant is concerned in the Analogies is how time 
consciousness, or the cognition of a temporal order (wrongly equating the two
95
), is 
possible
96. The epistemological reading will conclude, finally, that Kant’s answer to 
the question of the cognition of a temporal order, formulated in just a few words, is 
that one represents appearance as an object, in this case the temporal order, by 
subjecting representations to a rule. But the question formulated above had to do with 
the difference between com-posing a manifold in time and a manifold objectively 
existing in time and, as such, the question has clearly been left untouched in virtue of 
the fact that the distinction between com-position in time and objective existence in 
time is not being recognised. 
 
 Other examples could be given along the same lines
97
, and yet others 
pertaining to the role of time in relation to the second and third Critiques
98
, where a 
deflationary, anti-metaphysical reading, will struggle to find its way. Many of such 
examples, however, will appear later in this investigation. What is important, 
                                                            
93 (B219) 
94 Allison, Henry. Op. Cit. 2004, p. 231. 
95 Wrongly because, Allison thinks, the subjective order is “what would remain if (per impossible) we 
could remove the determinate structure imposed on the sensibly given (the manifold of inner sense) by 
the understanding” Ibid. p. 231. 
96 Ibid. p. 231. 
97 e.g. The capacity to distinguish between logical and real possibilities or the already mentioned 
difference between general and transcendental logic. 
98 e.g. Seeing the connection between time, the future, freedom, and teleology. 
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however, to take away from all of this is simply that, in overstressing the 
epistemological, theory of knowledge related aspects of Kant, anti-metaphysical 
readings will struggle not only to answer important questions concerning the 
architectonic of the critical system and fundamental questions concerning 
philosophical content, but will struggle in even beginning to formulate such questions 
in a transcendental way, i.e. a way that problematises the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgments. 
 
∴ 
 
In this chapter it was seen that it is impossible to separate Kant’s critical 
project from its general metaphysical ambitions, i.e. impossible to separate 
transcendental philosophy from the question on the possibility of metaphysics. For all 
of the merit that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant deserve, insofar as they provide 
extremely detailed reconstructions of some of Kant’s arguments, it remains 
significantly problematic to try to disentangle metaphysics from epistemology in 
transcendental philosophy. It was seen, accordingly, that specifically in relation to 
Kant’s conception of time it would be unwise to separate sharply between an 
epistemological domain and a metaphysical domain. It was suggested, instead, that an 
inquiry into the nature of time and the constitution of objectivity, including of course 
the epistemological aspects therewith associated, must keep in sight Kant’s critical 
project in relation to the entirety of metaphysics. 
 
The chapter began by appealing to a distinction brought forward by Sebastian 
Gardner and Frederick Beiser. The distinction consists in that one can have, on the 
one hand, a soft naturalist, anti-metaphysical, or deflationary approach to idealism or 
have, on the other hand, a metaphysical approach to idealism. To the extent that such 
distinction holds, it was seen that some contemporary Anglophone scholarship on 
Kant leans towards the soft naturalist, deflationary approach. This was done by 
reconstructing some of the major Anglophone interpretations of Kant that to a greater 
or lesser extent subscribe to the anti-metaphysical reading. Against these readings, 
however, three arguments were given that should discourage anyone from 
overemphasising Kant’s epistemological insights at the cost of metaphysics. First, it 
was argued with Gardner that so-called ‘epistemologically-based idealism’ will be 
unable to justify the supposed shift in standpoint that will allow a critical inquiry to 
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draw a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Without that 
distinction, however, one might as well adopt a hard naturalist perspective. Second, it 
was argued with Beiser that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant fail to do justice to 
the broader philosophical and historical context within which transcendental 
philosophy emerged. Most importantly it was argued, third, that Kant’s conception of 
time, and especially of time in relation to the understanding, evolved through a period 
of at least nine years. Whereas early on Kant had been thinking of constructing a 
phenomenological project that would concern itself with the limits of sensibility, later 
on he came to realise that such project needed to be widened. The later project, 
fundamentally and inexorably related to general metaphysics and to transcendental 
logic, is what came to be known as transcendental philosophy. From all of this 
discussion it was concluded, finally, that if an enquiry into the a priori ground of the 
possibility of relating to objects is going to take place, it will have to do so by means 
of acknowledging the possibility of a transcendental logic. 
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Chapter II 
 
The first chapter showed how closely intertwined a transcendental enquiry is 
to the problem of the a priori ground of the possibility of relating to objectivity. This 
was shown by remarking on the difficulties that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant 
necessarily encounter and concluding that transcendental philosophy is best 
understood as a general metaphysical project. But that transcendental philosophy 
seeks the a priori ground of the possibility of relating to objectivity was shown, 
furthermore, by means of tracing Kant’s metaphysical concerns, especially his 
concerns as to the nature of time, historically and philosophically since the time of the 
Dissertation. It was seen that only once the possibility of object-relatedness was 
brought into question did Kant begin to conceive of the relation between intuition and 
understanding transcendentally. 
 
Why, however, would an investigation concerned with the problem of how 
objectivity comes to be constituted focus primarily on the nature of time? There are, 
after all, two forms of intuition so why focus exclusively on one of them? The current 
chapter aims at answering this question in as much precision as possible. To do so, it 
will be shown, first, that time is the most universal and also the most fundamental 
form of intuition. It will be shown, second, that these characteristics of time answer to 
the fact that inner sense is primarily the mode in which the subject affects itself. This 
chapter will therefore be divided accordingly into two main sections. The first section 
will argue in favour of the priority of time over space as the fundamental form of 
intuition: it will be shown that time, inner sense, is the fundamental form of intuition 
insofar as its most primary character is that of being the representation of unity as 
given by subjectivity from itself and to itself. But because two distinct arguments will 
be offered advocating for the priority of time, this section will be, in turn, divided into 
two sub-sections. In the first sub-section it will be seen that time is prior to space on 
logical grounds. It will be argued that although both of the forms of intuition are 
indispensable requirements for the objectivity of outer experience, following Kant’s 
own distinction between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’, only one of those two forms, i.e. 
time, is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of positing a priori content. 
In the second sub-section it will be further seen that time is prior to space, also, on 
ontological grounds. It will be argued, namely, that time, in virtue of being primarily 
self-affection, that is to say the mode in which subjectivity opens itself as receptivity, 
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is the fundamental form of sensibility without which no representation whatsoever 
would be possible –not even the representation of space itself–. From the two 
arguments brought forward in the course of this section it will be concluded, briefly, 
that in being the innermost activity of the subject, time is also the locus that grounds 
the possibility of affectivity. 
 
 The discussion about the priority of time, especially from the argument 
concerning the ontological priority of time, yields an extremely important 
implication. It will be clear that characterising time as self-affection sheds much 
needed light on Kant’s often obscure way of treating time and temporality. But in 
doing so, a question emerges concerning what kind of relation, if any, self-affection is 
supposed to have to apperception. In the second section of this chapter, therefore, the 
role that time plays in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding will 
be elaborated on. It will be argued that, in relation to the A version of the Deduction, 
the supposed ‘paradox’ of self-knowledge and self-consciousness is dissolved by 
means of conceiving adequately of time and its relation to the syntheses of 
apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. It will be further argued that, in relation 
to the B version of the Deduction, the paradox is also dissolved by rightly conceiving 
of the relation between the unity of apperception and inner sense. This is to say that, 
by properly articulating unity and synthesis, it will be shown that in positing 
apperception Kant is positing an instance the essence of which is to encounter itself as 
temporally extended. This, in turn, will be seen to imply that time provides the self 
with a manifold that is independent from space in pure intuition. 
 
 Because of the structure of the chapter itself, one may regard the first section 
as a discussion seeking to illuminate the meaning of time in the Aesthetic of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, and regard the second section as seeking to illuminate the 
meaning of time in the Analytic of the Critique. 
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∵ 
 
§ i 
 
The priority of time 
 
 Space and time are described in the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine 
of Elements, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, as 
pure forms of intuition. This, to Kant, means that neither space nor time are entities 
out there to be encountered but, rather, forms which allow the encountering of entities 
in the first place: space and time are the conditions which allow, in being represented 
purely themselves, the representations of objects of possible experience. The concepts 
of both space and time are each presented in the Aesthetic by means of a 
metaphysical and a transcendental exposition. Although Kant grants from the very 
outset that the exposition [Erörterung, exhibitio] itself will not exhaust all there is to 
say about each one of these concepts
1
, the importance of the remarks made there echo 
throughout all of the Critiques and are therefore worthy of serious consideration. 
About space one learns, in a metaphysical exposition that develops that which is 
given in the concept a priori, four things: that space is not an empirical concept 
derived from experience; that space is a necessary a priori representation underlying 
all outer intuitions; that space is not a discursive or general concept but, rather, itself a 
pure intuition; and, finally, that the representation of space is given as an infinite 
given magnitude [Grösse]
2
. In the transcendental exposition, that unlike the 
metaphysical exposition is supposed to explain the possibility of a priori synthetic 
knowledge, one learns of space that it must be the form of outer intuition and, again, 
an intuition itself –for only thus does it ground synthetic knowledge a priori, e.g. 
geometry. In a similar vein but with slight variations
3
, about time one learns, in the 
metaphysical exposition of the concept, five things: that time is not an empirical 
concept derived from experience; that time is a necessary representation that 
underlies all intuitions; that the possibility of apodeictic principles concerning 
temporal relations is grounded on time’s a priori necessity; that time is not a 
discursive or general concept; and, lastly; that time too is given as one single infinite 
                                                            
1 (A23/B38) 
2 (A22/B37-A29/B45) 
3 Kant kept the five theses about time in the B edition of the Critique but dropped the fifth about space, 
for example. 
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magnitude. In the transcendental exposition of time Kant refers the reader back to the 
third point in the metaphysical exposition and briefly states that, in addition to a priori 
necessity of time for the possibility of apodeictic principles, time must also be 
thought as underlying the very possibility of alteration –something no concept 
whatsoever could ever do. 
 
But, if Kant argues repeatedly that both of the forms of sensibility are 
necessary conditions for objective knowledge, why, then, orient an investigation 
solely to time? Is it that time has some sort of priority over space as the primary form 
of intuition? Why focus an investigation that has the problem of the constitution of 
objectivity at its heart solely on one of the forms of intuition? Kant is clear that 
intuitions and concepts are required for knowledge, but he is also clear there are two, 
and not just one, forms of intuition. What grounds can one have to focus only on one 
of the forms? Is there not a danger in reducing Kant’s position in this way? Why 
could it not be said that time just is ‘co-founding’, ‘co-originary’ or ‘equi-primordial’ 
with space instead of saying that time is prior to, or more fundamental than, it? In the 
current section of this chapter it will be shown that time does, indeed, have priority 
over space. The kind of priority which time will be shown to have is not solely, or not 
exclusively, a logical priority in the sense that time and not space allows one to 
account for the mode of appearing of objects that do not necessarily appear in space; 
also, a kind of ontological priority will be argued for, one that will prove to lead 
necessarily to the problem of the self. This will be done by means of two main 
arguments –logical and ontological, respectively–. 
 
Although the problem of how objectivity comes to be constituted will only be 
frontally addressed in the following Chapter, there is nonetheless an important 
preliminary remark that should be made here. The aim in the current section is not to 
establish time as the sufficient condition for systematised experience of objects but, 
rather, to establish time as grounding the possibility of positing an a priori content-ful 
manifold in intuition. The latter claim should not be taken to mean, that is, that space 
is ‘dispensable’ in accounting for objectivity: Kant is clear, ever since the 1768 
“Directions in Space” essay but also throughout the Critical period, in that the 
specificity of space is indispensable in accounting for the relations objects have to 
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one another and objects have to thought
4
. The claim is weaker, to the extent that this 
Chapter is concerned, and should only be taken to mean that, existence not being 
something one can simply construct a priori
5
, time is a necessary condition for all 
appearing but not a sufficient one in securing the objectivity of experience.  
 
a) Logical argument for the priority of time: In the Aesthetic, Kant presents 
the reader with a series of distinctions the relevance of which, for the further 
development of the general argument of the Critique, can hardly be overestimated. 
Not only does Kant introduce there the difference between intuition and sensibility 
and that between sensation and appearance, he also presents the difference between 
form and matter in the briefest possible way, i.e. in two paragraphs. Intuition, one 
learns, is the immediate relation of a mode of knowledge to its object but intuition 
itself is possible only insofar as the mind is affected in some way. This ‘receptive’ 
capacity for being affected in some way is, simply, sensibility, and “it alone yields 
intuitions”6. With sensation being something like the effect or repercussion that an 
object has on our faculty of representation one can infer that, if an intuition relates to 
its object through sensation, then that intuition relates to something given –in virtue 
of having specified ‘sensation’ as an ‘effect’ or ‘repercussion’ of an object on one’s 
faculty of representation. It is not implied by this, however, that intuition can solely 
be empirical since, one has also learnt, one can represent purely without anything 
belonging to sensation and this latter intuition is, once again in virtue of its lack of 
empirical content, pure. If by appearance one understands the undetermined object of 
an empirical intuition, then, Kant thinks, one must be able to distinguish between its 
matter and its form: its matter is that which corresponds to sensation and its form 
“that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered 
in certain relations”7. These distinctions allow one to see how and why Kant would 
want to use the term ‘pure intuition’ in the way he does: if the pure form of sensible 
intuitions is not encountered but, rather, is necessarily a priori then it is safe to call it 
‘pure’ in the transcendental sense8.  
                                                            
4 See, for example, (AA 2:403); (AA 2:381); (AA 4:554ff) For an interesting account of the possible 
relations between schemata and spatiality, see Gibbons, Sarah. Kant’s Theory of Imagination. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, especially pp. 63-78. 
5 (A179/B221) See, also, Kant’s claim that “the existence of appearances cannot be cognised a priori” 
(A178/B221). The question that inevitably follows, in this sense, is: if the existence of appearances 
cannot be cognised a priori, what can be cognised a priori? 
6 (A19/B33) 
7 (A20/B34) 
8 (A21/B35) In (B2) Kant differentiates between ‘a priori’ propositions and ‘pure’ propositions on the 
basis that there are a priori propositions that derive (albeit weakly) from experience but no pure 
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Now, although the question about the distinction between form and matter 
only briefly mentioned before will be addressed later
9
, one knows the following: 
whereas space is the form of outer intuition –allowing beings other than ourselves to 
be encountered
10
, time is, on the other hand, the form of inner intuition –allowing 
beings in general, ourselves included, to be encountered. Time, unlike space, being 
“the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner states”11 
cannot be thought of directly in terms of shape, or position, “(…) it cannot be a 
determination of outer appearances, it has to do neither with shape nor position 
(…)” 12 , and that means, it must be thought of analogically –by representing 
becoming, a continuous line, a river, or the sort
13
. This peculiarity about time –the 
fact that no matter how hard one tries one is bound to think of it as related to space, 
nonetheless, should not hinder one from seeing that, even if both outer and inner 
sense as the pure forms of intuition underlie all outer representations, only the latter, 
inner sense that is, underlies all representations whatsoever –inner as well as outer. 
This is to say that all appearances are given within time but not all are given within 
space. Time, inner sense, is the formal condition of the connection of all 
representation
14
 and this means, it will be seen in the following sub-section, that it 
contains a priori a manifold in pure intuition
15
. 
 
 Already from these brief remarks it should strike one as odd that the literature 
has conventionally assumed that the manifold of time and space are coextensive or 
overlapping in all that subjectivity may represent. What has come to be known as the 
‘parallelism thesis’16, supposed to illustrate a parallel between appearances of outer 
and inner sense, argues that since there is no sensation pertaining to inner sense, there 
cannot therefore be a manifold that belongs to it and does not, ipso facto, belong to 
outer sense as well. This kind of argument has its origin in one of Salomon Maimon’s 
early criticisms of Kant. Because time and space, Maimon points out, are not forms of 
intuition but forms of the diversity of objects of sense in that they ground the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
proposition does. Since, in the case above, the pure intuitions are never derived from experience but 
necessarily ground experience, they may be called pure in the strict sense. 
9 Cf. (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 59-61) 
10 (A34/B51) 
11 (A33/B49) 
12 (A34/B50) 
13
 (B162ff) 
14 (A31/B47) 
15 (A139/B178) 
16 Collins, Arthur. Possible Experience. University of California Press, LA, 1999, p.115. 
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possibility of comparison
17
, and because comparison can only arise in something 
given as heterogeneous, there is no manifold of time that is not dependent on the 
heterogeneity of spatial representations
18. Maimon’s point has echoed far and wide. 
In Possible Experience, Arthur Collins claims, for example, that “Objects figure in 
representations of inner sense only at second hand. Transient representations of 
outer sense constitute the only ‘stuff’ to which inner sense is receptive”19. For Collins, 
this means that inner and outer sense, time and space as forms of intuition, must be 
parallel with one another to the extent that the manifold of the first is necessarily 
mediated through the manifold of the second. This mediation, in turn, amounts to 
saying that both manifolds are absolutely coextensive insofar as whatever is not 
mediated through outer sense cannot become an object of knowledge. In Collins’ 
reading, therefore, inner sense contains only a second degree manifold, as it were, of 
the representations of the representations already given in outer sense but nothing 
more: “in so far as there is an empirical manifold of inner sense, it will contain 
representations of the representations that make up the manifold of outer sense”20. 
 
 There are two strong reasons for wanting to defend the parallelism thesis. The 
first reason has to do with the structural similarities in the corresponding exhibitions 
of the metaphysical and transcendental concepts of each one of the forms of intuition. 
As it was seen, save for a minor variation in the number of theses expounded in the B 
edition of the Critique, both expositions virtually mirror each other. The second 
reason, even more compelling than the first, has to do with a passage where Kant 
claims that, except from feelings and matters of the will, everything belonging to 
intuition contains nothing but relations of extension, motion, and moving forces
21
. 
Since these relations, in Collins’ reading, have to be ‘mediated’ through spatiality, it 
must follow therefore that relations in intuition must be located in space. In Kant’s 
words, it must follow that “the representations of the outer senses constitute the 
proper material with which we occupy our mind”22. For defenders of the parallelism 
thesis this must mean, in turn, that the manifolds of inner and outer sense are 
completely overlapping. 
 
                                                            
17 (AA 11:391) 
18 (AA 11:392-393) 
19 Collins, Arthur. Op. Cit. p. 107. 
20 Ibid. p. 109. 
21 (B66-B68) 
22 (B67) 
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There are, however, better reasons to have serious reservations about the 
parallelism thesis. Starting with the structural similarities exhibited in both of the 
expositions contained in the Aesthetic, it would be unwise not to acknowledge that, in 
spite of their superficial similarity, there is, also, an extremely important difference. 
The transcendental exposition of the concept of space pursues an ostensive definition 
of the concept by means of geometry
23
. This is not the case with the transcendental 
exposition of the concept of time where Kant self-consciously points the reader back 
to the third point defended in the metaphysical exposition concerning the a priori 
necessity of apodeictic principles for synthetic knowledge
24
. The reason Kant had for 
asymmetrically exposing the two is apparent not only from the first edition of the 
Critique, but also from eleven years before, in the Dissertation. In the 1770 work 
there are, also, structural similarities between the expositions of the principles of 
sensibility, but that does not preclude Kant from constructing a significant argument 
in favour of the priority of time over space in logical terms. The same argument that 
would recur in the Critique goes as follows: space is an infinite given magnitude but, 
in order for it to be intelligible, i.e. in order to render its quantity sensible in the first 
place, one must presuppose the possibility of counting. Counting, however, is itself 
rendered possible in time and in time only: “And we can only render the quantity of 
space itself intelligible by expressing it numerically, having related it to a measure 
taken as a unity. This number itself is nothing but a multiplicity which is distinctly 
known by counting, that is to say, by successively adding one to one in a given 
time”25. From this it clearly follows that the apparent resemblance between the modes 
of exposition is in no way sufficient to justify the parallelism thesis. 
 
 But there is a further reason to be suspicious of the parallelism thesis and this 
reason speaks against the claim that intuition contains nothing but relations 
encountered in outer sense: there is an overwhelming amount of philosophical 
evidence throughout the Critique of Pure Reason that seems to contradict that point. 
                                                            
23 (B40-B41) 
24 (B48-B49) 
25 (AA 2:406) Interestingly, space and time are both, in the Dissertation, immutable “images” (typi), 
but it is time that resembles rational concepts the most and this is what allows Kant to speak of space 
as the image (typus) of time and, also, what allows him to draw the conclusion that both these forms, 
taken together, are “the underlying foundations upon which the understanding rests” (AA 2:405). In 
fact, if one stays with Kant up to the Scholium of Section 4, the justification for this supposed 
similarity between time and rational concepts actually appears: following Kant’s own metaphor, were 
one to venture beyond a certain ‘closeness to the shores of cognition’, one would have to go so far as 
to say that “the concept of time, as the concept of something unique, infinite and immutable, in which 
all things are and in which all things endure, is the phenomenal eternity of the general cause” (AA 
2:410). 
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Kant states, for example, that time and space are two distinct sources of knowledge: 
“Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge [Erkenntnisquellen] from 
which bodies of a priori knowledge can be derived”26. He claims that there is such a 
thing as ‘axioms of time in general’27 –the representation of which hardly seems to 
presuppose ‘mediation’ through outer sense–. And lastly, but importantly, Kant also 
claims that “Time is not a determination of outer appearances”28 but, rather, “(…) the 
formal condition a priori of all appearances whatsoever”29 –space included, just as it 
was in the Dissertation
30–.  
 
This important reason not to agree with the parallelism thesis can be better 
understood by means of a further distinction. Whereas, Kant claims, time is the 
immediate condition of inner appearances, it is only the mediate condition of outer 
appearances
31
. This means that if all representations that are in the subject are in time, 
then what is represented by that subject must also be in time in virtue of time’s 
immediate relation to subjectivity. This movement, which Heidegger and Sherover 
have described as a movement from the immediacy of the temporality of the 
representing subject to the mediacy of the intra-temporality of whatever is 
represented
32
, is very much in line with the Copernican Revolution in the sense that, 
representations of any other (supra-temporal) kind, are inaccessible to derivative, 
finite, and receptive beings –hence Kant’s emphasis on our mode of representation as 
opposed to some other, intellectually intuitive one
33
.  
 
The reasons enunciated above make it very difficult to agree with the 
parallelism thesis but do not, not by themselves at least, justify time’s logical priority 
over space. To establish the latter, one need to look at the Transcendental Logic 
where Kant opens the exposition of the first synthesis, that of apprehension, in the 
Deduction by stating:  
 
“Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of 
external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a 
                                                            
26 (A38/B55) 
27 (A31/B47) 
28 (A33/B50) 
29 (A34/B50) 
30 Vid. Supra. 
31 (A34/B51) 
32  (GA 25, p. 148) and Sherover, Charles. Heidegger, Kant and Time. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1971, pp. 48-57.  
33 (A26/B42) 
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priori or empirically as appearances - as modifications of the mind they 
nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the 
end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in 
which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. This is 
a general remark on which one must ground everything that follows”34.  
 
Once again with Sherover, for whom the remark about the movement from the 
temporality of the representing subject to the intra-temporality of the represented only 
derives from the relation to inner sense of those ‘modifications of the mind’, one can 
explain this as follows. Regardless of the relations attributable to appearances in 
terms of spatiality, representations are ‘brought into relations’ simply in virtue of 
their ‘belonging’ to inner sense. If time is the condition without which no relations, 
not even spatial ones, can be brought to bear, then, it follows that time is logically 
prior to space. It is impossible, therefore, to maintain as Collins does that all relations 
attributable to appearances are spatially mediated. The reason Kant had for making 
the claim Collins uses in support of the parallelism thesis, the claim about everything 
in intuition containing nothing but motive forces, can be explained differently. While 
Kant presents the passive or receptive side of the subject, portrayed in terms of 
sensibility, in the Aesthetic, he presents the active or spontaneous side, portrayed in 
terms of understanding, in the Analytic. In the former, space and time are paired with 
each other but, in light of the greater thesis the Aesthetic is trying to convey, in the 
latter the two are clearly disentangled: time discretely acquires its central importance 
in the Analytic –finding its culmination in the doctrine of Schematism and 
Principles
35
.  
 
 Perhaps a few examples as to the kind of relations Kant has in mind will help 
convey this point more clearly. What Kant calls, in the Metaphysical Exposition of 
the Concept of Time, the Axioms of Time in General, e.g. that time has but one 
dimension and that different times are not simultaneous but successive
36
, illustrates 
that specific relational properties can be drawn from appearances without a necessary 
appeal to their externality or spatiality. Kant goes as far as to say, further on in the 
same section, that the entire doctrine of motion itself is grounded on time’s priority 
over space and this is the case because matter will come to be defined, in the 
                                                            
34 (A98) 
35 Sherover, Charles. Op. Cit. p. 56. 
36 (A31/B47) 
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Phoronomy doctrine of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, as 
whatever is movable in space
37
 something that, ex definitio, presupposes motion. As 
Kant points out, the being and not being of one and the same thing in one and the 
same place is not a contradiction for the simple reason that both predicates may take 
hold at different times
38
. This is partly why further down in the fragment that Collins 
cites in support of the thesis that time’s relations need spatial mediation Kant speaks 
of strictly temporal relations of succession, endurance, and coexistence
39
. Something 
similar, although questionably relational, happens with Kant’s arithmetic conception 
of number. Although this will be dealt with at length in the following chapter
40
, 
suffice it to say for now and only as an example, that numbers, as such, are 
appearances with relational properties the nature of which is undoubtedly temporal 
but not spatial
41
. 
 
Thus, in light of what has been discussed it can be concluded that time has 
some kind of logical advantage, or edge, over space: it allows the subject to account 
for all appearances in general –those which are in space and others which are not 
necessarily spatial. It does so because in being the immediate condition under which 
representations come to be, it acts as conditio sine qua non of representation as such. 
In this sense, it is completely warranted to ask first and foremost about this form of 
intuition in the constitution of objectivity and thereby acknowledge its priority. In 
perhaps overly brief terms, the logical argument in favour of the priority of time over 
space as the fundamental form of intuition claims that time is prior to space simply 
because time is able to account for all representations and is not constrained to a 
given subset of that totality. But it is not the case that time is prior to space only in the 
sense that it allows for more representations to be accounted for. Time is, in fact, also 
prior to space in the sense that it is more closely linked, in its immediacy, to the 
subject as a representing entity
42
. Time, as was just discussed, is the immediate 
condition of inner appearances (volitions, moods, and all modifications of the mind) 
                                                            
37 (AA 4:480) See, also, the root of the name of the doctrine itself: ‘phoronomy’. 
38 (B49) 
39 (B67) 
40 (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-114) 
41 (A142/B182) This affirmation is corroborated and clarified by Kant’s discussion of the construction 
of concepts, being somewhat analogous with sensibilisation in the Schematism, in the Doctrine of 
Method. There, Kant states “To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which 
corresponds to that concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need non-empirical 
intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single object and yet nonetheless, as the construction of a 
concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all 
possible intuitions which fall under the same concept” (A713/B741).  
42 If a metaphor not altogether devoid of irony is allowed, time is, more so than space, ‘closer’ to the 
soul. 
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and this means that what is first and foremost given to subjectivity, as a representing 
and receptive, is that infinite given magnitude
43
 in which one encounters something 
and anything. Precisely why this is the case, nonetheless, remains to be seen. 
 
b) Ontological argument for the priority of time: There is yet a further and 
stronger reason for advocating in favour of the priority of time over space.  This 
further reason does not have to do so much with how much can be accounted for in 
terms of either one of the formal conditions of sensibility but, instead, with what each 
of these forms is and with the way of being of what is in them. Unlike what was 
before termed the logical argument, the ontological argument does not concern itself, 
not initially at least, with being able to account for, or being able to epistemically 
justify all representations. Instead, it will be seen, the ontological argument speaks 
about what is as being irremediably temporal and not being inevitably spatial. In sum, 
the ontological argument concludes that without the orderability provided in the 
representation of time itself, understood as an activity of subjectivity, no 
representation of space would be possible. 
 
 What, after all, does it mean that time is a ‘form’ of intuition? And what 
exactly is represented when one posits time as ‘the necessary representation 
underlying all intuition’44? Two important fragments, both from the Aesthetic, are 
worth quoting to begin answering these two questions: 
 
“Since this form [time] does not represent anything save insofar as something 
is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is 
affected through its own activity [Tätigkeit] (namely, through this positing of 
its representation), and so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but 
an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense”45. 
 
 And: 
 
“Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner states, 
yields indeed no intuition of the soul as an object [Objekt]; but there is 
nevertheless a determinate form, namely, time, in which alone the intuition of 
                                                            
43 (A25/B40) 
44 (A31/B46) 
45 (B67-68) 
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inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations 
is therefore represented in relations of time [Modified]”46. 
 
 A lot will be said in relation to these fragments but for now one central point 
should be considered: although primarily subjective, time is, Kant is saying, the form 
of intuition so far as one is affected by one’s self47. Time is, in other words, the 
activity of subjectivity that propitiates or brings about affectivity. But, does this last 
nuance about time being ‘primarily subjective’ not create severe tension with its 
affective character? How can something be, simultaneously, subjective and affective? 
It is only natural if, following the previous quotes, one asks oneself about the possible 
subjective or objective status of time since Kant had spoken of time as ‘mode of 
intuiting’. But if time is a mode of intuiting, what could it mean that it ‘affects’ the 
subject? It is in order to answer the previous questions that the twofold thesis about 
space and time being empirically real and transcendentally ideal comes into play. As 
it was seen in the previous chapter
48
, by saying that the pure forms of sensibility are 
empirically real Kant means that they belong, as determinations, to the factual 
character of objects –that is, they are not something one can get rid of in one’s mode 
of thinking about objects without it having fatal consequences to one’s very 
conception of what an object is. This is why Kant claims that one must dispute “all 
claim of time to absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as 
a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition”49. 
This entails, correspondingly, the other part of the twofold thesis, namely time’s 
transcendental ideality “according to which it is nothing at all if one abstracts from 
the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, and cannot be counted as either 
subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our 
intuition)”50. The twofold thesis on the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of 
space and time is helpful in clarifying their subjective character. It remains to be seen, 
however, what the affective character of time is. 
 
                                                            
46 (A22-23/B37) 
47  (A33/B49); (A34/B51); (AA 18:623) Yet again, that finite beings seem unable to describe to 
themselves the representation of time other than as a spatial magnitude does not imply that time itself 
is not, first and foremost, original self-affection. This curious property of the representation of time 
will come back as a relation of inverse proportion between the schemata of quantity and quality Vid. 
(Ch. III. §ii, pp. 112-116). 
48 Cf. (Ch. I. pp. 33-34)  
49 (A35/B52) 
50 (A36/B53) 
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Immediately before the first of the self-standing quotations above, Kant 
speaks of ‘form’ as the mode in which the mind from and out of itself affects itself51. 
Even though intuition’s dependency on the ‘existence’ of things52 for providing it 
with determinate content will no doubt factor in the equation, it is important 
nonetheless to dwell, momentarily, on the possible meaning of ‘form’ in this context. 
In the opening lines of the Critique, as was mentioned before, Kant speaks of form as 
“that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered 
in certain relations” 53 . This careful formulation is echoed elsewhere, in some 
Reflexionen for example, where Kant speaks of form in terms of coordination, for 
sensibility, and of subordination, for concepts
54
. Form thus conceived, allows Kant to 
move from ‘order’ or ‘coordination’ as such to the order of whatever is represented. 
Differently put, in stating that order or coordination are ‘form’ properly speaking for 
the sensible object, Kant is also saying that in the ‘form’ of intuition one posits an 
order or coordination according to which affectivity will arise. Because, however, the 
condition without which appearances would not even be such is time, the immediacy 
of that specific form of intuition once again comes to the fore: 
 
“Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, 
as the pure form of all outer intuition is so far limited; it serves as the a priori 
condition only of outer appearances. But since all representations, whether 
they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as 
determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state 
stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, 
time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever”55. 
 
It is important to note that the part of this claim that is being emphasised here 
is not the universality of time, something addressed in the previous sub-section, or the 
specific order of succession that must be represented in the intuition of time, 
something that will be addressed in the following section. The part that is being 
emphasised, rather, is the proximity or immediacy of that intuition to our own 
                                                            
51 “Now that which, as representation, can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, is 
intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition” and, Kant goes on with the 
first self-standing quotation above, “Since this form…” (B67/68). 
52 (Cf. B72) 
53 (A20/B34) 
54 “Form for the objectis sensuum is coordination; form for the objectis rationis is subordination”  
(AA 16:119 [1769-1775]) 
55 (A34/B50) 
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subjective activity
56. All ‘determinations of the mind’, after all, belong to our ‘inner 
state’ –and that inner state, in turn, stands under the condition of time, i.e. under a 
condition of orderability or coordination. What this entails is best clarified in light of 
the age old problem of the relation between time and alteration. If alteration is the 
change of something in time, then a disjunction follows: either one thinks of 
alteration as being a particular species of the wider genus ‘change’ which, in turn, 
presupposes time as succession; or, one differentiates kinds of alterations. Now, it 
would seem that if the first disjunct is followed, that of alteration being a species of 
the genus change, one could, perhaps, identify time or succession as the being of 
change. But, as Aristotle warns in the Physics, this leads to a circular argument in 
which time is what it is in virtue of change, but change is what it is in virtue of time
57
. 
To avoid, then, such circularity, the second disjunct must be followed, namely, 
having to differentiate more than one kind of alteration. Kant is aware of this and he 
therefore distinguishes between alteration as an act of the subject and alteration as a 
determination of an object
58
. Time, properly so called, is identified with the first: in 
representing time one attends “merely to the act of the synthesis of the manifold 
whereby we successively determine inner sense, and in so doing, attend to the 
succession of this determination in inner sense”59. This kind of alteration, itself the 
activity whereby the subject ‘posits’ in abstracto, grounds the possibility of alteration 
as a determination of what appears in space. In this sense, because the very intuition 
of time is almost indistinguishable
60
 from the activity of the subject known as 
synthesis, the immediate relation of time as a form of intuition to the core of 
subjectivity becomes apparent. This is not a claim that would hold for space as the 
form of outer intuition
61
. 
 
Thus, while being given a priori, in time “alone is the actuality of 
appearances possible [In ihr allein ist Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen möglich]”62. 
                                                            
56 Characterising the forms of intuition as activities is not unique to the Critique. See, for example, the 
Dissertation where Kant claims that the concepts of space and time have “been acquired, not indeed, 
by abstraction from the sensing of objects (…), but from the very action of the mind” (AA 2:406). 
57 (Physics, Δ, 208a–223b) 
58 (B154-155) 
59 (B155) (Cf. A204/B249) 
60 The qualifier here is important Vid. (Ch. II. §ii, pp. 77-81). 
61  Putting this differently (if somewhat problematically): matter, the indeterminate correlate of 
sensation, can be intuited only to the extent that it is subject to motion, but motion in space occurs only 
insofar as the subject can differentiate between different states. One differentiates between different 
states on the grounds of time and, therefore, intuition of anything outside of ourselves presupposes 
time as an antecedently given condition. This is, of course, an extremely difficult point but it will be 
elaborated extensively in relation to the Principles Vid. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-129). 
62 (A31/B46) 
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Alternatively phrased, in being the form that most closely characterises the activity of 
subjectivity time provides or yields a somewhat determinate orderability. This is 
what, in a way, makes time a ‘source of knowledge’63: that only in intuiting time, is 
conceptual determination expanded, a priori, beyond its merely logical form. This is 
why one can say that assertions such as ‘various times are not simultaneous but 
successive’ are synthetic a priori64. One comes to see the specific character or mode 
of the orderability provided in time precisely because of this.  If time as pure form of 
intuition is to be thought at all, it must be thought of as providing the subject with the 
orders of succession, endurance, and coexistence seen before –even if the dynamicity 
of the Analogies is needed to construct these orders in relation to space–. Although 
the importance and implications of this will be dealt with at length much later
65
 what 
is nonetheless important to keep for now is that this order is “(…) nothing but the 
mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity”66.  
 
Of course it is granted that, were space not also prior to experience, no 
possible outer intuition would arise –not even of one’s self as an embodied being 
occupying a determinate location–. Space, too, is an a priori intuition. But that does 
not entail, as far as one can see, that space itself is co-originary with time for it 
presupposes in any case the possibility of being affected in the first place, i.e. it 
presupposes time as self-affection or as having opened the possibility of affectivity in 
the first place. It is the presupposition of this order that partially justifies Kant’s first 
formulation, in the A edition, of the principle that makes experience possible in the 
Analogies
67
 and what justifies Kant in relating the unity of time itself to the necessary 
                                                            
63 (A38/B55) 
64 (A31/B47) 
65 Vid. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 116-125) 
66 (B67/68) Or, differently put, this order is “the time in which we set representations, which is itself 
antecedent to the consciousness of them in experience” (B67). 
67 (A177); The B-Edition formulation differs from it and goes as follows: “Experience is possible only 
through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B218). Although the Principles 
generally exhibit the previous conclusion in a relatively clear manner, a serious worry emerges if one 
commits to the point. The worry is that of attributing Kant a kind of impositionalist formalism which 
ends up sacrificing the role of that which is being taken up by form itself and no one, as far as the 
author of this is aware, has dealt with this issue more extensively than Fiona Hughes. In her view, 
Kant’s formal idealism, as opposed to a material one (A491/B519), is committed to the idea that 
“something must be given to the mind if experience is to be possible” (Hughes, Fiona. Kant’s Aesthetic 
Epistemology: Form and World. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007, p.88). This means that 
in the Copernican Revolution “Kant’s general point is that the extra-mental given in experience can 
only be taken up into consciousness and thus qualify as known by us insofar as we supply an a priori 
element that comes from mind alone. There are two elements of form, both aesthetic and conceptual, 
and they conjointly allow the unification of the sensory object under the rules of understanding so as to 
give rise to knowledge” (Ibid. p. 91). What Kant claims, therefore, is not that one imposes an order on 
objects but, rather, that the forms of intuition allow one to grasp something extra-mental –that is, they 
make possible one’s reception or response to objects: “If receptivity is a necessary component of 
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unity of apperception
68
. Without being able, however, to go much further here, it 
should be noted that all the ontological argument in favour of the priority of time 
states is that whatever is in space, it must also and necessarily be intra-temporal. Or, 
strengthening further the claim, the ontological priority of time resides in that in order 
for anything to be spatial, that anything had to be, temporal. 
 
The arguments presented so far in this chapter raise important questions. In 
light of what has been seen, there is little doubt in that Kant thinks of time as the most 
universal and most fundamental form of intuition. There is little doubt, furthermore, 
in that all that appears, must do so as temporally conditioned. The main concern Kant 
has throughout the Analytic, however, is not so much appearances in general, but, 
rather, knowledge that can, and must, be systematised into experience. A somewhat 
clumsy way of stating this last remark, but hopefully helpful, is by saying that, 
although time is a necessary condition for all appearing, it is not a sufficient condition 
for systematised knowledge. This implies a serious restriction on what time can offer 
in the Kantian view: without external validation, what one remains with is solely 
appearances but not secure objective knowledge. From this, two questions arise: first, 
what else, in addition to time, needs to be posited as for secure objective knowledge 
to arise? And, second, how is one to understand those appearances that, while being 
time-bound, do not amount to secure knowledge? Furthermore, the fundamentality of 
time is philosophically committing in the sense that it links the opening of affectivity 
directly and immediately to the activity of subjectivity. But does this point in favour 
of the priority of time mean that, in Kant’s terms, ‘all that is manifold in the subject is 
given by the activity of the self’? If so, then it would seem there would be little 
                                                                                                                                                                         
knowledge, then it cannot simply be the case that mind imposes order on the world” (Ibid. p. 93). 
When, however, the previous position is extended enough as to understand the Analogies under its 
light a problem would seem to emerge. When dealing with the second Analogy, succession in time, 
Kant has to distinguish subjective from objective succession in time. He does so by saying that 
“Everything, every representation even, insofar as we are conscious of it, may be entitled object 
[Objekt]. But it is a question for deeper enquiry what the word ‘object’ ought to signify in respect of 
appearances when these are viewed not insofar as they are (as representations) objects, but only 
insofar as they stand for an object” (A189-190/B234-235). The problem resides in that there is no way 
of going beyond our own representations, but, at the same time, there is no way of staying in them if an 
account of objective succession is required: “what sort of a connection in time belongs to the manifold 
in the appearances themselves?” (A190/B235). In other words, the materiality of the given is not 
necessary to account for the temporal succession of the manifold, not even in its representational vein 
for, otherwise, one would not be able to claim that, say, a feeling endures in any objective sense. It is 
doubtlessly true that Hughes provides a possible solution to this by reminding the reader that Kant 
concludes the second Analogy thus “a priori knowledge is simply the anticipation of our own 
apprehension, the formal conditions of which alone count as a priori” (Hughes, Fiona. Op. Cit. p. 
228). It is also true, however, that this generates very serious tension with Kant’s claim that in stating 
the possibility of the categories as a preformation system of pure reason one states their necessity and 
objective validity (A130); (B167). 
68 (B220) 
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ground for differentiating between an intuitive intellect and a discursive intellect –but 
this is not something Kant can afford–.  
 
§ ii 
 
Self-affection and Apperception 
 
 Characterising time as an activity of subjectivity, indeterminate and 
ambiguous as it has been left so far, helps to clarify time’s pre-eminence in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. By relating synthesis to intuition, but without 
equating the two, Kant offers a picture where the activity of affecting one’s self is the 
condition without which no representation, of whatever kind, is possible. If, as was 
mentioned before, Kant presents in the Transcendental Aesthetic an account of time 
related to passivity and the constitution of affectivity, it is only fair to expect that in 
the Transcendental Logic he would present an account of time related to spontaneity 
and the constitution of objectivity. In what follows it will be shown that inner sense is 
represented in intuition as having the specific directionality and orderability it does 
precisely because the activity of synthesis itself generates such directionality and 
orderability in the process of rendering itself sensible through the power of 
imagination. It will be seen, specifically concerning the problem of the relation 
between apperception and inner sense, that the synthetic unity of apperception renders 
itself sensible by means of positing a priori a manifold of inner sense. This, it will be 
concluded, is what will ultimately allow for one’s self to be transcendentally and 
empirically affected. 
 
 In spite of the clarity and insight into the nature of time gained with the 
arguments of the last section the questions with which the previous sub-section came 
to a close only become more pressing once attention is paid not only to intuition and 
its form, but also to understanding –the second stem of human knowledge–. In the 
closing lines of the previous section it was implied that tension arises when one 
thinks of time as the activity of affecting one’s self. Expanding on this, the tension 
resides in that if one understands inner sense to be an activity, precisely what was 
defended before, then it is difficult to see how or why it would also be affective or 
affect-able. In other words, it would seem as if of inner sense one either predicates its 
active character, or one predicates its passive character, but not both. Kant himself 
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was aware of this tension and, in his way of formulating it, it becomes a full-fledged 
paradox:  
 
“this sense [inner sense, time] represents to consciousness even our own 
selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we 
intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected, and this would seem to be 
contradictory, since we should then have to be in passive relation [or active 
affection] to ourselves [wir uns gegen uns selbst als leidend verhalten 
müssten]”69.  
 
In being an agent, differently put, one is also a patient
70
. The several 
complexities and ramifications of Kant’s doctrine of self-affection, self-
consciousness, and self-knowledge, have been pointed out many times
71
. This has to 
do with what Ameriks calls the ‘intrinsic complexity’ of the doctrine72, but it also has 
to do with what Fink-Eitel has pointed out regarding the doctrine’s relevance, namely, 
that “Kantian philosophy is the first philosophy that is grounded, as a whole, on a 
theory of self-consciousness”73. In what follows, however, the focus will be on the 
possibility of empirical self-knowledge and on why self-affection and inner sense are 
not a hindrance but a necessary condition for self-knowledge. Because it would be 
impossible to address the myriad issues that arise in Kant’s doctrine of self-
knowledge the following discussion will be narrower in scope: the paradox of self-
affection will be treated in strict relation to inner sense as it has been so far construed. 
 
 In a remarkably clear piece on the subject matter at hand, Markos Valaris 
argues that the paradox of empirical self-knowledge resides in that, within Kant’s 
doctrine of sensibility, the subject has to be both passive, insofar as it is affected by 
itself, and active, insofar as it affects itself
74
. The solution to the paradox, namely that 
“a subject has empirical knowledge of itself as an appearance, and not as a thing in 
                                                            
69 (B152) 
70 Mörchen, Hermann. Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant. De Gruyter/Max Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1970, pp. 
43-56. 
71 e.g. By Karl Ameriks, Henry Allison, or Pierre Keller, to name but a few. See: Ameriks, Karl. 
“Understanding Apperception Today” in Kant and Contemporary Epistemology (ed. Parrini, Paolo). 
Kluwer, Dodrecht, 1994, pp. 331-347; Allison, Henry. “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object” 
in Kant-Studien, 59 (1-4), 1968, pp. 165-186; and Keller, Pierre. Kant and the Demands of 
Consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 103-ff. 
72 Ameriks, Karl. Op. Cit. p. 331. 
73  Fink-Eitel, Hinrich. “Kants transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien als Theorie der 
Selbstbewusstseins” in Zeitschrift fuer philosophische Forschung, Bd. 32, H. 2, 1978, p. 212. 
74 Valaris, Markos. “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason” in Philosophers’ Imprint, Volume 8, No.4, May, 2008. 
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itself”75, he rightly thinks, is entirely predicated on the claim that the synthesis of 
imagination makes experience of objects possible
76
. This solution is available to 
Kant, he goes on, because of the resources presented in the Transcendental Deduction 
of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding –specifically, the resource of an 
imaginative synthesis–. To be able to represent anything in intuition, one needs, 
beyond impressions received from the outer world, impressions to be organised in a 
spatiotemporal manifold. Impressions need, in other words, to be inserted into the 
relational structure of space and time. It is the synthesis of imagination that takes up 
precisely such task and in doing so makes experience of objects possible: it is the act 
of consciousness whereby sensibility is affected by the understanding. Valaris notes, 
however, that this should not be taken to mean that sensibility must have had some 
pre-given spatiotemporally undetermined manifold before even carrying out its 
combinatory action. That space and time are the forms of intuition surely entails that 
things cannot appear but spatiotemporally determined and this applies to the 
representations of space and time themselves
77
. In this sense, space and time do have 
a formal structure (geometrical and chronological, respectively) but they lack unity 
since ‘unity’ is never merely given. The unity of space and time has its source, 
instead, in one’s own activity solely: “the upshot of the Transcendental Deduction is 
that sensibility itself owes its spatiotemporal form to the synthetic activity of the 
understanding”78 . This is why the figurative synthesis needs to play, in Valaris’ 
reading, two distinct roles in the process of cognition: in a material sense, the 
imagination is also called ‘apprehension’ (in the B-Deduction) and what it does is 
provide the self with a particular spatiotemporal order of an empirical manifold; in its 
transcendental sense, however, it provides the self with the pure or formal intuitions 
of space and time. 
 
 For its many complexities, Valaris’ point is relatively easy to grasp in relation 
to outer sense. The transcendental syntheses have to include an awareness of one’s 
own situational standpoint. If one perceives, for example, a sofa in the corner of a 
room, the synthetic processes that yield cognition of the sofa possible also yield one’s 
own position in relation to that sofa, e.g. ‘the sofa is beside me’. To see an object 
                                                            
75 Ibid. p.1. 
76 Ibid. p.7. 
77 Valaris thereby dismisses, like Longuenesse before him, the distinction between form of intuition 
and formal intuition as incoherent. See: Longuenesse, Béatrice.  Kant and the Capacity to Judge. 
Princeton University Press, NJ, 1998, pp. 214-228. 
78 Valaris, Markos. Op. Cit. p. 8. 
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spatiotemporally located is to see it ‘from where one stands’, as it were. Indeed, the 
solution to the issues concerning inner sense rests, Valaris thinks, on recognising that 
the role of inner sense is “(…) precisely to make the subject aware of its outer 
perceptions as its own in just this sense, and thereby becoming aware of itself in 
relation to the objects of its outer perceptions as well”79. ‘Awareness’, after all, was 
not part of the ‘content’ of sensibility. Instead, such awareness must stem from 
elsewhere. An experience not only conveys the information of its spatiotemporal 
location, it conveys, too, further information about the perspectival stance adopted in 
regard to that experience. That is, for Valaris, the crux of the matter: “this further 
information cannot be part of the content of outer intuitions; it must, rather, be 
characteristic of the specific mode in which we are aware of our outer intuitions in 
experience”80. Inner sense, he concludes, just is that mode of being aware of outer 
intuitions in experience because in inner sense the subject appears as a point of view 
only, and not in any ‘substantive’ way81. The paradox of self-knowledge is therefore 
solved insofar as inner sense, or time, simply is the act of adopting a specific 
perspectival stance with respect to the way things, and our selves, appear. 
 
 Valaris’ account is extremely helpful in conveying the complicated relation in 
which inner sense and self-knowledge stand: it is because of inner sense that one is 
able to locate one’s self in relation to outer intuitions. Were it not because of time, 
then, one would be unable to experience the organisation of outer objects in any 
significant way. Going even further, inner sense provides the self with important 
information as to its own spatiotemporal relations –to itself and to other beings. 
Valaris is absolutely right in the way he thinks of the problem of self-affection and 
self-knowledge: for the Kantian doctrine of inner sense to be philosophically viable 
the subject must be both passive, to the extent that it is affected by itself, and active, 
to the extent that it affects itself. He is right, furthermore, in that if a solution to the 
problem exists in Kant, then it must be in relation to the power of imagination and the 
role the latter plays in relation to sensibility and the synthetic processes making 
cognition possible. The problem with Valaris’ argument, however, is that it 
mistakenly concludes that time is solely the mode of being aware of outer intuitions 
and nothing more. That is to say, for Valaris, and other readings that follow similar 
                                                            
79 Ibid. p. 9. 
80 Idem. 
81 Ibid. p. 11. 
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lines
82
, inner sense can only and exclusively be the mode of awareness of the subject. 
But this conclusion relies on the mistaken premise that the manifolds of outer and 
inner sense just are one and the same manifold. In spite of the fact that Kant had 
claimed, in the Aesthetic still, that inner sense yields indeed intuitions
83
 Valaris 
insists that inner sense does not provide any ‘meaningful material’ for subjectivity to 
synthesise. Instead, he agrees with Allison in that the epistemic role of time is entirely 
procedural: time provides the limiting conditions in the acquisition of empirical 
knowledge. This can be corroborated, according to Valaris, in the B version of the 
Deduction where Kant claims: “I exist as an intelligence (…) which, in regard to the 
manifold that it is to combine, is subject to a limiting condition that it calls inner 
sense”84. From this, Valaris derives that there is no independent manifold of inner 
sense since Kant’s concerns were, above all else, epistemological and, thus, that Kant 
could not have been concerned with representations such as feelings, pain, volitions, 
or, by implication, things such as what Kant calls the Axioms of Time in General
85
. 
Rather, what Kant must have been concerned with is only what is given to the faculty 
of sensibility as outer intuition. 
 
 It was seen in the previous section, nonetheless, that equating the manifold of 
inner sense with the manifold of outer sense is not possible. Thus, Valaris’ account 
ends up owing an explanation as to what, if any, the role of inner sense will be once it 
is thought appropriately and independently from outer sense. In claiming, for 
example, that the role of inner sense is only that of allowing the self to position itself 
in relation to outer intuitions, Valaris reduces the function of time to the means 
through which the self will manage to establish itself in spatial relations to itself and 
other objects. Since in this account the manifold of inner sense just is the same as the 
manifold of outer sense but seen procedurally and from within, it becomes extremely 
unclear how the self will manage to establish itself in temporal relations to things. 
One can, in a very everyday sense, locate oneself as, say, having shown up before or 
after the departure time of a train. Even without necessarily appealing to spatial 
relations, further, one can position one’s self in relation to any previous or future 
                                                            
82 Allison and Collins being but two examples. 
83 (A33/B49) 
84 (B158-159) 
85 This is to the extent that Valaris thinks feelings, volitions, etc. are representations in the first place. 
In fact, Valaris insinuates that these are hardly representational and certainly not ‘sensational’ since no 
matter whatsoever is given in their intuition. For the many problems this kind of argument faces, 
however, see Dickerson, A. B. Kant on Representation and Objectivity. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004. 
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moment, e.g. yesterday or tomorrow, with enough certainty. It seems unwise to 
sacrifice the possibility of accounting for the originality of these kinds of relations for 
the sake of maintaining Kant’s supposed empiricism. 
 
 But if this kind of solution to the problem of self-knowledge and the paradox 
of the active passivity or passive activity of inner sense is not viable, what sort of 
solution does Kant have? Is the Kantian account of self-knowledge bound to remain 
in utter obscurity? Or is there a way to interpret Kant’s argument that renders it 
philosophically tenable? In what follows, an argument that takes into consideration 
what has been discussed so far will be elaborated. In somewhat similar lines to 
Heidegger, Henrich, Fink-Eitel, and Mörchen it will be argued that the unity of 
consciousness just is the act of determining itself as consciousness of unity. It will be 
argued, furthermore, that Kant does indeed think that a pure manifold of inner sense 
is posited a priori and that, only once this is acknowledged, can one begin to think of 
Kant’s solution to, first, the paradox of self-knowledge but, second, the problem of 
how the categories come to be endowed with transcendental content. In overly brief 
terms, the account that follows suggests that it is by means of the transcendental 
power of imagination that the self can be, at once, active and passive –towards itself, 
and towards anything else–. 
 
 To begin with, it helps keeping in mind the many characterisations Kant gives 
of the faculty of understanding:  spontaneity of knowledge
86
, power of thought
87
, 
faculty of concepts
88
 or even judgments
89
, and, most importantly, the characterisation, 
Kant tells us, the characterisation that “comes closer to its essential nature”90: the 
faculty of rules which “is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be 
increased by any additions from without” 91. As Béatrice Longuenesse has pointed 
out
92, a rule is according to Kant “the representation of a universal condition in 
accordance with which a certain manifold (of whatever kind) can be posited”93. In 
this sense, concepts themselves are, properly speaking, ‘rules’. If an intuition is an 
immediate and singular representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept is a 
                                                            
86 (A51/B75); (B137) 
87 (B158) 
88 (A50/B74) 
89 (A295/B352) 
90 (A126) 
91 (A64/B89) 
92 Longuenesse, Béatrice. Op. Cit. pp. 48-50. 
93 (A113) 
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mediated and general representation (repraesentatio per notas communes)
94
 that acts 
as the condition of unification of a manifold. This means concepts are discursive or 
reflected representations of what is common to a plurality of things
95
. Representing 
what is common to several things simply means to think as unified the plurality of the 
things that fall under a given concept. It is in this sense that Kant speaks of the unity 
of the concept as being its ‘form’ as opposed to its ‘content’ or matter, which is the 
determinability of that concept’s object 96 . This shows that two things are, then, 
important to concepts: on the one hand, concepts must represent what is common to 
many but, on the other hand, concepts must preserve the difference amongst the 
elements they unify (otherwise, as the Jäsche Logik discusses later, commonality 
would not even show up)
97
. In representing, therefore, what is common to several 
things, one must hold before one’s self the fact that commonality is of several things. 
 
 Where, however, does the unity thought of in the concept come from? Why 
can one think of the commonality of several things as unified? If the concept in 
question is empirical, Kant claims, then that unity is arrived at by means of 
comparison, abstraction, and reflection
98
. If, say, several four-legged animals appear 
in one’s intuition, one can first compare each one of these creatures with one another, 
abstract then from their specific differences, and reflect, finally, on what is common 
to all –thus arriving at the genus ‘cat’, ‘dog’, etc99. If the concept in question is not, 
however, empirical and is instead pure or a priori, then figuring out the origin of the 
unity thought of in that concept is slightly more complicated (as is thinking about the 
manifold that such concepts unify). Indeed, “A pure concept is one that is not 
abstracted from experience but arises from the understanding even as to content”100. 
Thus, trying to figure out what the unity of pure concepts amounts to cannot remain 
with logical analysis only but will necessarily involve digging into the activity of the 
subject that unifies in the first place. For Kant, this activity is simply called synthesis: 
“synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and 
                                                            
94 (AA 9:91 [Jäsche Logik]) 
95 (AA 9:97) 
96 (A239/B298) 
97 (AA 9:146) 
98 (AA 24:907 [Wiener Logik]); (AA 24:752ff [Dohna-Wundlacken Logik]); (AA 9:94 [Jäsche Logik]) 
99 Kant’s account on the acquisition of empirical concepts is not without issues, as Pippin has pointed 
out. Since the concern, at this point, is not with empirical concepts but with pure a priori concepts, the 
issue will be set aside. Pippin, Robert. “Kant on Empirical Concepts” in Studies in History of the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1979, pp. 1-19. 
100 (AA 9:92) 
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unifies them into a certain content”101. Synthesis, in other words, is that activity 
which gives rise to the possibility of thinking the unity that must necessarily be 
posited in order for pure concepts to count as such
102
. If one can think of a unity that 
pertains to the pure concepts of the understanding, it is so because it pertains to the 
nature of synthesis to ‘collect’ or bring together what would have otherwise been 
heterogeneous. Kant is famously ambiguous as to the nature of this supposed 
‘unity’103, of course, but what is important to keep in mind here is that collecting, 
bringing together, synthesising, are all activities that pertain to the understanding and, 
in this particular sense, the unity thought of in the concept must have its origin in that 
understanding. It is this insight, the insight that the birthplace of the categories
104
 is 
found in the understanding, which initially uncovered the problem of the legitimacy 
of the employment of the pure concepts of the understanding for Kant
105
. 
 
Immediately before presenting the Table of Categories, Kant claims that what 
transcendental logic teaches is not how one subsumes representations under concepts 
but, rather, how one brings the pure synthesis of representations to concepts
106
. What 
transcendental logic teaches is, in other words, how the pure concepts of the 
understanding are endowed with transcendental content. This and nothing more is 
what is at stake in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding: “The 
                                                            
101 (A77/B103) 
102 A ‘Fichtean’ worry might appear here concerning the nature of so-called positing [Setzen]. Is 
positing as understood here something defensible in Kant? It is important to distinguish Kant’s from 
Fichte’s doctrine of positing: Although for both Kant and Fichte positing is the product of the act of the 
positing of the self by itself, only for Fichte is the latter, the act of self-positing, immediate in the sense 
that it is simply an awareness of the subject-object relation. From this immediacy one can further infer 
that the positing of the self is absolute and not discursive (Werke I.97) and, in that sense, different from 
the Kantian self-positing to the extent that Kant’s positing of the self, and of anything else for that 
matter, is mediated through intuition (strictly speaking, through the fundamental form of intuition, i.e. 
time). See Fichte’s 1794 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschafstlehre (Werke, I. 93-98). 
103 In the famous “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, Dieter Henrich invites 
the reader to think of this ambiguity as presented in the second version of the Deduction in much 
clearer terms than the ones suggested so far (See: Henrich, Dieter. “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4, (Jun. 1969), pp. 640-659, p. 
640.) The proof, up to §20, is stated as a conditional: Kant “established that intuitions are subject to 
the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity” (Ibid. p. 645). Kant indicates thus 
by capitalizing the indefinite article in the expression “in Einer Anschauung” (B143) which is not 
usually capitalized, and which, because of its root, points towards Kant’s interest in showing the unity, 
not the singularity of the intuition (Henrich, Dieter. Op. Cit. p. 645). The result of the proof until §20, 
therefore, is only valid insofar as intuitions already contain some unity and, so, “wherever we find unity, 
this unity is itself made possible by the categories and determined in relation to them. In our 
representations of space and time, however, we have intuitions which contain unity and which at the 
same time include everything that can be present to our senses” (Ibid. p. 646). 
104 (A65/B90) 
105 “The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also precede, as conditions under which 
alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical 
cognition of objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition 
nothing is possible as object of experience” (A93/B126). 
106 (A79/B104) 
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explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I call 
a transcendental deduction”107. Knowing that the pure synthesis of representations 
and concepts must ‘meet’, as it were, is what allowed Kant to ask the question as to 
whether the object alone makes the representation in the subject possible or 
representation alone makes the objects possible
108
. It should be clear that, if the first, 
then, only empirical representations would be possible. Since, however, other kinds 
of representations are possible, then it must be the second, i.e. the representation must 
make the object possible. This does not entail, in any way, that representation or the 
representing subject ‘causes’ the object. It means, instead, that in having derived the 
Table of Categories from the Table of Judgments in a Metaphysical Deduction, Kant 
begins outlining a field for objectivity in general that is object-enabling. Thus, 
  
“Transcendental logic has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori 
which the transcendental aesthetic offered to it (…) Space and time contain 
[that] manifold of pure a priori intuition but belong nevertheless to the 
conditions of receptivity (…) Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that 
this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way 
in order for a cognition to be made out of it. This act I call ‘synthesis’ 
[Modified]”109. 
 
 The A edition account of this ‘going through’, ‘taking up’, and ‘combining’ is 
relatively well known. At the empirical level this works as follows: through the 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the subject successively runs through a 
manifold in perception. In successively perceiving something, differently put, the self 
apprehends pluralities of things or pluralities of parts of things. Through the synthesis 
of reproduction in imagination cognition re-produces the given in empirical 
apprehension, ‘bringing a representation back’ (this is all that ‘retaining’ means), if it 
will be able to establish associations between objects. Through the synthesis of 
recognition in concept, finally, the mind identifies what it had previously 
apprehended and reproduced, intuited and imagined, and re-cognises it or brings it 
into unity as concept, insofar as the representation is the same as itself
110
. At the 
transcendental level, nonetheless, the process works slightly differently: the 
transcendental synthesis of apprehension must hold together a plurality in intuition 
                                                            
107 (A85/B117) 
108 (A92/B124) 
109 (A77/B102) 
110 (A103) 
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that makes possible the empirical running through of multiplicities in perception
111
. 
The transcendental synthesis of the productive power of imagination generates 
succession, as it were, so that apprehension is able to pick up that plurality, to ‘hold it 
together’, and for the empirical synthesis of reproduction to have something to 
reproduce –this is why Kant believes there is an essential connection between the first 
two syntheses
112
. The specific operations being carried out by the transcendental 
power of imagination will be examined in substantial detail in the next chapter
113
. For 
now, and for the sake of simplifying what already is an extremely difficult issue, 
however, it should suffice to keep in mind that Kant believes that not even the 
representations of pure space and pure time would be possible without this 
transcendental power
114
. The transcendental synthesis of recognition, finally, provides 
the self with the possibility of ascribing identity to the representations produced. 
Thus, the synthesis of recognition at the transcendental level, comes to unify the 
entirety of the process as for it to be worthy of the name ‘cognition’ in the first place.
  
 
 But if the operations that make cognition possible are divided and diverse, on 
what grounds can one claim that they constitute ‘one’ cognition or, even, cognition 
‘in one subject’? In answer to this question Kant remarks that, insofar as the three 
syntheses answer to the question of what the nature of the relation between the 
cognising subject and the object of that subject’s cognising is115, a unity needs to be 
posited as grounding and unifying the three processes. Without this original unity the 
syntheses would be disarticulated from one another to the extent that cognition would 
not be possible. But this unity, just like its synthetic counterparts, can also be of two 
kinds, i.e. empirical or transcendental. The empirical unity of apperception, or 
consciousness of the unity of the diverse acts of syntheses, unifies the manifold as for 
it to be subsumable under one representation: “The word ‘concept’ itself could 
already lead us to this remark [the remark of the consciousness of the unity of 
synthesis]. For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been 
successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation”116. On the 
basis of the empirical consciousness of unity, then, the interrelatedness of the 
                                                            
111 (A99) 
112 (A102) 
113 Cf. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-129) 
114 (A102) 
115 (Axvi) 
116 (A103) 
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processes of cognition at the empirical level becomes relatively clear: just as much as 
reproduction presupposes a prior produced something in apprehension, recognition 
presupposes a prior reproduced something in imagination. But this is hardly the end 
of the story for even that consciousness of the unity of syntheses itself presupposes a 
further transcendental unity that grounds it. Thus, if empirical apperception is the 
consciousness of one’s own inner states, transcendental apperception is “the pure, 
original, unchangeable consciousness that is the necessary condition of experience 
and the ultimate foundation of the unity of the latter”117. This is to say, borrowing an 
Allisonian expression
118, that consciousness of the unity of one’s diverse acts of 
synthesising is itself grounded on the transcendental unity of consciousness that 
conditions it. More accurately put, this time with Fink-Eitel, the transcendental unity 
of apperception is the unity of the consciousness of unity and multiplicity
119
. This 
implies amongst other things that, if it really is the case that both apprehension and 
production are, even at a transcendental level, subject to the original unity of 
apperception, and knowing that this original unity is synthetic
120
, then it must be the 
case that the transcendental unity of apperception, spontaneous as it is, provides itself 
from itself and for itself with the possibility of encountering a unified temporal 
successive manifold in intuition
121
. 
                                                            
117 (A107) 
118 Allison, Henry. “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object” in Kant-Studien, 59 (1-4):165-186 
(1968) 
119 Fink-Eitel, Hinrich. Op.Cit. p. 215. 
120 “(…) pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all 
experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding” (A120). 
121 Perhaps clarity is gained by contrasting Kant’s account in this matter with another, similar account 
that is closer to our current paradigm, namely, Husserl’s. In Zur Phänomenologie der Zeitbewusstseins, 
Husserl indicates that the experienced present (Präsenzzeit) is the phenomenological articulation of 
retention, the direct and immediate consciousness of what is past, and protention, the direct and 
immediate consciousness of what is to come. Each of these are intentional acts that relate to the past 
and the future but that have a different and more primary intentional structure than their empirical 
counterparts, i.e. remembering and expecting. Retention and protention differ from remembering and 
expecting insofar as only the latter make the past and future ‘present’ to consciousness. Remembering 
and expecting, in other words, ‘presentify’ the past and the future. In retention and protention, the more 
primary, one does not bring the past or future to the present, but “directly perceives” (Hu X:39) them 
as what they are. Retention and protention are, for Husserl, essentially non-presentifying and the 
primary manifestation of time consciousness. They are fundamental and, importantly, constitutive of 
the empirical level where time appears, in remembering and expecting, as a series of nows because the 
experienced present (Präsenzzeit) is itself the ground and possibility of the ‘now’ as such. For Kant, 
something similar is happening to the extent that the transcendental syntheses are necessary conditions 
for our formal intuition of time, i.e. for understanding time as past, present, and future, but it is also 
similar in that those syntheses themselves elapse in time as form of intuition -syntheses are, after, 
activities and, as such, elapse in time-. This is why Kant had linked, since the 1770s, synthesis as such 
with time as a form of sensibility and denied, therefore, that things can be represented in absolute time: 
“Everything that occurs is in the series of succession and is represented therein. Nothing, however, can 
be represented in absolute time, but things are represented in a successive series only insofar as there 
is conceived a real connection of things by means of which one member draws the next after itself; thus 
nothing in a series can be cognised as real if the transition from the preceding member to it is not 
necessary in accordance with a general law, i.e., without a ground, even if one does not cognise it” 
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There are several different philosophical implications that can be drawn from 
this account of the syntheses that make cognition possible for inner sense. One can 
think, for example, of the very fundamental relation that succession has to the 
transcendental synthesis of apprehension in giving rise to plurality from unity. One 
can think, also, that the transcendental power of imagination’s task of generating 
unified succession as to give rise to permanence is equally as, if not more, important 
than the first. One can think, moreover, that the synthesis of recognition presupposes 
time elapsing or flowing from the past, through the present, to the future, as for 
identity and empirical unity to arise
122
. One can think, lastly, that this sort of account 
would fare well in justifying the ‘posteriority’ of consciousness whereby one is only 
ever conscious, even of one’s self, of a prior given something. For now, however, 
only one these implications will be developed, namely, that the sketch of the 
transcendental synthetic operations of cognition elaborated above warrants the 
beginning of an answer to the problem of self-knowledge in relation to passive 
activity or active passivity of inner sense. 
 
This answer is best understood in light of the ambiguous role that the power 
of imagination plays throughout the Deductions. Indeed, Kant speaks often of the 
imagination as being linked to sensibility, but also often speaks of the imagination as 
being linked to the understanding. Thus, one reads, on the one hand, that “There must 
therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty 
I give the title imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perception, I 
entitle apprehension” 123 . But one reads, on the other hand, that “The unity of 
apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and 
this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(AA 17:444). See also (AA 18:276). The difference between the two accounts, however, resides in 
Kant’s emphasis on synthesis being an activity and not a ‘structure’, as it were. 
122 This is indeed something Kant mentions but that, unfortunately, he leaves very underdeveloped. In 
the notes from Kant’s metaphysics lectures, from 1790-1791, entitled Metaphysik L2, Kant writes, for 
example: “The faculty of imagaining -facultas imaginandi- is the faculty of intuition of the objects of 
past time, the faculty of anticipation -facultas praevidendi- is the faculty of intuition of the objects of 
future time” (AA 28:585). This is reiterated in the Anthropology where Kant claims “The faculty of 
deliberately visualising the past is the faculty of memory, and the faculty of visualising something as 
taking place in the future is the faculty of foresight. Provided that they both belong to sensibility, both 
of them are based on the association of representation of the past and the future consciousness of the 
subject within the present; and although they are not themselves perceptions, as connecting of 
perceptions in time, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what no longer exists with what 
does not yet exist through what presently exists” (AA 7:182). 
123 (A120) 
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the pure understanding” 124 . Rendering these two seemingly incompatible claims 
coherent with one another is not simple, but it need not be impossible, either. Earlier, 
time was characterised as the primary form of intuition that must be understood as the 
activity through which the self opens itself to affectivity. It was then seen that, in 
Kant’s account of synthesis, the transcendental unity of apperception, because it 
grounds the possibility of being conscious of unity, and because it is synthetic in 
itself, provides the subject with the possibility of encountering the succession of the 
manifold in intuition
125
. Pure apperception, in fact, 
 
“(…) forms the correlate of all our representation insofar as it is to be at all 
possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly 
belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, 
as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely to time. It is this 
apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its 
function intellectual”126. 
 
Because human subjectivity is not constituted as an intuitive intellect, time, 
Kant is saying, must be the act through which the transcendental unity of 
apperception renders itself intelligible: the transcendental unity of apperception, in 
time, determines –forms– the manifoldness of that which is to be determined –
content, itself–127 . But since for Kant “the unity of the manifold in a subject is 
synthetic; [and] pure apperception therefore yields a principle of the synthetic unity 
of the manifold in all possible intuition”128 , the syntheticity of the unity of the 
manifold can mean nothing other than that apperception is indissolubly bound to time 
to the extent that the first wants to think of its own empirical determinacy. This is to 
say that apperception is indeed essentially synthetic but only to the extent that the 
representations it unifies are inscribed in its own activity. That activity, in turn, must 
be an a priori synthesis that is able to move between the sensible and the intellectual.  
                                                            
124 And Kant goes on: “In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain 
the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. 
These, however, are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding” (A118). 
125 It is not as Heidegger would want, therefore, that one permanently keeps the original and originary 
unity of temporality in view when synthesising (GA 3, p. 90). Instead, Kant’s account offers a picture 
where, because the synthetic processes of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition themselves 
elapse in time, the unity of apperception is able to become conscious of their unity. 
126 (A123-124); See also (A117fn) 
127  This is echoed in the Metaphysics lectures when Kant claims that “If time were not given 
subjectively and thus a priori as the form of inner sense (and no understanding to compare it), then 
apperception would not cognise the relation in the existence of the manifold a priori, for in itself time 
is no object of perception” (AA 18:271) 
128 (A116) 
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The ambiguity of the role played by the imagination is not, in this sense, contingent to 
Kant’s account. It is, instead, and as Hermann Mörchen has pointed out, fundamental 
to the productive power of imagination that it be capable of relating to sensibility as 
passivity and to the understanding as activity if it will successfully relate apperception 
and inner sense
129
. In this sense, that the transcendental power of imagination sustain 
inner sense, or the activity of subjectivity, as itself enduring is a crucial aspect to 
Kant’s account of synthesis. 
 
It might be helpful to try to understand this point in relation to the B version 
of the Deduction. The problem of the relation between apperception and inner sense 
is, once more, that one needs to be able to maintain subjectivity as both passive, to the 
extent that it is affected by itself, and active, to the extent that it affects itself. The 
solution as presented in the B version, unlike in the A version, does not concern itself 
so much with the particular synthetic activities of the mind and, instead, departs from 
‘synthesis’, as such, “being an act of the self-activity of the subject [ein Actus seiner 
Selbsttätigkeit ist]” 130 . This act of combining is carried out by a spontaneous 
understanding the nature of which demands that it accompany such combining with 
the possibility of ascribing the combined representations to a singular ‘I’131. In doing 
so, in ascribing multiple representations to a singular ‘I’ that is, that spontaneous 
understanding manifests as differing from the ‘product’, as it were, of the process: the 
first is the synthetic and synthesising unity of apperception, the second is the analytic 
unity of apperception. The latter, in turn, “is possible under the presupposition”132 of 
the former
133
. The synthetic and synthesising unity of apperception, Kant claims, is 
the unity through which the manifold of intuition is united in the concept of an object 
and is, in this sense, objective
134
. The analytic unity of apperception, in contrast, is 
merely subjective because it, itself, is the product of certain associations carried out in 
each individual’s mind. But, and the key move for present purposes resides here, Kant 
points out that  
 
                                                            
129 Mörchen, Hermann. Op. Cit.  pp. 11-21. It should be noted that Mörchen arrives at this conclusion 
but having taken a different starting point, i.e. Kant’s anthropological writings and the role empirical 
imagination plays there 
130 (B130) 
131 (B132-133) 
132 (B133) 
133 Paul Guyer is therefore mistaken in claiming that Kant conflates the meanings of consciousness and 
self-consciousness (Guyer, Paul. “Kant on Apperception and a priori Synthesis” in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, No. 3, July 1980, pp. 205-212.). Consciousness is characteristic 
of the activity of subjectivity that makes empirical self-consciousness possible. 
134 (B139) 
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“the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition in general, which 
contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, 
simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of the intuition to the 
one ‘I think’, and so, through the pure synthesis of understanding which is the 
a priori underlying ground of the empirical synthesis”135 
 
That time is subject to the original unity of consciousness, or to the synthetic 
and synthesising unity of apperception, means that if the understanding is the source 
of synthesis, inner sense is the activity through which that understanding comes to 
determine itself because it contains an a priori manifold
136
. This is not to say that 
inner sense synthesises, for it does not. It means, rather, that the understanding can 
determine itself inwardly with respect to its own activity by means of a faculty that 
oscillates between spontaneous activity and receptivity to a pure intuition: “Thus the 
understanding, under the title of transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs 
this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in 
saying that inner sense is affected thereby”137. The reason one encounters succession 
in the way one does, alternatively phrased, resides in that the synthesising of 
subjectivity determines the form of inner intuition sequentially –since one cannot 
think the whole at once–. That time is represented in intuition as having the specific 
directionality it does, answers precisely to the fact that synthesis itself generates such 
directionality in the process of rendering itself sensible through the power of 
imagination. Kant responds to the problem of the relation between apperception and 
inner sense by rendering the activity of the first as the origin of the specific 
determination of the second. This, in turn, is what will ultimately allow for one’s self 
to be inwardly and empirically affected
138
. 
                                                            
135 (B140) 
136 (B152-153) 
137 (B153-154) 
138 Perhaps it helps to try and understand this extremely complicated point by means of a parallel 
argument, one that Kant was surely familiar with, from Tetens. The argument claims that causality, as 
such, is something which thought posits in the manifold. The reason why, however, thought can do 
that, has to do with the fact that thought itself operates causally, i.e. it effects some repercussion on 
things. As Corey Dyck has pointed out, by ‘thought’, Tetens understands the faculty through which the 
soul cognises the relations among things (faculty which includes perception [Gewahrnehmen] and 
consciousness). For Tetens, crucially, those relations among things are in fact nothing but effects of the 
act of cognising itself: “(…) the very connections, or relations, among things that Sulzer takes to be 
the object of the act of attention are in fact effects of the activity of the power of thinking” (Dyck, 
Corey. “Spontaneity before the Critical Turn” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 54, Nr. 4, 
2016, p. 641). . Tetens agrees, therefore, with Hume in that the relation of causality is not something 
that is passively perceived and that is, instead, a contribution of the mind. But unlike Hume, Tetens 
thinks the ‘necessity’ implied by causality rules out the imagination as a suitable candidate for the role 
of its creator. Instead, because causal dependence is the same as conceiving an effect through its cause, 
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This does not entail that one has therefore empirical knowledge of one’s self. 
It entails, solely, that one is conscious of one’s self as having to determine that self in 
accordance with the succession inherent to the activity of thinking
139
. Were it 
otherwise, no solution to the paradox of self-knowledge would have been found 
simply because no distinction between the appearance of the self and the being of the 
self could be upheld. One is indeed subject to the limiting condition imposed on the 
self by inner sense to the extent that any act of combination, any synthesis, will be 
made intuitable “only according to relations of time”140. This is what Kant means by 
being conscious of one’s self. To have knowledge of the self, however, the positing of 
a manifold in intuition would also be required and this would imply linking the 
representation of the self to a particular given material content in intuition. Kant is not 
yet, at least not insofar as the problem of empirical self-knowledge and self-affection 
is at stake, concerned with specific content one will know of that self. Instead, he is 
concerned with the possibility of an act of determination the actuality of which 
resides in acknowledging that “(…) experience itself is nothing other than a continual 
conjoining (synthesis) of perceptions”141. 
 
 From this it follows that if one wants to philosophically understand Kant’s 
solution to the paradox of self-knowledge, one must acknowledge, contra Valaris, 
that positing a manifold of inner sense independent from the manifold of outer sense, 
is absolutely indispensable. Indeed, Kant claims at the beginning of the Schematism 
chapter that “Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and 
therefore of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in 
intuition”142. In light of what has been discussed so far, this should be read and 
understood as saying that the transcendental unity of apperception owes its 
syntheticity to the fact that in unifying it posits itself as temporally indexed. In other 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Tetens argues the ability to effect a causal relation must pertain to thought itself: “[R]elation does not 
come to be from sensation, but rather is an effect added [hinzukommende Wirkung] by the power of 
thinking”  (Tetens, J.N. Versuche, IV.vi.2.I.337). Tetens’ point is parallel to Kant’s, or illustrates neatly 
Kant’s argumentative strategy, not because they advocate the same thing, obviously, but because they 
advocate it in the same way: there is a peculiarity in the act of thinking that allows such act to ‘project’, 
as it were, its very action onto perception, for Tetens, or onto intuition, for Kant. 
139  Kant illustrates this point by means of an act of attention: “In every act of attention the 
understanding determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination which it thinks, to that 
inner intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding” (B156-157fn). 
For further interesting discussion of the self’s representation in inner sense see: (AA 28:584, 
Metaphysik L [1777-1779]). 
140 (B159) 
141 (AA 4:276) 
142 (A138/B177) 
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words, that the transcendental unity of apperception, in being the innermost actus of 
subjectivity, materialises or determines itself as the temporally extended unity of the 
synthetic act of self-affection. Through the inherently ambivalent role of the power of 
imagination that at once affects and is affected, the self posits itself as subject and 
object –the self thereby renders itself intuitable. The power of imagination, the 
essence of which dictates that it relate content and form, not only takes place a priori 
but also “conditions the possibility of other a priori knowledge”143. This point holds 
as much for the general applicability of the pure concepts of the understanding as it 
does for empirical self-knowledge, self-affection, and self-consciousness. It will be 
therefore the task of the next chapter to show, in all specificity, how the productive 
synthesis of imagination provides the categories with transcendental content.  
 
 By way of conclusion, a few closing remarks on Heidegger’s reading of the 
relation between self-affection and apperception are pertinent. Although the account 
given above is very close to Heidegger’s in spirit, it also is on a collision course with 
it in the letter, as it were. Heidegger recognises that Kant’s account of time is the first 
and only to move forward in the direction of temporality
144
. This is the case, 
Heidegger thinks, because in orienting his investigation toward the being of the 
connection between time and the ‘I think’ “Kant reached the limits of what can be 
possibly stated about time” 145 . For Heidegger, too, transcendental apperception, 
understood as spontaneity of the self, just is the activity of combining carried out by 
subjectivity. But when this spontaneity is viewed qua self-affection, then it must be 
characterised as receptivity or ‘letting one’s self be encountered’. What Heidegger 
calls the ‘pre-view’ [Hinblick, Anblick] of time, or time understood as formal 
intuition, belongs therefore originally to spontaneity
146: “This spontaneity of the I (of 
the self) is thus also original apperception and pure self-affection, pure ‘I think’ and 
time”147 . In this sense, time provides what can be determined by the activity of 
                                                            
143 (B151) See also the Anthropology where Kant contrasts ‘facultas’ to ‘receptivitas’: “In regard to 
the state of its representations, my mind is either active and exhibits faculty (facultas), or it is passive 
and consists in receptivity (receptivitas). A cognition contains both joined together, and the possibility 
of having such cognition bears the name of cognitive faculty – from the most distinguished part of this 
faculty, namely the activity of the mind in combining or separating representations from one another” 
(AA 7:140). 
144 (GA 2, p.23) 
145 (GA 21, p. 311) 
146 (GA 21, p. 340) In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger goes even further. There, time 
is not something ‘added’ to pure apperception but is the ground for the possibility of selfhood as 
contained within it: time and apperception are identical (GA 3, pp. 191-193). 
147 (GA 21, p. 342) 
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synthesis but the giving itself is the action of one’s activity148. The pre-view on the 
basis of which the self comes to determine itself and appearances as pertaining to 
intuition, operates for Heidegger as the background condition against which 
transcendental content is highlighted. But that pre-view is there in the first place 
because “Pure self-affection provides the transcendental ground-structure 
[Urstruktur] of the finite self as such” 149 . Now, since in Heidegger’s reading 
receptivity does not receive ‘from the outside’ anything the condition for which had 
not already been given by subjectivity, the case must be that the self pre-posits itself 
as capable of being affected temporally
150
. This capacity for being affected 
temporally that arises from one’s own self-affectivity, in turn, constitutes the pre-
viewed horizon against which one projects the categories as determining what 
amounts, and what not, to objectivity. In Heidegger’s terms: “The description of the 
ego as "abiding and unchanging" means that the ego in forming time originally, i.e., 
as primordial time, constitutes the essence of the act of objectification and the 
horizon thereof”151. 
 
 The fact of the matter remains, however, that Heidegger’s reading 
misrepresents at certain points
152
 an important aspect of Kant’s understanding of time. 
Kant failed to articulate, in Heidegger’s view, the structural connections of the 
aforementioned ‘pre-view’ and of ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered’.  In other words, 
according to Heidegger, Kant’s conception of the connections in spontaneity and in 
receptivity is deficient to the extent that Kant limited time to the latter –thus 
providing an unclear and partial picture of the receptivity of the subject
153
. But as it 
was discussed above, Kant does not limit inner sense to radical passivity. By ‘inner 
                                                            
148 In words from the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: although 
the self does not ‘access’ itself in intuition, transcendental apperception exists as spontaneous, but in 
order to be able to intuit itself, it needs to give itself, from itself, time –hence determining itself. Time 
is the mirror-like image that the self provides for itself in order to become intuitable (GA 25, pp. 377-
395). 
149 (GA 3, p. 191) 
150 This results, again, because time and the ‘I think’ “beide sind vorgängig und unumgängliches 
Worauf des unthematischen Hinblicks im konkreten Erkennen, beide ursprüngliche Seinsmodi des 
Subjekts” (GA 21, p. 346). 
151 (GA 3, p. 193) 
152 The qualification is due to the fact that Heidegger’s position concerning Kant changed over time. 
As a quick glimpse onto, say, the 1929 Kantbuch in contrast to the 1935 lecture course Die Frage nach 
dem Ding illustrates, Heidegger reviewed and re-evaluated his assessment of some of Kant’s basic 
philosophical tenets. For literature on the matter see, for example, Engelland, Chad. “The 
Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy” in Journal for the British 
Society for Phenomenology, 41, 2010, pp. 150-169 and Reichl, Pavel. Heidegger’s Late Marburg 
Project: Being, Entities, and Schematism (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from University of Essex, 
2016. 
153 (GA 21, p. 340)  
- 83 - 
 
sense’ Kant understands, first and foremost, the mode in which the self affects itself 
and is thus, by means of the transcendental power of imagination, both passive and 
active with respect to the subject. There is a serious philosophical risk in missing this 
subtle point: Heidegger, perhaps understandably, seems to inadvertently approximate 
Kant’s understanding of time as form of intuition to Kant’s understanding of time as 
formal intuition. While not unaware of the distinction between the two, Heidegger 
does seem to miss its implications. Whereas, Heidegger claims, the form of intuition 
is the oneness of intuition that delineates and allows, without needing, the unity of the 
manifold of impressions, formal intuition is the product of categorially determining 
that unity
154
. But, by his own standards, Heidegger collapses the two when he takes 
Kant to be saying that the ‘unity’ of time must be kept in view as for the categories to 
arise
155
. For Heidegger, the temporal horizon, in its encounterable character, must be 
constantly present as pre-view for objectivity as such to emerge (for this is what it 
means that the understanding is sustained [gegründet] by intuition). But what this 
amounts to is a quasi-substantialisation of time where, unless the latter is kept 
permanently ‘in sight’, no transcendental content may be lifted by the act of 
synthesis. This hardly seems like what Kant meant when he characterised inner sense 
as an activity of subjectivity since, as was discussed above, what matters most is not 
that one represent the unity of time as such but, rather, that one’s own act of 
representing endure or elapse in the unity of time. Only this latter interpretation will 
do justice to Kant’s conception of inner sense as “the intuition of ourselves and of our 
inner states”156 . This, of course, shifts the burden of proof towards the account 
developed here in the sense that this investigation will have to justify how exactly, if 
not in the way Heidegger describes, the categories are endowed with temporal 
transcendental content. That is, therefore, the basic task of the following chapter. 
 
∴ 
 
 In the course of this chapter, two questions were answered: whether there is 
any kind of priority that can be attributed to time over space as the basic form of 
intuition; and what the nature of the relation between apperception and self-affection 
is. In answer to the first question it was argued, in opposition to readings that seek to 
equate the manifolds of outer and inner sense, that there is way of conceiving of time 
                                                            
154 (GA 25, p. 137); For Kant’s discussion of the distinction see (B160-163) 
155  “(…) if beings are to be capable of offering themselves, the horizon within which they are 
encountered must itself have an offering-character [Angebotcharakter]”  (GA 3, p. 90) 
156 (A33/B49) 
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in Critical philosophy that renders it both logically and ontologically prior to space. 
The logical argument in favour of time’s priority states that, unlike space, time is not 
constrained to a sub-set of appearances and, instead, is able to account for all 
appearances whatsoever. The ontological argument in favour of time’s priority states 
that, unlike space, time more closely characterises the activity of subjectivity and, 
therefore, amounts to the primary condition according to which affectivity is possible. 
 
 In answer to the second question it was argued, counter to some recent 
readings, that the relation between apperception and self-affection is best understood 
in terms of the first grounding and making the second possible through the flow of 
time. In other words, it was argued that what makes the synthetic unity of 
apperception ‘synthetic’ in the first place, is precisely the fact that it carries out its 
combining activity as enduring. From that, it was inferred that if one can be conscious 
of the unity of the diverse synthetic processes elapsing in cognition, it is only because 
one can think of the unity that makes those processes possible as inherently and 
inexorably bound to an a priori manifold posited in inner sense. It was seen, first in 
relation to the A version of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, 
that the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are unified because 
of the unity of apperception. But because Kant characterises that unity of 
apperception as itself synthetic, it was also seen, apperception must necessarily be 
conceived as having some kind of fundamental relation to time –for otherwise it 
would not be ‘synthetic’ in any meaningful sense. If that is the case, and it is also the 
case that time is the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity, then 
it follows that those transcendental syntheses constitute temporally the possibility of 
affectivity. This point was further clarified by looking at the B version of the 
Deduction. There it was argued that time is represented in intuition as it is, precisely 
because of the kind of relation it holds to synthesis as such. It was seen, furthermore, 
that Kant’s answer to the problem of the relation between apperception and inner 
sense resides in that he speaks of inner sense as the activity through which 
apperception renders itself intuitable through the oscillating power of imagination. 
 
 It was concluded, finally, that an indispensable requirement for thinking 
coherently about Kant’s conception of time is acknowledging that, in time, one posits 
a manifold a priori that is independent from the manifold of outer sense. Although 
this was stated as a condition without which Kant’s solution to the paradox of self-
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knowledge could not work, the specific content of that pure manifold was left wholly 
undetermined. For the purposes of trying to dissolve the paradox of how one renders 
one’s self intuitable, merely stating the possibility of such pure manifold is enough. 
For a thorough account of the way in which Kant conceives of time, however, merely 
stating the possibility is far from being enough. Instead, it will be necessary to show 
how is it exactly that categories, time-determinations, and principles relate to each 
other. 
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Chapter III 
 
If the first chapter successfully showed the impossibility of sacrificing the 
problem of relating to objects for understanding transcendental philosophy, the 
second chapter showed the way in which self-affection discloses the possibility of 
that relation. It was shown, first, that an enquiry into Kant’s critical philosophy must 
necessarily take into account the a priori ground for the possibility of the subject’s 
relation to objects. This was seen to entail distancing one’s reading of Kant from 
readings that tend to overemphasise Kant’s epistemology and seen to entail, also, 
approximating one’s reading to Kant’s general metaphysical project. Being able to 
engage with the question of the possibility of relating to objectivity, it was argued, 
depends on acknowledging Kant’s metaphysical worries. Indeed, the historical 
discussion of the way in which Kant arrived at formulating the subjectivity and 
universality of the forms of intuition generally, and of time particularly, showed this 
and nothing more: the forms of intuition need to be thought of as sensible conditions 
under which things appear precisely because only then the beginning of an answer to 
the problem of the constitution of objectivity shows up for transcendental philosophy. 
But it was shown, second, that in order to be able to establish the necessary 
conditions for objectivity, it is necessary to examine the temporal structure of the 
experience of objects. Hence, it was seen that time is the fundamental form of 
intuition to the extent that it is the manner in which the subject affects itself through 
its own activity. Time has, indeed, primacy over space, logically speaking, insofar as 
it is the form of intuition without which no appearance whatsoever would be possible 
and, ontologically speaking, insofar as it is inextricably related to the synthetic 
activity of subjectivity. This led, in turn, to a discussion that sought to clarify the 
relation between the activity of affecting one’s self and the unity of apperception. 
Since inner sense is affection of the self through that self’s own activity, it was 
concluded, the self’s activity, being temporal in its nature, cannot disclose the field of 
receptivity save as temporalised: whatever can appear, will appear as enduring. This 
is the sole meaning of the rather dense, but precise claim that time is self-affection. 
 
This last remark is important for the main purposes of this investigation and 
for the discussion that will follow. The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding is supposed to answer the question, according to Kant, of whether “a 
priori concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone 
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anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general”1. Because Kant 
answers in the affirmative, this is tantamount to saying that, in addition to the formal 
conditions of intuition, the pure concepts of the understanding must also be in place a 
priori if knowledge of objects, as objects of possible experience, will arise. Now, in 
the previous chapter it was argued that a manifold of inner sense, independently from 
a manifold of outer sense, must be asserted as possible if one is to account for 
receptivity in general. The question remains, however, as to whether affirming the 
possibility of receptivity amounts to affirming the actuality of objectivity. This 
chapter, therefore, should be read as addressing the central problem of this 
investigation, namely, the problem of understanding precisely in what way the 
content provided by the activity of affecting one’s self is structured or configured. It 
will be argued that, unlike empirical concepts, the objectivity of which is warranted 
by positing an objective unitary correlate in the form of the concept of the ‘object in 
general = x’, pure concepts of the understanding need to undergo a process of 
sensibilisation carried out by the transcendental power of imagination to gain a 
foothold in sensibility. It will be concluded, therefore, that in gazing at the structure 
that articulates judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, one sees in all 
precision the way in which self-affection discloses a radically temporal configuring or 
objectivising frame that is determinate enough as to warrant objective validity. 
 
Before venturing to elaborate on this last point, however, an important 
omission in the previous chapter can no longer be ignored: Kant’s doctrine of affinity. 
Although the argument concerning the sensible provision of content through the 
schematism is not dependent on the affinity doctrine, it is nonetheless helpful to 
address the issue from the outset. The affinity doctrine presented in the A-edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason is not only extremely difficult but it is also almost 
entirely dropped in the B-edition. The reasons for this are various and will be 
explored later
2
. What must be borne in mind, nonetheless, is that the whole discussion 
on affinity that opens this chapter, enlightening as it may be for understanding the 
function of the power of imagination, is not pivotal in the central argument developed 
in this investigation. This is to say that although transcendental affinity, as a 
philosophical concept, sheds bright light on the way in which the transcendental 
power of imagination operates in relation to the unity of apperception, it is 
nonetheless a dispensable doctrine for the philosophical argument that follows in the 
                                                            
1 (A93/B125); (A85/B117) 
2 (Ch. III, §I, p. 98-99) 
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sense that, even if the affinity doctrine were deemed altogether philosophically 
untenable, the argument for the process of sensibilisation of the pure concepts of the 
understanding by means of the imagination could still hold. 
 
 What exactly is, in this account, the doctrine of affinity supposed to be doing? 
Precisely because time is self-affection whatever appears for the self will not only 
endure according to Kant, but also appear as having inherited, or having been 
bestowed with, the numerical identity of the unity of the self. In 1781, it will be 
argued in the first section of this chapter, Kant entertained that this ‘bestowal’ of 
identity not only is the ground for the self’s relation to possible objects of experience 
but that, furthermore, the bestowal works as the objective ground of 
interconnectedness of objects amongst themselves. In other words, in the first edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason, specifically in the first version of the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories, the self’s activity has two necessary outcomes. The first, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter, is the self’s possible relation to objectivity. 
The second outcome, however, is that the self’s activity is supposed to provide the 
objective ground for the association of appearances amongst them.  It will be seen 
that transcendental affinity, the name Kant gives to this objective interconnectedness 
of appearances, designates the inherited denominator that all appearances have in 
common or share insofar as they are identical to themselves, and that operates as the 
objective ground for associating one appearance to another. Simply put, all 
appearances, in virtue of being such, partake in the identity of the subject for whom 
they are appearances and, on that ground only, come to manifest as having some 
kinship amongst them –albeit a very minimal one.  
 
 Thus, even if the affinity doctrine presented in the first edition of the first 
Critique is ‘dispensable’, as it were, for the purposes of the argument that will be 
developed in what follows, the case remains nonetheless that, because of this 
doctrine’s proximity to what has been until now characterised as the unique nature of 
the power of imagination, it helps to clarify in some precision the relation between 
this power and objectivity. It will be seen that the objective interconnectedness of 
appearances helps in understanding the complicated relation in which objects stand to 
one’s cognising faculties because that interconnectedness grounds a subjective 
association amongst appearances. It is through the transcendental power of 
imagination that a subjective ‘law’ for the association of appearances emerges: 
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without the power of imagination’s productive and reproductive capacity no relation, 
not even of a single representation with its own past states, would be possible. In this 
sense,  insofar as the A-Edition of the Deduction is concerned, that there is some kind 
of regularity in the appearing is what Kant terms the subjective association of 
appearances and nothing more. 
 
Whether one takes the affinity doctrine presented by Kant in the A-Edition of 
the Transcendental Deduction as philosophically plausible or whether one does not, 
what becomes very clear in discussing the affinity doctrine is what was described, in 
the previous chapter, as the oscillating role of the power of imagination. Because of 
its inherently ambivalent role, the transcendental power of imagination relates to the 
activity of the understanding and to the passivity of sensibility in such a way that it 
connects the purely formal with the purely material and it does so a priori. 
 
 It was claimed in the previous chapter that the Transcendental Deduction of 
the Pure Concepts of the Understanding shows two things: it shows that there must be 
unified experience and, in virtue of the syntheticity of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, it shows the possibility of endowing the pure concepts of understanding 
with transcendental content. Although the discussion of the doctrine of affinity, as has 
been repeatedly stated, is not essential to the general argument developed here, its 
importance and helpfulness should become apparent in what follows. Indeed, the 
central question of this chapter, provided that it has been granted that the 
understanding can relate meaningfully to the content provided in intuition, is how 
exactly is it that the imaginative provision of sensible conditions for the categories 
works. The second section, which makes up the bulk of this chapter, is devoted to 
answering this question. It will be seen, there, that the imagination’s ambiguous 
status, wavering between subjectivity and objectivity, is a fundamental piece of the 
puzzle. Synthesis speciosa is both intellectual in its combining according to rules, 
therefore spontaneous or active, and also sensible, therefore receptive or passive to 
particulars, i.e. the species, in sensibility. It lingers in the ambiguity, so to say, of 
being active in its passivity and passive in its activity and this very ambiguity is 
passed onto its products, the schemata. Schemata, in virtue of their universality, and 
having derived their unity from concepts (and ultimately from apperception), must be 
homogenous with concepts themselves while, at the same time, in virtue of time being 
the fundamental form of intuition, schemata must also be homogenous with 
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appearances. The schema, product of the imagination, cannot therefore be an image, 
insofar as the latter is too closely linked to sensibility, nor a rule, insofar as images 
are too closely linked to understanding. The schema is, rather, a universal procedure 
which underlies both images and rules. 
 
But if indeed the schemata are, properly speaking, the procedures of 
sensibilisation for the pure concepts of the understanding, why then is it that Kant 
enumerates, contrary to all expectation,  only eight of them when there are twelve 
categories? It will be seen, in answer to this question, that because of the way in 
which the system of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles is articulated, 
two different kinds of relations need to be accounted for in relation to experience. 
Whereas, on the one hand, for the mathematical-constitutive judgments, categories, 
schemata and principles it is the construction of all objects in intuition that needs to 
be specified, for their dynamical-regulative counterparts, on the other, it is the 
legislation of the way of appearing of existing objects for experience that needs 
stipulation. The first two sets of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles 
genuinely constitute intuitions and are inescapable insofar as the structural relation in 
which they stand to intuitions is constructive. The second two sets of judgments, 
categories, schemata, and principles only regulate, mediated by experience, the 
existence of objects insofar as the structural relation in which they stand to the latter 
is merely legislative. 
 
Lastly, the chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of how the 
sensibilisation processes occur: for judgments and categories of quantity, the 
procedure of sensibilisation is number and the principle that manifests number is the 
Axioms of Intuition. For judgments and categories of quality the procedure of 
sensibilisation is degree and the principle that manifests degree is the Anticipations of 
Perception. For judgments and categories of relation the procedures of sensibilisation 
are persistence, causality, and community and the principles that manifest them are 
the Analogies. Lastly, for the judgments and categories of modality the procedures of 
sensibilisation are agreement, actuality and eternity and the principles that manifest 
them are the Postulates. 
 
∵ 
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§ i 
 
Affinity and association 
 
Ever since Kemp Smith’s Commentary, and perhaps even before that, Kant’s 
doctrine of affinity as presented in the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason has 
been in disrepute. Indeed, Kemp Smith made sure this was the case by characterising 
affinity as “obscure and misleading”3, as implying all sorts of dire consequences4, 
and worst of all, as an awkward piece of “conjectural transcendental psychology”5 
that Kant must have written in the midst of some kind of ecstasy brought about by his 
own discoveries
6
. Recently, however, the doctrine has undergone some kind of re-
evaluation. In a recent article Gualtiero Lorini, for example, has advanced the 
hypothesis, opposed to what had been argued before by Kemp Smith, that the 
doctrine of transcendental affinity is not only a fundamental part of the Deduction but 
that it plays a systematic role in the entirety of the Analytic of Concepts
7
. 
Recognising the fundamental role that the transcendental synthesis of the power of 
imagination plays in the so-called ‘objective’ part of the A-Deduction, Lorini defends 
that the very possibility of association of diverse appearances by means of the 
imagination is grounded on the possibility of an affinity that underlies their diversity
8
. 
In other words, that “the pure productive synthesis of imagination, synthesis which 
allows apperception to represent a series of phenomena in experience objectively, 
presupposes that ‘all possible phenomena belong, as representations, to a whole of 
self-consciousness’ (A113)”9. Because of this, Lorini thinks, it should be unsurprising 
that Kant would move in the A-Deduction directly from the enunciation of this 
transcendental affinity and its immediate consequence, namely, empirical affinity, to 
                                                            
3 Kemp Smith, Norman. A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, MacMillan, London, 1918, 
p. 540. 
4 Ibid. p. 544. 
5 Ibid.  p. 546. 
6 Ibid. p. 490. Guyer, Strawson, and Allison also agree with this to some extent -although Allison’s 
latest book reconsiders this (See Allison, Henry. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-
Historical Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 205-208). Attempts have also 
been made at recovering the affinity doctrine, albeit in a different way to the one that follows. Ståle R. 
S. Finke, for example, discusses affinity in relation to cognition, first, and in relation to reflective 
judgment, second. See: Finke, Ståle R. S. Transcendental Affinities: Judgment and Experience in Kant 
(Doctoral Dissertation) Retrieved from, University of Essex, 1998, pp. 51-54. 
7  Lorini, Gualtiero. “O papel da afinidade transcendental entre os fenômenos na teoria do 
conhecimento kantiana” in Estudos Kantianos, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p. 215-230, Jan./Jun., 2017, p. 216. 
8 (A113) 
9 Lorini, Gualtiero. Op. Cit. p. 217. 
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the unity of nature: transcendental affinity allows Kant to move from the possibility 
of experience, through the laws that govern that experience, to the unity of those 
laws
10
. 
 
Conceiving of affinity thus, Lorini rightly thinks, allows Kant to formulate a 
transcendental rule according to which the necessity (and not just the possibility) of 
the objective validity of the forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the 
understanding is secured
11
. The further thesis Lorini entertains, as to the identity 
between transcendental affinity as it is conceived in the A-Deduction and affinity of 
the laws of the understanding as it is conceived in the Dialectic
12
, will have to be left 
for another time. It was nonetheless important to rescue Lorini’s first point because, 
formulated in this way, important light is shed on the function of the transcendental 
power of imagination throughout the Deductions. Kant introduces affinity, indeed, as 
the objective interconnectedness that grounds any, and every, possible association 
between appearances: “The objective ground of all associations of appearances”, 
claims Kant, “I entitle their affinity”13 –relating thereby sensibility and understanding 
in one objective foundation. This is to say that, if the ‘object = x’ confers objective 
validity to concepts insofar as it acts as the ‘external’ correlate to all and any one of 
these concepts
14
, transcendental affinity confers necessity to the particular relation in 
which one perceives the connection of two or more appearances. Affinity being, in 
fact, “the union of the manifold in virtue of its derivation from one ground” 15 , 
prevents one’s synthesising acts from associating perceptions in an entirely 
undetermined and accidental way
16
. And, although the doctrine of affinity is not 
thoroughly developed in the first Critique
17
, it is nonetheless useful for clarifying the 
                                                            
10 Ibid. p. 218. From this unity of nature arrived at in the A-Deduction, Lorini derives that it is possible 
to conjecture a possible corroboration of Kant’s commitment to the doctrine of affinity in his mention 
of the natura materialiter spectata at the end of the B-Deduction. Lorini’s point, however, is based on 
merely conjectural evidence and it would be difficult to agree with him merely on that basis. 
11 Ibid. p. 226. 
12 (A657/B685) 
13 (A122)  
14 (A109) 
15 (AA 7:176-177) 
16 (A122) 
17 In spite of what a quick reading of the B-Edition of the first Critique might suggest, affinity, as 
understood and developed in this paper, does not completely disappear from Kant’s philosophy after 
1781. In fact, as Erich Adickes suggested almost a century ago (Adickes, Erich. Kants Lehre von der 
doppelten Affektion unseres Ichs als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie, Mohr, Tübingen, 1929, pp. 
91-93), the subsequent unfolding of transcendental philosophy, especially as it is presented in the 
second section of the third Critique, in the Anthropology, and in the Opus Postumum, requires Kant to 
posit an objective ground for the relations amongst empirical objects and empirical subjects. Had more 
time been available, it would have been imperative to go precisely onto this: in post-Critical writings, 
instead of fading away, transcendental affinity only seems to gain in vigour and relevance -especially 
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discussion in the previous chapter concerning the relation between the transcendental 
unity of apperception and the transcendental power of imagination. 
 
What, then, is the exact role that affinity plays in the A-Deduction? Since all 
possible appearances, as representations, belong to the whole of self-consciousness
18
, 
these appearances ‘inherit’ in their relation to each other, as it were, the numerical 
identity (=1) of that self-consciousness
19
. The inherited identity of each appearance is 
the necessary common denominator that appearances must have if they are to be 
related to one another (they are all ‘appearances’ after all). But the bestowal of this 
identity implies a common condition in accordance with which these appearances 
must be posited –a common condition that Kant calls the law of thoroughgoing 
connection or transcendental affinity–. There must be, in other words, some 
minimally constant element that appearances share. This constant is none other than 
their ‘belonging-to-someone-ness’ that allows for them to be unities in themselves 
and unified as a whole. This ‘kindred’ feature of appearances, in short, is what Kant 
designates transcendental affinity. 
 
It is not surprising, then, that Kant uses the Latinate ‘Affinität’, most 
commonly employed in chemistry at the time
20
, instead of the more everyday German 
word ‘Verwandschaft’ to designate this interconnectedness or bonding capacity of 
appearances. The Latin ‘affinitas’, just as much as the English ‘kinship’, suggests a 
common note amongst things that allows one to gather them under a shared phylum. 
In this case, given the nature of the thing in question, this common note mandates that 
it be applicable as the most general possible predicate. If x, say, did not appear, and it 
is worth pondering how much it has taken for some things to become manifest as 
appearance
21
, y would certainly not appear in any kind of necessary relation to x. It is 
only once x has been structured as appearance that y started appearing in necessary 
relation to it. But necessity in the connection of two or more appearances is not 
something that can be derived from the empirical. Rather, that two or more 
                                                                                                                                                                         
in the Opus Postumum. It is as if, there, Kant wanted to recover the notion and, even if transforming it 
substantially in the re-appropriation, make it a central tenet of the transitional project. 
18 (A113) 
19 (A112-14) 
20  (Newton, Opticks, Query 31); See, also, Lavoisier’s 1789 Traité élémentaire de chimie where 
affinity [affinité] is spoken of mostly in relation to acids and oxidation (pp. xxvii-xlii). Cf. Goethe’s 
Die Wahlverwandschaften or Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung Bd. 1, p. 193. 
Interestingly, Zedler’s 1740 Lexicon does not have an entry for affinity. 
21 See, for example, how gravity becomes appearance in Galilei, Galileo. Dialogue Concerning the 
Two Chief World Systems. Modern Library, New York, 2001. 
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appearances ‘appear’ in necessary connection one to the other owes its modal status 
to the fact that these appearances share their mode of appearing in virtue of their 
conforming
22
 to one consciousness. Affinity, in this sense, designates the fact that 
unification of two or more appearances in one cognition is not only possible but, for 
some appearances, necessary
23
. 
 
Thus, in answer to the question of how it is that appearances relate necessarily 
to one another, Kant replies, in the A-Deduction, by means of the objective 
interconnectedness in which representations stand. Transcendental affinity must be 
presupposed in order for appearances to be relatable to each other as appearing 
necessarily and, hence, the ‘objective interconnectedness’. And, although it is easy to 
see how, through the synthesis of recognition, empirical cognition is endowed with 
the numerical identity of the unity of apperception –since all empirical cognition 
belongs to one nature–24, seeing how transcendental affinity grounds the subjective 
association of appearances is less easy. Indeed, in the A-Deduction one reads that this 
objective interconnectedness gives rise to the subjective and yet empirical association 
of appearances carried out by the imagination:  
 
“The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (of 
original apperception) is thus the necessary condition even of all possible 
perception, and the affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary 
consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on 
rules [Modified]”25. 
 
Whereas the transcendental unity of apperception gives rise to the 
transcendental affinity of appearances in virtue of the first’s numerical identity, the 
power of imagination gives rise to a subjective ‘law’ for the association of 
appearances. That one can relate, say, redness with cinnabar requires that the 
                                                            
22 (A122) 
23 (AA 7:177) Concoctions of the imagination, for example, are not necessarily connected when they 
are not ‘tied to anything objective’. 
24 “That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, indeed in 
regard to its lawfulness even depend on this, may well sound quite contradictory and strange. But if 
one considers that this nature is nothing in itself but a sum of appearances, hence not a thing in itself 
but merely a multitude of representations of the mind, then one will not be astonished to see that unity 
on account of which alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature, solely in the 
radical faculty of all our cognition, namely, transcendental apperception; and for that very reason we 
can cognise this unity a priori, hence also as necessary, which we would certainly have to abandon if it 
were given in itself independently of the primary sources of our thinking” (A114).  
25 (A123) 
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perception of cinnabar itself be brought back from past perceptions by the 
reproductive power of imagination. But if this relation did not follow some kind of 
regularity, some kind of consistency, e.g. that cinnabar appears red constantly, then 
that initial relation between redness and cinnabar would not be possible. The 
reproduction of past perceptions in the imagination follows therefore a rule according 
to which the reproduction itself happens and it is this that Kant calls the subjective 
and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules, or association of 
representations
26
. The reproductive power of imagination, if left to fend for itself, 
would never bring back into cognition the necessary order and regularity that has to 
be assumed to achieve knowledge. Reproduction, however, does not work alone: the 
productive power of imagination provides it, through an a priori synthesis, with the 
possibility of holding things together
27
 as to be able to relate the present perception 
with either its past/future states or, other absent perceptions
28
.  
 
That one can, for another example, associate the position of heavenly bodies 
at an arbitrary point in time with the future behaviour of anyone born at that moment 
betrays the subjectivity of the principle of association brought about by the productive 
power of imagination. But the fact that such association, if it is to be counted as 
experience, should be grounded on the transcendental affinity of appearances is 
precisely what prevents one from drawing such arbitrary connections
29
. Before going 
any further, however, it is worth asking whether Kant is not, as Deleuze swiftly 
                                                            
26  (A121) But note: perhaps it is the ambiguity in which affinity lingers that justifies Kant’s 
terminological carelessness. It is as if, sometimes, he felt compelled not to draw a distinction between 
the objective interconnectedness of appearances and the subjective association one makes between 
them. He will sometimes call association that which is here being identified as affinity (see A122) and 
sometimes call affinity that which is here being identified as association (see A123). Ultimately, 
because of the necessarily bipolar role of the imagination, this will come to be justified to some extent. 
27 (A101-102) 
28 The formative faculty happens in relation to both given and non-given (AA 15:131 [1776-1778]) 
objects: when in relation to given objects, the Bildungsvermögen is called Bildungskraft; when in 
relation to non-given objects it is called Einbildung. These last two, both modes of the 
Bildungsvermögen, are not exhaustive, however: Kant also speaks, at least pre-Critically, of 
Nachbildung (reproductive image formation) Abbildung (direct image formation) and Vorbildung 
(anticipatory image formation) (313a; AA 15:133; 123 [1776-1778]; [1769]); (AA 15:130 [1776-
1778]) –all these ‘temporally definable’ (as opposed to Gegenbildung –symbol, Ausbildung –
formation, and Urbildung –archetypal formation, which are not temporally definable). Regarding 
Einbildung specifically, the formative faculty when in relation to non-given objects, something else 
should be said: pre-Critically, Kant still speaks of it as “not having its cause in real representations, 
but arising from an activity of the soul” (AA 15:124 [1769]) which, it would seem, makes it a more 
active than passive faculty –something that will change when its function is narrowed in the first 
Critique. For further reading on the diverse functions of the imagination, see (Makkreel, Rudolf. 
Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment. The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 12-15). 
29 We find ourselves drawing these kinds of connections frequently. The question is whether they 
amount to experience, properly speaking. Kant’s answer, clearly, is negative. 
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insinuates, smuggling in a reformed version of Leibnizian pre-established harmony. 
The suspicion does not seem groundless since, after all, whatever subjective 
association one might draw needs to be validated by that which grounds it, namely, 
transcendental affinity, and that ground is entirely ‘objective’. If this is right, then, the 
entirety of the Copernican revolution, “to substitute the idea of a harmony between 
subject and object (final harmony) for the principle of a necessary submission of the 
object to the subject”30, seems to crumble. This, however, is hardly the case since it is 
clear that ‘objective’ here means something completely different than what Leibniz 
took it to mean. ‘Objective’, for Kant, just means indexed to the transcendental unity 
of apperception. As stated before, it is only in virtue of this unity of apperception that 
transcendental affinity arises and, in that sense, it is not ‘external’ objects which share 
their kindred but solely one’s representations of them. 
 
This becomes very clear when contrasted to Baumgarten’s law of the nexus 
universalis –and the way Kant turns it on its head. In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten 
insists on there being some necessary link amongst singular things presented to 
external sense: “Imagination and sensation are of singular beings, and hence of 
beings located in a universal nexus. Whence the law of imagination: When a partial 
idea is perceived, its total idea recurs” 31 . Since material particulars present 
themselves to sensation standing in a necessary relation to all its compossibles, it 
must be the case for Baumgarten that imagination, in representing these particulars, 
brings about the totality of their relations. Kant, however, is stating the opposite: if 
there is such a thing as a nexus universalis, then it is so in virtue of the connected 
particulars’ belonging to one consciousness. Then, if imagination brings about a 
pattern for their association, it will be so on the grounds that their objective affinity 
had already been given.  
 
It has been seen so far that transcendental affinity is the objective ground of 
the associations of appearances
32
, and it can only be found in the principle of the 
unity of apperception –in virtue of the latter’s synthetic unity33. But this is not the end 
of the story for Kant since, moments later in the same section, he asserts that it is 
                                                            
30 Deleuze, Gilles. La Philosophie Critique de Kant. Quadrige/PUF, Paris, 1963, p. 23.  
31 (Metaphysics, III, i.iv §561) 
32 (A122) 
33  This is just to say that transcendental affinity is the totality of the unity of the layout or 
interconnectedness of the pure concepts of the understanding, as some have supported. See: Reich, 
Klaus. Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel, Felix Meiner Verlag, Berlin, 1986, pp. 101ff. 
- 97 - 
 
“only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination that even the 
affinity of appearances, and with it the association and through the latter finally 
reproduction in accordance with laws, and consequently experience itself, become 
possible”34 . And, thus, how is it that the power of imagination does what it is 
supposedly doing in its transcendental function? That is, how is it that imagination 
can uphold the association of appearances, infused in normativity, while at the same 
time reproducing particulars, derived from sensibility? Or, why can the imagination 
mimetise the understanding in its legislating capacity
35
 and mimetise also sensibility 
in its receptive capacity
36
? 
 
In spite of their heterogeneity, understanding and sensibility must work in 
communion to yield cognition
37
. The unity of apperception and its inherent necessity 
on the one hand, and the manifold of intuition and its contingency on the other, have 
to be set in some kind of relation. It is the task of transcendental power of imagination 
to bring these two together and generate knowledge:  
 
“This synthetic unity [of apperception], however, presupposes a 
synthesis, or includes it, and if the former is to be necessary a priori then the 
latter must also be a synthesis a priori. Thus the transcendental unity of 
apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an a priori 
condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in cognition. But 
only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for 
the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle of 
the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination, 
before [vor] apperception, is thus the ground of the possibility of all 
cognition, especially that of experience [Modified]”38.  
 
 Although a lot could be discussed about this dense paragraph, for present 
purposes what matters most about this it is the very peculiar character of the pure 
synthesis of the imagination. Kant is saying here that the imagination has to be able to 
                                                            
34 (A123) 
35 “In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of 
the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, however, are the 
categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding” (A118). 
36 (A120). 
37 “Despite their dissimilarity understanding and sensibility by themselves form a close union for 
bringing about our cognition, as though one were begotten by the other, or as though both had a 
common origin” (AA 7: 177). 
38 (A118) 
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provide some way for apperception to ‘compose’ a manifold in sensibility. Indeed, 
the imagination is the only faculty capable of achieving this since it is both sensible 
and intellectual
39
 –it operates at both a subjective and objective level. This is the case 
because apperception cannot relate immediately to the fundamental form of sensibility 
–time, that which is most foreign to it40, without thereby sacrificing its universality 
and necessity. Instead, it does so only mediately, through the imagination’s swinging 
back and forth between the objectivity of the unity of consciousness and the 
subjectivity of the manifold in intuition. The image of a swinging pendulum going 
now hither, now thither is not altogether inaccurate: on the one side, the imagination 
renders rules sensible while, on the other, it renders intuitions conceptual. Being 
neither sensible nor intellectual and being both at the same time, it goes back and 
forth between the two poles of cognition providing sensible content-ful 
representations to rule-bound thought. 
 
By way of conclusion to the present digression or excursus on the role of 
affinity in relation to the A Deduction, it should be pointed out that the ambiguity 
with which Kant describes the function of the transcendental power of imagination in 
relation to the affinity doctrine is hardly accidental. As enunciated above, at times 
Kant defends the position that transcendental affinity is the product of the unity of 
apperception’s bestowal of identity onto appearances. At times, however, Kant 
defends that transcendental affinity is the product of the power of imagination 
carrying out combinations. But, even though illustrative for the purposes of grasping 
the general function of the transcendental power of imagination in the constitution of 
objectivity, the affinity doctrine poses nonetheless a serious interpretative challenge 
for anyone seriously engaging with the A-Deduction. Furthermore, this challenge will 
only become more puzzling if one considers the remarks Kant makes in the Dialectic. 
“Reason” one reads there “prepares the way for the understanding” 41  in that it 
provides principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of the forms in 
which the understanding may ‘move’ between representations. If homogeneity allows 
the understanding to go, within a certain horizon
42
, from the genus to the species of a 
representation, and specification allows the understanding to go from the species to 
                                                            
39 “For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always 
sensible” (A124). 
40 (B156) 
41 (A657/B685) 
42 By ‘horizon’ Kant understands, in this context, “a multiplicity of things that can be represented and 
surveyed, as it were, from it” (A658/B686). 
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the genus, continuity or affinity warrants the kinship between any two given 
representations as to give rise to a unified field within which to link representations. 
But in spite of their superficial resemblance, the continuity or affinity of nature and 
transcendental affinity differ in that the former is a mere idea of reason for which no 
corresponding object can be found
43
. If one is willing to defend, with Lorini, that 
transcendental affinity warrants the move the understanding performs in going from 
the possibility of experience, through laws, to the unity of those laws
44
, one would 
have to somehow square the ideality of the affinity of reason with the objectifying 
capacity of the transcendental affinity spoken of in the Deduction and the latter’s link 
to the imagination. Since this has not been done, nor an argument in this direction 
found, the issue of whether the affinity of reason and transcendental affinity are the 
same will remain undecided
45
. 
 
§ ii 
 
Sensibilisation and determination 
 
 The previous chapter yielded the conclusion that time is self-affection. This 
was seen to imply that the relation between the transcendental unity of apperception 
and its empirical counterpart has to be understood as follows: one sees one’s self as a 
unity because, and not in spite of, the fact that the transcendental unity’s ‘reflection’ 
in the flux of time is successive
46 . That one thinks of one’s own identity as 
necessarily abiding and unchanging could in no way have been derived from the 
experience of one’s empirical self. It was shown that the case must be, rather, that the 
empirical self is the temporally constituted correlate of an assumed transcendental 
unity that is absolutely self-same. In other words, the previous chapter concluded that 
there is a unity of consciousness and that, if time is the fundamental intuited unity, the 
unitary character of the latter is derivative from the unitary character of the former, 
i.e. time is both the activity of intuiting and the content intuited. It was seen, 
moreover, that the synthetic processes at work in the acquisition of knowledge come 
to be unified by means of a synthesis of recognition. Not only is it that the third 
                                                            
43 (A661/B689) 
44 Lorini, Gualtiero. Op. Cit. p. 218.  
45 A promising path in the latter direction would be through the third Critique’s idea of reason as the 
necessary condition for the understanding to be able to exercise its capacity in reaching out into nature 
(AA 5:417ff). 
46 (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 65-81) 
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synthesis provides the necessary rule for the unification of representations by 
providing the concept that renders what was previously only successive into a 
coherent unity. It is, also, that in carrying out such synthesis, the understanding 
becomes conscious of its own activity. This ‘becoming conscious’ was seen to 
designate nothing but the fact that the representations that ‘I am unifying’ just are 
representations ‘for/in me’. In other words, the synthesis of recognition makes evident 
two things. It makes evident, first, that consciousness of the unity of representations 
is, at one and the same time, the unity of the diverse acts of consciousness. The 
manifold, put differently, is a unity for the consciousness that apprehends it because 
that consciousness is itself a unity. But it makes evident, second, the closeness Kant 
thinks exists between the unity of consciousness and the concepts this consciousness 
uses to effect synthesis in intuition. The unity consciousness, after all, “(...) however, 
indistinct, must always be present; without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of 
objects, are altogether impossible”47. 
 
 This account signals, however, the beginning of a wider and more difficult 
problem since, as Kant makes clear at the end of the Deduction
48
, the transition from 
transcendental unity to empirical unity is supposed to do two fundamental things: a) 
provide proof for the much sought-for objective validity of the pure concepts of the 
understanding; and, b) provide some kind of legitimate warrant for these concepts’ 
relation to sensibility. Or, as Dieter Henrich has put it, Kant has to meet both of the 
aforementioned desiderata by, first, showing what the nature of a category is, and, 
second, showing that such category can exercise synthetic functions in intuition
49
. In 
fact, Kant explicitly states as much when he asserts:  
 
“(…) we cognise the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold 
of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been brought 
about [hervorgebracht] through a function of synthesis in accordance with a 
rule that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a 
concept in which this manifold is united possible [modified]”50. 
                                                            
47 (A104)  
48 (B163-B169) 
49  Henrich, Dieter. “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” in The Review of 
Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4, Jun. 1969, p. 652. The distinction between the ‘nature of the category’ 
and the category’s capacity to ‘exercise synthetic functions in intuition’ is not very clear-cut. The 
distinction can be drawn for analytic purposes, however, simply because the category as a function of 
judgment has a logical, if not transcendental, meaning. 
50 (A105) 
- 101 - 
 
 
It is important to notice that Kant’s claim here is that the very ‘hervorbringen’ 
of an intuition is carried out by a ‘function of synthesis’. This corroborates, first, the 
conclusion reached in the previous Chapter, namely, that apperception posits itself as 
a temporally extended unity the essence of which is to be receptive to its own activity 
and also to whatever is given in intuition. But from the claim one can infer, second, 
that ‘cognition of the object’ is not possible without a ‘function of synthesis’ that 
brings about the intuition in accordance with a rule or concept that will allow it to do 
so. This is significant to the extent that phrasing things thus allows Kant to shift the 
terms of the discussion from how the subjective activity works to why there is 
objective validity. If up until now the discussion had to limit itself to speaking of the 
correlate of apprehension as ‘content’ or ‘whatever can be apprehended’, this is no 
longer the case. Instead, the discussion can now turn to something much more 
specific, namely, ‘objects’.   
 
 By object in general, Kant understands “that which prevents our modes of 
knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in 
some definite fashion”51. This means, if what was seen in the previous chapter is 
correct, that the self must provide itself with some kind of a priori ‘traction’ whereby 
ontological relations, holding sway over specifics, do not do so in a completely erratic 
manner. But, where does this ‘traction’ reside? Is it something imposed on the mind 
by sensibility? Or is it, rather, something to be encountered in sensibility but posited 
by the mind? 
 
 The most intuitive, if not most philosophical, answer to these questions would 
begin by pointing out that, after all, there are things ‘out there’ to which one’s 
cognitive faculties relate. This kind of answer, however, does not sit well with Kant. 
The Aesthetic yielded, as a general result, that one is only ever conscious of one’s 
own representations
52
. By exclusion, and within the bounds of the Copernican turn, 
one is never conscious of some external ‘transcendentally existing’ thing ‘out there’. 
Instead, what one can say and think about the ‘external’53 correlate of intuition is that 
it is a nothing
54. But in light of the fact that one does cognise objects, this ‘nothing’, it 
                                                            
51 (A104) 
52 (A42/B59) 
53 ‘External’ in a rather sui generis way: certainly not in that it is outside of the self as some kind of 
transcendental existence.  
54 “(…) vor uns nichts ist” (A105) 
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would seem, does more than something since the pure concept of it alone can confer 
empirical concepts with objective validity: “The pure concept of a transcendental 
object, which is in reality one and the same = x throughout all our knowledge, is 
what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts the general relation to an 
object, that is, objective validity”55. This is to say that, in spite of its indeterminacy, 
the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ provides a fixed pole to which 
consciousness can attach or link the objectivity of its representations. 
 
 Perhaps it is tempting to question, if not dismiss altogether, the role and 
legitimacy of such explanatory instance as the concept of the ‘object in general = x’. 
After all, if the ‘object in general = x’ is only the ‘external’ correlate of intuition 
about which one can predicate nothing, why not simply leave it aside as completely 
irrelevant? Why not just proceed in a quasi-Wittgensteinian way without it and speak 
solely of representations and the relation they have to one’s faculties and to each 
other? Legitimate as these questions may be, they find an answer in something stated 
a few moments ago: an ‘object’ is that which prevents one’s modes of knowledge 
[Erkenntnisse] from making random and arbitrary connections (or, by implication, an 
object is what it is out of necessity). The positing of the ‘object in general = x’ is 
therefore what allows the mind to establish necessary relations between 
representations validly
56
. It is in fact this positing that allows one to distinguish 
between the arbitrary imaginative subjective association of representations and the 
necessary objective relations one can establish amongst things. It allows one to do 
this simply because consciousness is always consciousness of representations and 
never of things themselves
57
 and, if one wants to distinguish between a subjective and 
an objective dimension of these representations, one has to do so through the 
necessity inherent to the latter. Only positing an ‘object in general = x’ as the 
objective correlate of the unity of apperception allows one to claim, validly, that there 
exists such a thing as a necessary relation between empirical entities. 
 
 As the triangle example used by Kant shows, the necessary unity of an object 
is nothing but the unity of the rule one uses to construct the object in the 
imagination
58
. Indeed, what is at stake here is not the relations one can establish 
between transcendentally existing elements, since ‘access’ to them was ruled out in 
                                                            
55 (A109) 
56 (A109) 
57 (A197/B242) 
58 (A105) 
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the Aesthetic (what one given is, after all, necessarily temporal
59
). It is, rather, the 
objectivity of the concept of an ‘object in general = x’, i.e. the concept of the 
necessary synthetic unity of representations: “the unity which the object makes 
necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis 
of the manifold of representations”60. In other words, the ‘object in general = x’ turns 
out to be nothing but the objective correlate of the unity of consciousness which 
grounded the consciousness of unity. It is, strictly speaking, mediated by the rule for 
the construction of the unity of an object. If, say, one were to associate one’s own 
body with the head of a bull and empirically identify one’s self as a Minotaur, one 
could do so on the sole grounds that there is a ‘one’ to identify-as[-a-Minotaur] and a 
‘one’ doing the identifying. Something similar is happening concerning all empirical 
concepts: the unity of consciousness, grounding the consciousness of synthetic unity, 
determines the object of intuition in such a way as to allow for that object to be set in 
necessary relation to the rule whereby it was given and in necessary relation to other 
objects
61
. The transcendental power of imagination’s task in all of this, to the extent 
that it “aims at nothing but the necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in 
appearance”62, is to grasp the particular that will be subsumed under a given concept 
–when this concept is empirical– or to sensibilise the concept itself –when it is a pure 
concept–. 
                                                            
59 (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 62-65) This should not amount to denying that there is a ‘material element in 
appearances’ (A20/B34) 
60 (A105) 
61 “The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a 
consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, 
that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing 
determine an object for their intuition that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily 
interconnected” (A108). A further example can therefore be given about this in relation to the B-
Deduction. In a footnote, Kant famously claims: “The ‘I think’ expresses the act [Actus] of 
determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to 
determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. 
For that self-intuition is required, which is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e., time, which is 
sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable. Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, 
which would give the determining in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before 
the act of determination, in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus I cannot 
determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my 
thought, i.e., of the determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., 
determinable as the existence of an appearance. Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call myself an 
intelligence” (B158fn). Just as it is with the construction of the triangle, also in intuiting one’s self, or 
representing one’s own self-activity as existence, one determines what is intuitable about that very self. 
Or, better yet, the unity of the pure self, i.e. the act of determining, is necessarily mediated by the rule 
for the construction of the empirical self, i.e. the ‘I’ determinable as appearance. In an overly 
simplified way, this could be phrased as follows: a) The spontaneity of thought is the unity of 
consciousness; b) the representation of spontaneity is, in this case, the consciousness of unity; c) one 
does not know the first save insofar as it is perceived as the second; d) one merely represents the 
determining as determinable; d.i) but we are not intellectual intuitions; ∴ the unity of consciousness 
(the determining) intuits itself only as the consciousness of its empirical determinations (the 
determinable). 
62 (A123) 
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With empirical concepts the necessarily ambiguous task of the imagination is 
clear in light of the discussion of the ‘object in general = x’: the imagination provides 
an image for the concept which is, at the same time, a sensible representation and 
subsumable under a concept itself. Following on Kant’s example: the sensible 
representation of a dog can be subsumed under the general concept of ‘dog’ because 
the imagination provides an image of the doglike that is both sensible and intellectual. 
This image can be described, for instance, as that of any domesticated quadruped that 
barks and anything beyond these boundaries starts being un-doglike. The 
consciousness going through the process of identifying the dog enacts the rule 
according to which something will either resemble the image or will not (rule that 
would read something like: ‘if x is a quadruped that barks, then x pertains to the set of 
the doglike’) and ‘projects’, for lack of a better term, a unitary pole to which it can 
attach the objectivity of the sensible representation.  
 
This discussion, however, brings to light the central problem of this 
investigation. If the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ warrants the general 
relation to an object that empirical concepts have, if, that is, by means of this concept 
empirical notions achieve objective validity, what then warrants the general relation 
to an object of pure concepts of the understanding? How, in other words, are the 
categories endowed with transcendental content? For the purposes of a reading such 
as the one herein developed –a reading, that is, that defends the thesis that time 
should be understood as affection of the self and that the activity of affecting one’s 
self yields an a priori manifold to which consciousness must fundamentally relate–, a 
lot depends on answering this very question. Primarily, understanding time as self-
affection ought to concern itself with the question about the constitution of 
objectivity, and to do that, one has to justify not only the way in which empirical 
concepts have objective correlates but, also and more importantly, one has to justify 
the way in which pure a priori concepts relate to, and constitute, objectivity in 
general. It will be seen in what follows that in the activity of affecting one’s self, not 
only does one open one’s self to possibility of receptivity but, furthermore, that the 
opening is itself an already temporalised field of objectivity the nature of which 
allows for the categories to attach to transcendental content.  
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Categories, pure concepts of the understanding, are far from intuition in that 
they spring from the spontaneity of the understanding and in that they are pure and 
universal
63
. Categories have indeed a meaning, but that meaning is a purely logical 
one: it expresses solely the logical function according to which a judgment can be 
carried out
64
. This is the case precisely because one arrives at those categories by 
means of a metaphysical deduction from judgment itself
65
. If one were to strip away 
the sensible condition for the application of the category, Kant says, one would 
remain with a function that represents no object whatsoever
66
. But this is why Kant 
claims that “pure a priori concepts, in addition to the function of understanding 
expressed in the category, must contain a priori certain formal conditions of 
sensibility, namely, those of inner sense, i.e. time”67. It is in providing those sensible 
conditions that imagination enters into a relation with the pure concepts of the 
understanding and, furthermore, that synthetic judgments a priori come to be 
possible. The supreme principle of all synthetic judgments states that the a priori 
conditions of all possible experience in general are at the same time the a priori 
conditions of all possible objects of experience
68
. But, as the discussion of the 
previous chapter showed, this is so on the grounds that the formal conditions of a 
priori intuition have been brought into relation with the unity of apperception through 
the a priori synthesis of the imagination.  
 
                                                            
63 (A137/B176) 
64 (A147/B186) 
65 By ‘metaphysical deduction’ Kant understands the categories’ ‘concurrence’ with, and a priori origin 
from, judgments (B159). 
66 (A147/B187) Karin de Boer offers support for this reading in her excellent article “Categories vs 
Schemata”. Considering the schemata ‘conditions’ for the applicability of pure concepts, strictly 
speaking, means that they ought to be set in relation to judgment. But, she also thinks, a distinction can 
be drawn between categories and pure concepts: unlike categories, pure concepts do not abstract from 
the sensible condition for their application. Thus, when one speaks of a ‘category’ one may very well 
neglect the sensible content supposed to be thought in that function of unification in judgment. Not so 
much, however, when one speaks of ‘pure concept’ since, there, one necessarily thinks of the function 
of judgment as it is applied under the condition imposed on it by the pure intuition of time. In this 
sense, but in this sense only, the category is an abstracted version of the pure concept of the 
understanding. This, in turn, leads her to conclude that because the distinction between pure concept 
and schema is merely analytical, it is therefore impossible to grant priority to one or the other –one 
does not ‘add’ the schema onto the category but, rather abstracts the category or the schema from a  
previously unified ground that is the rule for the application of a certain judgment–. De Boer, Karin. 
“Categories vs Schemata: Kant’s Two-Aspect Theory of Pure Concepts and his Critique of Wolffian 
Metaphysics” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 3, Jul. 2016, pp. 441-668. The 
distinction between category and pure concept will not be followed through in this investigation, 
however, simply because Kant himself does not abide by it Cf. (A76/B102); (A119); (B146ff).  
67 (A139/B178) 
68 (A111) and “In this way synthetic a priori judgments are possible, if we relate the formal conditions 
of a priori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, and its necessary unity in a transcendental 
apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general, and say: The conditions of the 
possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of 
experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori” (A158/B197). 
- 106 - 
 
The name Kant gives to any one of the imaginative processes of ‘provision of 
sensible conditions’ is, famously, ‘schema’. Strictly speaking schemata are 
determinations of time or self-affection. They determine, again strictly speaking, the 
only pure inner intuition, time
69
, in that they transform its continuity into discreteness 
as for it to be able to relate to the logical functions of the understanding. Schemata, in 
virtue of their universality, and having derived their unity from concepts (and 
ultimately from apperception), must be homogenous with concepts themselves while, 
at the same time, in virtue of time being the fundamental form of intuition, schemata 
must also be homogenous with appearances
70
. The schema cannot therefore be an 
image, insofar as the latter is too closely linked to sensibility, nor a rule, insofar as 
this one is too closely linked to understanding. The schema is, rather, a universal 
procedure which underlies both images and rules: “This representation of a universal 
procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of 
this concept/Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie 
[liegen…zum Grunde] our pure sensible concepts”71. 
 
 Before going on to explore in detail the nature of each one of the processes 
through which the imagination provides the self with the sensible conditions that 
must be in place for the categories to have objective validity, three important 
considerations ought to be kept in mind. The first consideration may be deemed 
semantic insofar as it concerns the division between the productive and reproductive 
synthesis of the imagination and the fact that only the former may be called synthesis 
speciosa, properly speaking. The second consideration may be deemed systematic 
insofar as it concerns the position of the Schematism section of the first Critique in 
relation to what comes before, namely the Deduction, and what comes after, namely 
the Principles. The third consideration may be deemed architectonic in the sense it 
was used in the first Chapter: it will be suggested, indeed, that the Schematism and 
Principles be read, too, as following the mathematical-constitutive/dynamical-
regulative distinction. 
 
The first consideration to keep in mind is related to the discussion in the 
previous chapter
72
 insofar as claiming that the synthesis of imagination just is the 
                                                            
69 (A123-124) 
70 (A139/B178) 
71 (A140-141/B179-180) 
72 Vid. (Ch. II. §ii. pp. 70-78) 
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effect spontaneity has in sensibility, is not altogether wrong
73
. Indeed, the productive 
power of imagination, in opposition to the merely reproductive power and to 
apprehension, is characterised to a large extent as the determining act of synthesis and 
not just as the determinable matter of sense. But this characterisation, helpful as it 
may be, needs further consideration. The figurative synthesis, or productive synthesis 
of the imagination, is the synthesis of the manifold in sensible intuition
74
. It is 
distinguishable from an intellectual synthesis (synthesis intellectualis) insofar as this 
one could only be a synthesis of the manifold of intuition in general in accordance 
with concepts. The difference between the two is not as subtle as Kant’s wording 
might at first suggest: in sensibility there are only particulars, and therefore an 
intellectual synthesis cannot relate to them in any meaningful way
75
. A figurative 
synthesis, however, is by definition
76
 capable of relating first, to these particulars, and 
second, these particulars amongst them –as discussed before. The discussion about 
the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ made clear that the imagination, when 
associating particulars amongst one another following a subjective empirical law, is 
only carrying out its reproductive task and not, therefore, yielding a priori 
knowledge. It became clear, also, that in relating pure concepts of the understanding 
to sensibility, its task is a priori and transcendental and was termed, therefore, 
‘productive’. Since it is the faculty of imagination that carries out both these tasks, it 
is important to reserve the term ‘productive’ imagination solely for the one that 
relates pure a priori concepts to sensibility. 
 
 Kant also calls this productive or figurative synthesis, once again in 
opposition to synthesis intellectualis, simply synthesis speciosa on the grounds that it 
alone can provide the ‘species’, ‘aspect’, or the particular in sensibility, of some 
wider genus (in this case, the concept). Synthesis speciosa, as its name indicates, is a 
‘showing’ or ‘eidetic’ bringing together 77  of the sensible particular, i.e. the 
appearance, with the rule that constructs it, i.e. the concept. This is why the previous 
discussion about what was characterised as the pendulum movement of the 
imagination, and the digression on the doctrine of affinity at the beginning of this 
                                                            
73 (B151-152) 
74 (B151) 
75 This is why the pure schema is “the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of unity, in accordance with 
concepts, to which the category gives expression” (A142/B181). 
76 In its most elegant formulation, imagination is “the faculty of a priori intuitions” (AA 5:190). 
77 Species, in Latin, just means a ‘look’, an ‘image’, an ‘aspect’, an ‘appearance’. In philosophical 
tradition, it was used in the Middle Ages to translate the Aristotelian formula (γένος + διαφορά = 
εἶδος) into (genus + differentia = species).  
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Chapter, were important. On the one side, the imagination renders rules sensible 
while, on the other, it renders intuitions conceptual. It is synthesis speciosa since it is 
both intellectual in its combining according to rules, and therefore spontaneous or 
active, and it is also sensible, and therefore receptive or passive of the species in 
sensibility. It lingers in the ambiguity, so to say, of being active in its passivity and 
passive in its activity. Although the process of sensibilisation of the pure concepts of 
the understanding is not particularly simple, it helps to keep this first consideration in 
mind. 
 
The second consideration to bear in mind is that the Schematism chapter of 
the first Critique cannot be read independently of its subsequent section, the Analytic 
of Principles, just by dint of the fact that, in themselves, the schemata articulate no 
sensible content, i.e. no matter for perception. This is why Kant claims that “The 
schematism displays the conditions under which an appearance is determined with 
regard to the logical function and thus stands under a category; the transcendental 
principles display the categories under which the schemata of sensibility stand”78. 
Although in what follows a detailed analysis of each particular schema will be 
presented it is important to bear in mind that whereas the highest principle of all 
analytic judgments is the principle of non-contradiction; the highest principle of all 
synthetic judgments is that “every object stands under the necessary conditions of 
synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience”79. By now it 
should be clear, given what was seen in the previous Chapter, that the possibility of 
combining is given solely in time. This is so because if one wants to develop 
knowledge beyond the one provided in a single concept, one needs to do so 
synthetically and, therefore, a third element is indispensable: “What, now, is this third 
something that is to be the medium of all synthetic judgments? There is only one 
whole in which all our representations are contained, namely, inner sense and its a 
priori form, time”80. Only with the former permanently in mind81 one can turn to look 
at the Schematism, along with its articulation with the System of Principles, in 
sufficient detail as to clarify how they articulate objective validity. Or, in other words, 
with the Table of Judgments as guide, one can finally see how the categories, 
schemata, and principles articulate themselves in such a sufficient way, one should 
say, as to ‘constitute’ objectivity.  
                                                            
78 (AA 18:393) 
79 (A158/B197) 
80 (A155/B194) 
81 (A160/B199) 
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This second consideration should be read as appeasing the worry, articulated 
most clearly but not solely
82
 by Eva Schaper, about the systematic role of the 
Schematism doctrine. Stated as a dilemma, the worry reads as follows: either Kant 
achieved a transcendental proof for the objective validity of the categories in the 
Deduction –thereby rendering the Schematism redundant–, or the Schematism 
contributes in some way towards this proof –thereby rendering the Deduction 
incomplete–83 . The way out of the dilemma, for Schaper, consists in doing two 
things: a) making central that the schemata are laid out by the pure productive power 
of imagination and not by understanding, sense, or reason; and b) knowing that the 
schemata are pure time-determinations –which takes some of the burden off of 
formality and structure being completely on the side of the subject. This solution, 
however, has an important consequence that Schaper recognises and is willing to 
admit but that cannot be granted here, namely, that it must be the case that the 
architectonic is based on distinctions that will only work up to a point, but not 
beyond
84
. That point, she claims, is the end of the Deduction where Kant shifts the 
question to be answered and starts concerning himself with providing a metaphysics 
of experience. Because of this, “schemata as belonging to productive imagination, 
and schemata as pure time-determinations –can thus not be discussed without 
throwing doubt on some of Kant's own systematic tenets”85. Although Schaper is 
generally correct in the way she understands the function of schemata
86
, the 
‘systematic worry’ should be appeased once more to the extent that, it will be seen, 
there is absolutely no tension in the way the schemata relate to the preceding and 
succeeding sections of the first Critique. As the following will make clear, the 
Schematism flows rather naturally from the systematic tenets laid by Kant in the 
Analytic of Concepts generally. As was mentioned a moment ago, the schemata and 
principles are arrived at using the blueprint of the categories, and the categories, in 
turn, were deduced from judgments (which is not to say that the schemata and 
Principles are themselves deduced from the categories). That it is difficult to hold the 
                                                            
82 See, for example, de Vleeschauwer's, H. J. La Déduction Transcendantale dans l'Oeuvre de Kant. 
Vol, 3. Paris, 1937, pp. 441ff. 
83 Schaper, Eva. “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
Dec. 1964, p. 270. 
84 Ibid. p. 274. 
85 Ibid. p. 275. 
86 See, for example, the claim that “The basic Kantian insight which lurks in Schematism seems to me 
this: though it is true that we construct, we construct not as minds, or intellects, not by being mind, but 
by being in time” Ibid. p. 281. 
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entire structure in view is certainly true, but that such difficulty amounts to an 
insurmountable systematic problem is not. 
 
This leads to the third fundamental issue to bear in mind, one that can only be 
briefly mentioned here, related to Kant’s distinction between mathematical and 
dynamical judgments, categories, schemata and principles. As Michael Friedman has 
pointed out, the distinction between the ‘constitutive’ and the ‘regulative’ marks the 
division between understanding and reason in the first Critique
87
. This amounts to a 
rather clear distinction in that experience necessarily conforms to constitutive 
concepts and principles of the understanding but does not necessarily conform to 
regulative ideas of reason. The supposed clarity in the division between the two is 
blurred by Kant, however, when he distinguishes, even amongst the so-called 
constitutive principles of the understanding themselves, between mathematical-
constitutive and dynamical-regulative principles
88
. This, in turn, has generated serious 
confusion in the literature about the schematism
89
. It is worth noting with Friedman, 
therefore, that the distinction between mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-
regulative principles should be understood from the outset as follows: whereas the 
dynamic concepts and principles are merely regulative concerning intuition, they are 
constitutive regarding experience
90
. It is worth noting, further, that the distinction 
itself is not exclusive to the principles themselves and applies, instead, to judgments, 
categories, schemata, and principles. Although it will be discussed at length later in 
this section, it is nonetheless important to remark that the first and second sets of 
judgments, categories, schemata and principles are mathematical-constitutive insofar 
                                                            
87 Friedman, Michael. “Constitutive and Regulative” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
XXX, 1991, p. 73. 
88 Ibid. p. 75. 
89 Because of the failure to acknowledge the distinction in question, several Anglophone commentators 
have ended up being unable to justify the very order of presentation of the Schematism. H. J. Paton 
missed this (See: Paton, H. J. Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience Vol. II, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
London, 1936, p. 63-64.) and, more recently, Henry Allison ended up reproducing the same mistake. 
Allison went even further, in fact, by stating that the connection between categories and schemata is 
one that Kant “simply dogmatically asserts (…) [providing] no account of how one can ever establish 
the connection between a given category and its schema” (Allison, Henry E. “Transcendental 
Schematism and the Problem of the Synthetic a priori” in Dialectica, Vol. 35, No. 1/2 (1981), p. 76). 
For the same issue arising in an even more recent context see, for example, the exchange between 
Mark Risjord and Frank Leavitt on the matter (Risjord, Mark. “The Sensible Foundation for 
Mathematics: A Defence of Kant’s View” in Studies in the History of Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, 
No. 1, pp. 123-143, 1990, p. 124. Leavitt, Frank. “Kant’s Schematism and his Philosophy of Geometry” 
in Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 22, No. 4, 1991, pp. 647-659). For literature relating to the Schematism 
chapter that fails to acknowledge the point elaborated above see also: Winterbourne, A. T. 
“Construction and the Role of Schematism in Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics” in Stud. Hist. Phil. 
Sci., Vol. 12, No. 1, 1981, pp. 33-46 and Chipman, Lauchlan “Kant’s Categories and their Schematism” 
in Kant-Studien (Online), 2009, 1613-1134. 
90 Friedman, Michael. Op. Cit. pp. 78-79. 
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as they are concerned with objects of intuition, both pure and empirical, and have 
therefore no previously given correlates
91
. This means that, in carrying out synthesis 
in accordance with the rule provided by mathematical concepts, of concern is only the 
intuition of an appearance
92
. Mathematical judgments, categories, schemata and 
principles will be unconditionally necessary (apodictic) and, therefore, constitutive 
and allow therefore for intuitive certainty
93
. The third and fourth sets of judgments, 
categories, schemata and principles, however, are not mathematical but dynamical-
regulative insofar as they are concerned with the existence of those objects and have 
therefore previously given objective correlates
94
. This means that, in carrying out 
synthesis in accordance with the rule provided by dynamical concepts, of concern is 
the existence of the appearance
95
. Dynamical judgments, categories, schemata and 
principles will also be necessary a priori, but only mediately so, i.e. mediated through 
experience. This is why they only attain discursive certainty and instead of being 
constitutive they are only regulative in their employment
96
, that is, regulative insofar 
as empirical knowledge is concerned
97
. Perhaps oversimplifying this, but important 
for the sake of clarity: whereas the mathematical is constitutive of whatever may 
appear in time, the dynamical is only regulative of what appears to us as experience, 
first, in relation of one appearance to another (Analogies) and, second, in relation to 
the understanding (Postulates). Without keeping this distinction in mind not only will 
the Schematism make no sense whatsoever but, even worse, later in the Critique, the 
Antinomies would prove irresolvable
98
. For the sake of clarity in relation to this third 
consideration, a table accompanies this Chapter in the form of an Appendix
99
. 
 
With the semantic, systematic, and architectonic considerations in mind, then, 
the question about the way in which self-affection delineates objectivity may be re-
stated: how are the categories endowed with transcendental content? In what way, 
exactly, does objectivity come to be constituted by the activity of affecting one’s self? 
In one widely neglected but crucially important remark that Kant makes in the 
                                                            
91 (B110) 
92 (A160/B199) 
93 (A161/B201) 
94 (B110) 
95 (A160/B199) 
96  This echoes Spinoza’s distinction between mathematical (“a certainty which follows from the 
necessity of the perception of the thing that is perceived or seen”) and regulative certainty in his 
discussion of prophetic revelation through imagination. See Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, II, 3-4. 
97 (A162/B201) 
98 Since the Antinomies presuppose that the Analogies and the Postulates are governing experience, 
properly so called (A494/B522). 
99 (Ch. III. Appendix, p. 135) 
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Schematism section, a hint is provided as to how exactly the pure concepts of the 
understanding articulate themselves in and with time. Or, using Kant’s own words, 
how these time-determinations ‘connect’ a priori with the unity of apperception100: 
“The schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance 
with rules, and these concern, according to the order of the categories, the time-
series, the time-content, the time-order, and finally the time-paradigm [Zeitinbegriff] 
in regard to all possible objects [Modified]” 101 . ‘According to the order of the 
categories’ means, here, according to quantity (unity, plurality, totality), quality 
(reality, negation, limitation), relation (of inherence and subsistence, of causality and 
dependence, of community) and modality (possibility-impossibility, existence-non-
existence, necessity-contingency). In other words the schemata can be classified, 
according to the function they are carrying out, as portraying the time-series as 
succession (numerus), as portraying the time-content as quid (sensation), as 
portraying the time-order as order (perdurance, causality, community) and, finally, as 
portraying the time-paradigm as relative to thought (agreement, actuality, eternity)
102
. 
 
 The first procedure for the sensibilisation of a category Kant presents is 
number. In number (numerus), the schema of quantity which manifests the time-
series, Kant shows a fundamental feature of his understanding of self-affection, 
namely, that it cannot be solely a chronologically running sequence (or the elapse of a 
given sequence). One can see that in articulating number as the transcendental 
procedure for determining time according to quantity Kant hints, rather, at something 
important: the time-series, succession as such, once sensibilised, is not just a 
sequence but it is also a series. The synthesis speciosa provides an infinite series of 
moments necessary for counting as such to emerge at all. Put in other words, the 
synthesis speciosa highlights a possible particular moment against the intuited unity 
of time. Echoing Euler, Kant states: “Number is therefore the unity of the synthesis of 
the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time 
itself in the apprehension of the intuition”103 . But one must not understand this 
‘generation’ as if it were a creation ex nihilo –this ‘generation’ is, rather, the bringing 
forth, a showing, of quantity as determinable against the unity of one’s own pure 
activity.  Number is, put differently, the condition for the possibility of the 
                                                            
100 (A142/B181) 
101 (A145/B184) 
102 Kant uses ‘Zeitinbegriff’ to refer to this last one. This means: time-epitome, time-embodiment, 
time’s innermost essence or time’s example. 
103 (A143/B182) 
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determinability of the given in accordance with the a priori concept(s) of quantity. 
The homogeneity in question, here, can be no other than magnitude itself (or the 
having rendered discrete that which was continuous). This is to say that whatever 
appears, if it is to be known as object, it is to be known as unity, plurality, or totality. 
The sensibilised counterpart of these quantities is precisely the unity of synthesis 
insofar as it has been temporalised in accordance with the time-series.  
 
Not in vain, therefore, does Kant state the principle of the Axioms of Intuition 
in relation to number: “All intuitions are extensive magnitudes”104. This means that 
appearances cannot be apprehended in the first place save through the combination of 
the manifold of homogenous intuitions and the unity of one’s apprehending it105, i.e. 
apprehension is always an apprehension of something numerically given. This is 
derived from the definition of the schema of number, certainly, and is very much in 
line with what would have been stated in the kind of foundational mathematics that 
Kant was familiar with. Euler’s definition of number, for example, as “the proportion 
of one magnitude to another, arbitrarily assumed unit” 106, would have aimed at 
grounding numerical ordinality and cardinality. Kant, not unaware of this, is trying to 
preserve that definition’s capacity. That there is a one to one correspondence, for 
example, between the total amount of natural numbers (ℕ) and the total amount of 
prime numbers (Ᵽ), speaks of there being a homogenous note shared by both serial 
totals. The cardinality of both will be the same in this particular case due, precisely, to 
the synthesis being carried out in the homogeneity of that note. 
 
The schema of number, along with the principle of the Axioms of Intuition, 
provides the necessary image of every extensive magnitude. For further clarifying 
this, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant invites anyone 
interested in connecting the doctrine of phoronomy with the schema of quantity to 
note that “since the concept of quantity [read schema of number] always contains that 
of the composition of the homogeneous, the doctrine of the composition of motion is, 
                                                            
104 (A162/B202) 
105 (B203) 
106 The full definition is worth quoting in full: “Now, we cannot measure or determine any quantity, 
except by considering some other quantity of the same kind as known, and point out their mutual 
relation (…) So that the determination, or the measure of magnitude of all kinds, is reduced to this: fix 
at pleasure upon any one known magnitude of the same species with that which is to be determined, 
and consider it as the measure or unit; then, determine the proportion of the proposed magnitude to 
this known measure. This proportion is always expressed by numbers; so that a number is nothing but 
the proportion of one magnitude to another, arbitrarily assumed unit” Euler, Leonhard. Vollständige 
Anleitung zur Algebra (Cap. 1, Def. 3), Opera Omnia, Teubner, Berlin, 1911,  p. 106. 
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at the same time, the pure doctrine of the quantity of motion”107. In other words, 
anything that can be counted, and any thing intuited can be counted, will have to be 
subsumed in some way or other to unity, plurality, or totality.  Subsumed, that is, 
under these categories’ schematic condition, i.e. number. At the same time, anything 
given in intuition, must be numerically identical to itself and, therefore, subsumable 
under the principle of the Axioms that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes. The 
principle itself, however, is not the same as particular formulae derivable from it. 
That ‘x + y = z’ certainly corroborates the operation of the schema, insofar as two 
homogenous things will synthetically yield a third one. But one would need an 
infinite amount of propositions like that one to account for the complex relation 
arithmetic holds to intuition. Instead, in the Axiom it becomes clear that, so long as 
anything is intuited, it is intuited as extension. 
  
  In sensation (sensatio), the schema of quality that manifests the time-content, 
yet another fundamental feature of self-affection emerges: just as it did in the 
number-schema, time here figures not so much as series but more so as something in 
the series, the content, i.e. its thingness (quid). Similar to what happens in the schema 
of number, then, the synthesis speciosa highlights or shows a possible something 
against the unity of self-affection that it itself fills up; dissimilar to what happens in 
the schema of number, time is not produced here but, rather, filled or imbued
108
 
insofar as here the exhibiting is just a giving itself of the possibility of encountering 
something, a quid, in time. This means that sensation as the schema of reality is first 
and foremost the mode in which the synthesis speciosa provides itself for grounds of 
determinability –if the definition of matter is followed through109. 
 
 As previously with the schema of number and the principle behind the Axiom 
of Intuition, so it is with the schema of sensation and the principle behind the 
Anticipation of Perception: “In all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation 
has intensive magnitude, that is, degree”110. This is to say that in perception, which is 
just empirical consciousness, appearances contain the matter of perception itself –the 
real of sensation as merely subjective representation. But from empirical to pure 
                                                            
107 (AA 4:495) 
108 (A143/B182) 
109 Matter signifies only “the determinable in general” (A266/B322); “the content of a cognition” 
(A59/B83); “that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation” (A20/B34); “that in the outer 
intuition which is an object of sensation” (AA 4:481). See also: (A261/B317) 
110 (B207) 
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consciousness a discrete transition can be followed: from the real to the merely 
formal and, so, also a magnitude is to be attributed to the spectrum of sensation. 
Whereas on the one side of the spectrum one finds absolute negation, as the 
categories show, on the other side of the spectrum one finds absolute reality. A 
sensation is that the apprehension of which does not entail, in any way, the process of 
going from parts to the whole
111
, however, and this is why Kant terms this magnitude 
‘intensive’ –as opposed to ‘extensive’. An intensive magnitude, or degree, is one 
which is apprehended as a unity and its reduction occurs only by limitation via 
negation. This is why, regardless of what is apprehended, the matter of that 
apprehension is said to have a greater or lesser degree of reality. The ‘moment’ 
therefore, the minimum unit of time, is said to be the fundamental form of realitas
112
. 
It is important to remark here that property of magnitudes whereby no part of them is 
ever the smallest, i.e. their continuity. Unlike discrete magnitudes, such as the series 
of integers (ℤ), continuous magnitudes, such as the series of real numbers (ℝ), cannot 
be reduced to distinguishable unities. It is this property that allows one to claim of 
intensive magnitudes, specifically, that no matter what the degree of reality which 
they are given, the importance for present purposes is that they are given in the 
activity of affecting one’s self at all113.  
 
 The fact that sensation, or the real, is ‘anticipated’ must strike anyone familiar 
with transcendental philosophy as problematic: how can the quality of something, its 
matter which is by definition empirical, be anticipated in any meaningful way? This 
problem is partially solved
114
, however, if one considers that empirical consciousness 
can be raised, in and through time, from absolute negation to absolute reality 
instantaneously
115
. This is to say: since the continuous magnitude in question is not 
an extensive but an intensive one, and since the number of appearance can vary 
independently of the sensation it produces, then it must be the case that the 
imagination (being a progression in time) gives rise to the property of degree in a 
synthesis a priori
116
. In an ironic twist of fate, and Kant remarks this, it is rather 
                                                            
111 (A167/B209) 
112 (A168/B210) 
113 Uncountable infinity, such as the one found in real numbers (ℝ), is a great example of this: the 
infinite that separates 0 from 0.0…1 is greater that the infinite which separates 1 from ∞. It is so much 
greater, in fact, that it is strictly speaking un-countable. 
114 Vid. (Ch. IV, pp. 136-146) This will become a problem for Kant of significant proportions when set 
in relation to the concept of matter as an empirical correlate of sensation. Friedman, Rand, Förster, and 
Tuschling have all noted this issue. 
115 (A176/B217) 
116 (A176/B218) 
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curious that of extensive magnitudes we know a priori only their quality, i.e. their 
continuity, whereas of intensive magnitudes we know a priori their quantity, i.e. their 
degree –“everything else has to be left to experience”117. Sensation, importantly, 
designates nothing but the subjective aspect of one’s representations, i.e. the real in 
them
118
. We can attribute reality, therefore, to an appearance solely in terms of its 
degree of reality (infinitely present in sensation), un-reality (infinitely absent in 
sensation), or limited-reality (present and absent in sensation). This justifies, in a 
way, that the Doctrine of Dynamics in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science, would open by defining matter as “the movable insofar as it fills a space”119. 
There, where outer sense is already at play, something must be posited as occupying 
some space if it is to be considered subject to interaction with other things. 
  
 Now, in order to be able to elucidate the dynamical schemata, it is 
indispensable to go back to the third, that is, the architectonic consideration 
mentioned earlier. It was pointed out, with Friedman, that Kant draws a distinction, 
even within the constitutive principles of the understanding, between the 
mathematical-constitutive and the dynamic-regulative
120
. It was only briefly 
insinuated that the reason Kant has for doing this lies in that, whereas the 
mathematical-constitutive principles are such for intuition, the dynamic-regulative 
principles are constitutive for experience
121
. In the Appendix to the Transcendental 
Dialectic, Kant claims:  
 
“In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished, among the principles 
of the understanding, the dynamical, as mere regulative principles of 
                                                            
117 (A176/B218) 
118 “Sensation (…) expresses the merely subjective aspect of our representations of things outside us, 
[and] strictly speaking it expresses the material (the real) in them (through which something existing is 
given) [modified]” (AA 5:189) 
119 (AA 4:496) 
120 (A161/B201) 
121  A helpful way of understanding the distinction between the mathematical-constitutive and 
dynamical-regulative has been recently offered by Konstantin Pollok in light of what he calls Kant’s 
theory of normativity: the dynamicity and ‘regulativity’ of the Analogies and the Postulates resides in 
that a judgment carried out in accordance with either may fail to obey the principle in question (i.e. one 
can make mistakes in these kinds of judgments) because an existence, beyond what is solely 
constructed in intuition, is factored into the function of the judgment. With mathematical-constitutive 
principles, however, one cannot fail to obey the principle but, instead, would fail applying the 
appropriate principle if one were to make a mistake in judging. Interestingly, Pollok arrives at the 
previous conclusion for different reasons than the ones developed here. For him, Kant is in need of the 
mathematical-constitutive/dynamical-regulative distinction because transcendental philosophy is 
seeking to justify the lawfulness of what would otherwise be completely contingent sensations. See 
Pollok, Konstantin. Kant’s Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason. Cambridge UP, 
Cambridge, 2017, (see especially) pp. 220-248. 
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intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive with respect to 
intuition. In spite of this, the dynamical laws in question are nonetheless 
constitutive with respect to experience, in that they make the concepts without 
which no experience takes place possible a priori”122. 
 
If Kant’s systematic ambitions are followed through, and it is being claimed 
here that they should be followed through, the distinction between the mathematical-
constitutive and the dynamical-regulative is one that applies just as much for 
schemata and principles as it does for judgments and categories. Indeed whereas for 
the categories of quantity and quality the schema pertaining to each one of the 
categories is one and the same, in virtue of their mathematical-constitutive nature; for 
the categories of relation and modality the schema pertaining to each one of the 
categories, although following a uniform principle in each case, is different, in virtue 
of their dynamical-regulative nature. This is clarified perfectly if only one asks 
oneself a question hitherto neglected in the literature: given that there are twelve 
categories, three for each one of the four modes of judgment (quantity, quality, 
relation, and modality), why are there only eight schemata? The answer lies in that for 
the first two kinds of categories, the respective schema is number in the case of 
quantity and sensation in the case of quality –since they are both magnitudes123. For 
the modes of relation and modality, the former cannot be the case, however. This is to 
say that whereas there is only one schema for all of the categories of quantity, that of 
number, and one schema for all of the categories of quality, that of sensation; there 
are three schemata, one for each one of the categories, that fall under the heading of 
relation (although all of them expressing the time-order) and, likewise, three 
schemata, one for each one of the categories, that fall under the heading of modality 
(although all of them expressing the time-paradigm) –vid. Appendix124.  
 
The previous point has often been missed in the literature and has therefore 
created a significant lacuna. Sebastian Gardner, for example, seems unaware of the 
division. In the Schematism section of his Guide he claims that “On this basis, Kant 
specifies twelve transcendental schemata, one for each category (A142-5/ B182-
                                                            
122 (A664/B692) 
123 “And thus the possibility of continuous magnitudes, indeed even of magnitudes in general, since the 
concepts of them are all synthetic, is never clear from the concepts themselves, but only from them as 
formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience in general” (A224/B271). 
124 (Ch. III, Appendix. p. 135) 
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4)”125, something that is, simply, false. Kant does not specify twelve but only eight 
schemata and he does so precisely because of what was mentioned. Not only Gardner, 
but other commentators have fallen prey to the complexity of the schematism as well. 
Gerhard Seel rightly claims that for the first class of categories (quantity) there is one 
schema, but wrongly claims that for the second class (quality), there are two and for 
the third and fourth classes there are three
126 . Even Paton’s rather exhaustive 
commentary on the matter errs in this regard –albeit ‘errs’ differently. For Paton, 
there are only four real schemata and the role that the three schemata for each one of 
the last two classes are playing is more of an ‘explicative’, rather than constitutive 
one. Hence, one reads that “The difference between one schema and three is merely 
an indication of the less or greater difficulty of making clear what is involved in one 
aspect of synthesis”127. So, even though Paton recognises that there is a shortage of 
schemata, he nonetheless fails to grasp why that is the case. But as was argued a 
moment ago, and will be further clarified below, it cannot be as Gardner, Seel, or 
Paton want, because of the specific way in which time-determination occurs in each 
one of the eight schemata as following the time-series, time-content, time-order and 
time-paradigm. Only Klaus Düsing
128
, who will be discussed later, comes close to 
seeing the distribution herein advocated. In “Objektive und Subjektive Zeit” 129 , 
Düsing seems to implicitly recognise that quantity and quality have only one schema 
each, but he does not specify the reasons why he thinks this to be the case nor what 
their relation to the time-series and the time-content is. Because of this the discussion 
that follows may be read as trying to remedy the lacuna in question
130
. 
 
Anything that may appear must do so as being numerically definite (as having 
an extensive magnitude) and as being gradually definite (as having an intensive 
                                                            
125 Gardner, Sebastian. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge, Abingdon, 1999, p. 169. 
126 Seel, Gerhard. “Schematismus und oberste Grundsätze” in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Mohr 
& Willaschek eds.), Akademie V. Berlin, 1998, p. 236. 
127 Paton, H. J. Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience Vol. II, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1936, p. 
65. 
128  And, perhaps, William H. S. Monck who indeed recognises the numerical discrepancy while 
nonetheless insisting vehemently that each category must have a schema: “There thus arise exactly as 
many a priori determinations of time as there are kinds of mental activity –that is to say, as there are 
categories” Monck, William H. S. An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy. University Press, Dublin, 
1874, p. 44. 
129 Düsing, Klaus. “Objektive und subjektive Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Kants Zeittheorie und zu ihrer 
modernen kritischen Rezeption” in Kant-Studien, Vol. 71. 1-4, Jan. 1980, pp. 9-11. 
130 It could be argued that a further exception can be found in Mario Caimi’s extraordinary piece “The 
Logical Structure of Time According to the Chapter on Schematism” in Kant-Studien, 103. Jahrg., 
2012, S. 415–428. What makes this piece unique is that Caimi does provide a comprehensive account 
of the way in which categories and time relate to one another. Unfortunately, Caimi does not justify in 
any way the numerical discrepancy of categories and schemata. 
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magnitude). There is, in other words, no escaping the mathematical-constitutive 
judgments, categories, schemata and principles (this is what their intuitive certainty 
amounts to). It works differently, however, with the dynamical-regulative judgments, 
categories, schemata and principles: they are only mediately, and not immediately, 
necessary and the mediation is given by experience (this is what their discursive 
certainty amounts to). Take a mathematical figure like any Platonic solid, for 
example, into view: regardless of whether a dodecahedron exists or not, one can 
predicate it number and degree. But, if existence were removed from the concept of 
such figure, would one be able to predicate its cause or whether it is necessary? 
Certainly not: a dodecahedron contrived by the imagination, or somehow built in 
Euclidean geometry, will necessarily have a number and a degree pertaining to it –
otherwise it would not appear as an object in intuition. This same dodecahedron need 
not appear as causally bound or as being necessary –that will only come about once 
the appearing of the figure is mediated through experience, e.g. having rendered it 
sensible on a piece of paper. In the terminology employed by Kant in the 
Metaphysical Foundations, one would say that the dodecahedron has an essence, but 
not a nature, properly speaking
131
. Another way of putting this is as follows: Kant 
needs to be able to account for two heterogeneous relations in which thought stands to 
objects. According to the mathematical-constitutive relation one constructs all 
possible objects in intuition, i.e. nothing is without also thereby being numerical and 
gradual –for this is what ‘being constitutive’ means. According to the dynamical-
regulative relation one legislates on the existance ofobjects in connection to one 
another (Analogies) and in connection to thought (Postulates). Succinctly phrased, 
one could say that the bond between quantity/quality and intuitions is structured 
differently from the bond between relation/modality and existence. Or, better yet, the 
structural relation characterised as mathematical-constitutive constructs all 
intuitions; the structural relation characterised as dynamical-regulative legislates the 
appearing of existence. This is the reason why Kant only provides one schema for 
quantity and one for quality but three for relation and three more for modality: the 
first two are necessary conditions for any appearing whatsoever; the following six, as 
will be discussed shortly, are necessary conditions, too, but only of the existence of 
the appearance
132
. The exposition of the following schemata, therefore, will be 
                                                            
131 Nature in its formal meaning simply is “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the existence 
of a thing” whereas essence is “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the possibility of a thing” 
(AA 4:468). 
132 Perhaps a perspectival point might help: seen from the perspective of appearances in general, all is 
bound to the mathematical-constitutive principles; seen from the perspective of experience, however, 
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divided in the following way: first, the relation of the general schema to the general 
principle will be stated; second, the particular schema will be presented in each case 
followed by its respective particular principle.  
  
 The general principle that manifests the time-order, as stated in the A-Edition, 
is “All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules 
determining their relation to one another in time”133 (in the B-Edition: “Experience is 
possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of 
perceptions”134). It is an analogy insofar as it allows one to see that if a perception is 
given, then that perception is given in a time-relation, and only in a time-relation, as 
having its existence necessarily connected with other perceptions –before and after it. 
Now, an analogy in Kantian philosophy is understood as “a rule according to which a 
unity of experience may arise from perception”135 and, importantly, as the rule which 
allows for the subsumption of appearances not only under categories but, as Kant 
emphasises, under these categories’ respective schemata 136 . This means that the 
analogies themselves serve no other purpose except for that of providing the 
necessary condition for the unity of empirical knowledge in the act of synthesis. Since 
one knows that such unity, the structural unity of possible ontological predicates, i.e. 
the categories, can only be thought in schematism
137
, then, it is only through 
clarifying the relation of specific relational schemata to their respective principles that 
one arrives at understanding how experience comes to be constituted in the first place. 
 
The functions of the understanding, in themselves, have no sensible restriction 
and, therefore, no objective validity
138
. It is only in their articulation with their 
respective schemata, and further articulation with their respective principles, that 
these functions achieve objective validity properly speaking. It is this that Kant means 
when he says that “In the principle itself we do make use of the category, but in 
applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema as the key to its 
employment, or rather set it alongside the category, as its restricting condition, and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
all is bound by the dynamic-regulative principles. The two sets of principles operate, in other words, at 
different levels: the level of appearances and the level of experience. The difference between 
perspectives is precisely what will open the possibility for judgments that do not seek a thorough 
determination of their object –viz. aesthetic judgments–. (AA 5:232ff) 
133 (A177) 
134 (B218) 
135 (A180/B222) 
136 (A181/B223) 
137 “But such unity can be thought only in the schema of the pure concepts of the understanding” 
(A181/B224). 
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as being what may be called its formula”139. The analogies are principles for the 
determination of the existence of appearances in time in accordance with self-
affection’s own modes of instantiation (duration, succession and simultaneity140). But 
this determination cannot be reduced to time itself, of course, since it pertains to the 
understanding to provide the rule according to which the existence of appearances 
will acquire synthetic unity –that is the role of the categories here–.  Now, insofar as 
time comprehends all existence
141
, and insofar as the analogies themselves are a 
priori, not only will they serve to ground empirical laws of every kind but, also, will 
evince in a very particular way how time and apperception, taken together, constitute 
one nature. 
 
 In persistence (constans et perdurabile), the schema of subsistence that first 
manifests the time-order, synthesis speciosa specifies, as transcendental time-
determination, the time sequence in accordance with the category of substance. 
Subsistence should be understood here as that which underlies all possible mutation, 
i.e. an a priori determining of a (single) thing that remains throughout time. If the 
correlate of synthesis speciosa in its relation to time as number showed up as time-
production and in relation to sensation showed up as time-filling, then, one must ask: 
what could possibly guarantee a persisting something through time that does not 
change?
142
 In one word: identity. But where can identity be derived from in an ever-
flowing river of succession? When discussing whether every substance is extended 
and continuously changed
143
, Kant says that the former is indeed true, at least pre-
Critically, but only insofar as it pertains to the imagination’s efforts to adumbrate 
(adumbrare) for itself the aspect (species) of things –therefore inapplicable to the 
conditions of existence of some ‘external’ or transcendentally existing thing144. In the 
Critical period this amounts to saying that what the imagination provides itself with in 
intuition, are essences insofar as the existence of something that remains does not 
allow for infinite variation
145
. Substance here is just taken to mean an essence that 
                                                            
139 (A181/B224) 
140 An interesting question that will have to remain unanswered here is to what extent the ‘modes’ of 
time are not, themselves, different kinds of temporality.  
141 (A216/B263) 
142 (A143/B183) 
143 Claim that is not a proper subreptic axiom but, rather, an imposture of the imagination. 
144 (AA 2:414) 
145 As stated in a quote above, “essence is the first inner principle of all that belongs to the possibility 
of a thing. Therefore, one can attribute only an essence to geometrical figures, but not a nature (since 
in their concept nothing is thought that would express an existence)” (AA 4:468). This is the sense in 
which Kant uses ‘essence’ in, for example, “On the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason” 
when discussing systematicity late in the first Critique (A669/B697ff). 
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inheres, or participates, in existence –i.e. in time. If, for example, one wanted to 
determine to what extent ice, water, and steam are one substance, it would be 
necessary to strip away the inhering predicates of solidity, liquidity and gaseousness, 
correspondingly. The identity of that which endures through time, however, could not 
be removed (say, water’s chemical composition). But it will be solely on the basis of 
that chemical composition’s endurance through time that its substantiality can be 
predicated. Constancy and duration of a substratum, through time, are what provides 
substance with its necessary determination, namely, essence that exists. The principle 
that exhibits this time-determination, persistence, in its particularity is the first 
analogy: “In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in 
nature is neither increased nor diminished” 146 . It exhibits a time-determination 
insofar as there must be a subsistent something
147
 about which one must be able to 
predicate, in the first instance, the identity of that thing to itself and, later, other 
attributes such as motion, rest, etc. Taking this last one as an example, rest is only 
attributed to something insofar as it “is perduring presence (praesentia perdurabilis) 
at the same place; what is perduring is that which exists throughout a time, that is, 
endures”148. 
 
 A brief note on what Kant is distancing himself from might be helpful in this 
case. In §§193-204 of the Metaphysics, Baumgarten speaks of substance as something 
that can exist without being a determination of another or as something that subsists 
per se (accidents, on the other hand, are that the existence of which inheres in 
something else)
149
. In light of the Copernican turn, however, Kant cannot accept the 
Baumgartenian definition of substance simpliciter. Indeed, if Critical philosophy 
depends on anything, it depends mostly on recognising that subsistence is a predicate 
the correlate of which resides in intuition, and not in the mere concept of substance: 
substance, in transcendental idealism, does not subsist per se but only per quod. This 
is to say, with Kant, that the judgment ‘all substances persist’ is synthetic a priori. 
Deriving, in fact, the subsistence of substance merely from the concept itself, would 
amount to having made no appeal whatsoever to intuition or self-affection. Since, 
however, subsistence itself is something that can only be predicated in relation to a 
presupposed time, predicating subsistence will necessarily be in relation to intuition 
                                                            
146 (B224) 
147 An ὑποκείμενον. 
148 (AA 4:485) 
149 (Metaphysics, II.vii, §§191-204) 
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or self-affection
150
. One is, in conclusion, entitled to make objective use of the 
concept of substance in experience, precisely because in the activity of affecting 
one’s self, one recognises certain entities as persisting over time151. 
 
 The schema of cause, and of causality in general, is the real upon which 
whenever x is posited, something inevitably follows: “it consists therefore in the 
succession of the manifold, insofar as that succession is subject to a rule”152. Once 
the identity of something has been guaranteed as that something’s remaining in time, 
it is possible then to conceive how that identity is inscribed in the order of one after 
another that is exhibited in the general principle of the Analogies. Subordinated to 
this but nonetheless different, is the specific principle of this analogy, however, since 
what exhibits the time-determination as presented by the schema of cause-and-effect 
is, obviously enough, the second analogy: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to 
be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule”153. It is the 
second exhibition of the time-order insofar as that which is being articulated by it is 
nothing but succession that, in order to be thought in relation to the existent, has to be 
thought as the order of one after another that perception captures. Previously, 
persistence provided the grounds for the possibility that if something remains through 
time, and that something is self-same in its remaining, then that something is 
substance. But as is intuitively clear, things change, and while one knows that a 
substance’s endurance requires solely its constancy through time, that substance’s 
change will require a further ground for the determination of that specific change. 
Since matter has no essential internal determinations, insofar as matter just is the 
determinable in intuition, it follows that all change will have an external cause
154
. 
One cannot think, again, a transition in the state of a substance (e.g. from liquid to 
gaseous) without thereby also thinking the external cause that brings that transition 
about (e.g. heat). 
 
 Although it would be impossible to cover the copious amount of literature that 
exists on the second Analogy, remarking on the following might be helpful. In “Kant 
                                                            
150 (AA 29:794-797 [Metaphysik Mrongovius]) 
151 In this sense, what Rae Langton claims about substance in Kantian Humility is entirely correct: 
“When Kant says that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves, he means that we cannot 
make use of the pure concept of a substance in a manner that will enable us to determine a thing 
'through distinctive and intrinsic predicates'” Langton, Rae. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of 
Things in Themselves. Clarendon/Oxford Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 50. 
152 (A144/B183) 
153 (A189) 
154 (AA 4:543) 
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on Receptivity and Representation”, Paul Abela speaks of schemata as being 
receptivity conditions for the pure concepts of the understanding
155. Although Abela’s 
reading of the schemata differs from the one being elaborated here
156
, the way in 
which he describes the relation between hypothetical judgments and the schema of 
cause and effect is illuminating. He invites the reader to take the hypothetical 
judgment ‘if x, then y’ and think about the intellectual component expressed in it, 
namely, a ground and consequent relation. From this, he claims, one can think of its 
sensibilised counterpart as necessarily holding on to that relation while nonetheless 
respecting the restricting condition imposed by sensibility. Thus, the judgment ‘if x, 
then y’ turns out to be ‘whenever x is posited, y will follow in temporal succession’. 
In this sense, Abela thinks, the schema works as a non-discursive enabling condition 
that makes judgments meaningful by giving them intuitional form
157
 –and here it is 
being claimed that not just any form, but the form that the self provides itself with, 
namely, time. 
 
The final schema that determines the time-order is that of community or 
reciprocity according to which “the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of 
their accidents, is the coexistence, according to a rule, of the determinations of the 
one substance with those of the other” 158 . Importantly, here, the reproductive 
synthesis of imagination in apprehension shows only that when one perception is ‘in’ 
the subject, another one is not there, and vice versa. If that same synthesis, however, 
is taken in its full transcendental and productive power, as linking the pure concept of 
the understanding that pertains here (community), in relation to whatever is given in 
one and the same time, through the power of the schema of reciprocity, then, 
coexistence becomes possible. The imagination provides the self hereby, according to 
the definition of coexistence as time-determination, with the possibility of 
understanding mutual influence. The principle that exhibits the time-determination as 
presented by the schema of reciprocity or community is the third analogy: “All 
substances, insofar as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing 
                                                            
155 Abela, Paul. “Kant on Receptivity and Representation” in Baiasu, Bird, Moore (eds.) Contemporary 
Kantian Metaphysics. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 23-40. 
156 It differs in that, although this reading agrees with the claim that “As such, it is not that the 
Schematism restricts cognition to phenomena, but rather that the cognition of phenomena first 
becomes possible through the restriction imposed on judgment by the pure structures of receptivity” 
(Ibid. pp. 28-29); it nonetheless remains the case that the departure point for this investigation is the 
question about the way in which self-affection provides the understanding with transcendental content 
–something Abela does not elaborate on. 
157 Ibid. p. 28. 
158 (A144/B183) 
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reciprocity”159. Influence, Kant says, is the relation of substances in which the one 
contains the grounds for the determination of the other
160
 and reciprocity is when one 
can add to that statement ‘and the interaction is reciprocal’. This is what leads, 
ultimately, to the continuity of nature, i.e. to a nature that saltum non facit, that has to 
be presupposed in experience and, furthermore, to being able to derive from it 
Newton’s Third Law of Motion, according to which, “To every action there is always 
opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are 
always equal, and directed to contrary parts”161. 
 
 Finally, the last series of schemata pertains to the categories of modality 
(possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency) and all of 
them, in one way or another, manifest the time-paradigm. That they manifest the 
time-paradigm just means that in one way or another, these schemata exemplify the 
kind of relation in which thought in general finds itself concerning its own 
temporality. Unlike the previous schemata, these, and their respective principles, the 
Postulates of Empirical Thought in general, are nothing but explanations
162
 of the 
categories themselves. In these, or better yet, in their mode of determining an object, 
they do not expand the concept of which they are predications. This becomes very 
clear if one remembers the ‘peculiarity’ attributed by Kant to judgments of modality 
very early on in the Critique: modal predicates, unlike the other three kinds, 
contribute absolutely nothing to the ‘content’ of a particular judgment, but only to the 
copula in the relation of a predicate to ‘thought in general’163.  
 
The schema of number as a determination of self-affection provides the 
sensible condition for the categories of quantity and constitutes whatever might be 
intuited as having a definite number.  The schema of sensation does the same for the 
categories of quality and constitutes whatever might be intuited as having a certain 
degree of reality.  The schemata of persistence, cause and effect, and reciprocity, 
regulate whatever might be experienced as necessarily being in relation to something 
beyond the initial experience. The schemata of relation, differently put, allow one’s 
experience to be an experience of a set of interconnected relations and not of isolated 
                                                            
159 (A211/B256) 
160 (A211/B258) 
161 Newton, Isaac. Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica . Vol. I, 1729 trans., p. 20. 
162 ‘Explanations’ in the sense that they do not expand the concept of the object, but only the object’s 
relation to the understanding in its empirical employment (A219/B266). 
163 (A74/B99-100) 
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entities. The schemata of modality, lastly, regulate not so much the relations which 
one entity holds to another entity but, rather, the relation one or many entities hold to 
the thinking subject. 
 
 In agreement (adaequatio), the first schema of modality that manifests the 
time-paradigm, one sees “the agreement of the synthesis of different representations 
with the conditions of time in general. Opposites, for instance, cannot exist in the 
same thing at the same time, but only one after another”164. The ‘conditions of time in 
general’ are what in the Aesthetic had been called the Axioms of time in general (e.g. 
time’s mono-dimensionality and the fact that different times can only be successive) 
and, therefore, one sees that via the articulation of the principle of non-contradiction, 
the supreme principle of all analytic judgments, Kant is articulating time’s 
exemplification of copulative thought. Because of this, it might be tempting to 
minimise the importance of the schemata of modality: after all, they, too, are only 
regulative of experience and only of experience as related to thought. Doing this 
would be a mistake, however. The first schema of modality yields a fundamental 
constraint upon which the transcendental power of imagination stumbles. To the 
question of what the transcendental power of imagination can conceive when 
articulating understanding and sensibility, Kant replies in one word: the possible
165
. It 
is clear, therefore, why the principle that exhibits the first determination of time in 
accordance with modality is the first postulate: “that which agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts is 
possible”166. The principle is said to manifest the time paradigm insofar as, while 
being an exemplar of pure time, it exhibits the constraint the category stumbles upon, 
i.e. the formal conditions of experience. Perhaps it is useful to see this as echoing a 
distinction Kant had drawn in the 1763 essay “The only possible argument in support 
of the demonstration of the existence of God”. There, as Michelle Grier has noted167, 
Kant distinguishes between the logical and the real element in the concept of 
possibility
168
. The logical or formal element in the concept of possibility simply refers 
to that possibility’s agreement with the principle of non-contradiction. The real or 
material element in the concept of possibility, however, refers the datum about which 
                                                            
164 (A144/B184) 
165 (A144/B184) 
166 (A218/B265) 
167  Grier, Michelle. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004, pp. 24-26. 
168 (AA 2:77ff) 
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possibility is being predicated. In the Schematism of the first Critique, mutatis 
mutandis, it is the schema of agreement that takes up the role of provider of that 
datum and the first Postulate that enacts, so to speak, such provision. 
 
This last point illustrates neatly the pendulum function attributed to the 
imagination in the last section of the previous Chapter. The task of allowing one’s 
self to be encountered by the possible can be performed by no other faculty than the 
transcendental power of imagination, spontaneous receptivity, via the schematism. 
This is especially clear in the principles that concern not the relation amongst objects, 
since the Postulates say nothing about that, but the relation of objects to thought. If 
one claims of any given particular that it is ‘possible’, one does not thereby modify 
the intuition itself but, only, the modality of the relation of the intuition to concepts. 
But what can it mean that something be ‘possible’? From the previous discussion it 
becomes clear that it is not simply a matter of not contradicting thought. It must be, 
rather, that ‘possibility’ is linked via spontaneous receptivity to the way in which 
intuition is configured via the first three kinds of categories. This is where the traction 
spoken of earlier, traction in relation to the external correlate of intuition, is 
displayed, in the possible/impossible distinction, as the paradigmatic question 
evincing the nature of self-affection.  
 
 Actuality (actualitas) is the schema of existence in some determinate time and 
the principle exhibiting that time determination is the second postulate: “That which 
is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is 
actual”169 . This is to say: if something is, at any given moment, a correlate of 
perception and consequently ‘occupying’ a definite portion of time, then that 
something is said to be actual. By perception here is meant, only, a sensation of 
which one is conscious
170
. Note, however, that this does not entail the immediate 
presence of something before perception since, as seen before with the Analogies, it 
is sufficient that something be in connection with some other, actual thing, for that 
other to be considered actual also –in virtue of the schema of reciprocity and the third 
Analogy. If through agreement one comes to be aware of whether something can be 
the case or not when the concept is set in a general relation to time, through actuality 
one comes to know whether that ‘possibly being the case’ is attached to a particular 
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perception which provides it with ‘matter’ 171 . But from matter being only the 
subjectively determinable in sensation, it must follow that the attribution of actuality 
to it only comes after the perception itself
172
. This is just to say that if possibility 
precedes perception, actuality presupposes it
173
. 
 
 Finally, the schema of necessity is existence of an object at all times 
(aeternitas)
174
, and the principle exhibiting it as a time determination, is the third 
postulate: “That which in its connection with the actual is determined in accordance 
with universal conditions of experience is (that is, exists as) necessary”175 to which, 
Kant adds in a marginal note to his own copy of the first edition of the Critique: 
“That which is determined through the concept of time itself [is (exists) 
necessarily]”176. As a time determination, the schema of necessity illustrates clearly 
what Kant means by time-paradigm: something that is a certain way and could not 
have been otherwise is, according to the Introduction
177, ‘necessary’ and, furthermore, 
that it be so at all times without exception is its schematic extension: time provides 
the ground for something to be thus, and not in any other way, eternally. If in the 
schema of agreement one thinks, for example, that x could be the case in accordance 
with the laws of thought and with experience; and if in the schema of actuality one 
thinks that x is the case as it is both possible for it to be thus, and also has a 
perception corresponding to it; in the schema of eternity one further adds that x not 
only can be the case given certain conditions and is the case since the conditions are 
in place but, also, that x must always be (that is to say, x is in some way and cannot be 
otherwise) the case at any and every time, i.e. eternally
178
. 
 
∴ 
                                                            
171 The ‘Explication’ given at the beginning of the Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology, the 
fourth and last part of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, reads as follows: “Matter is 
the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, can be an object of experience” (AA 4:554). Corresponding 
to actuality, however, is Proposition 2 therein: “The circular motion of a matter, as distinct from the 
opposite motion of the space, is an actual predicate of this matter; by contrast, the opposite motion of 
relative space, assumed instead of the motion of the body, is no actual motion of the latter, but, if taken 
to be such, is mere semblance” (AA 4:557). 
172 This is slippery terrain for Kant: matter is only definable at the level of special metaphysics (viz. 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) but for the schema of actuality to be able to display the 
‘material conditions of experience’, matter itself must be presupposed.  This will re-emerge in the 
following Chapter. 
173 (A225/B273) 
174 (A145/B184) 
175 (A218/B266) 
176 (AA 23:32) 
177 (B4) 
178 In its temporalised version this would read as follows: if agreement says x can be at any time, 
actuality says x is at some determinate time, and eternity says x is at any and every single time. 
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But what does this rather convoluted portion of the architectonic say? And, 
furthermore, how is it related to the previously provided description of time 
understood as self-affection? Let the answer to these two questions work as a 
conclusion by way of a small summary of what has been achieved. It was after the 
findings of the previous chapters, after knowing that subjectivity affects itself and that 
it does so temporally, that the unity of consciousness emerged as a conditio sine qua 
non for being conscious of the unity of the diverse acts of synthesis. The power of 
imagination, in its empirical capacity, allows for the reproduction of past experiences; 
this same power, in its transcendental capacity, allows for the identification of past 
states with present and future ones. Thus, consciousness of the diverse acts of 
synthesis, mediated by the power of imagination, designates the possibility of 
ascription of experience to one and the same subject. 
 
But if what one is after, and certainly this is what one is after, is determination 
of sensible content, i.e. sufficient determination of the given as to be able to make it 
knowable, then, the imagination has to be able to move between the particularity of 
intuition and the universality of understanding swiftly. Or, stated differently, 
apperception was seen to be essentially synthetic insofar as whatever it posits, it 
posits as grounded in some a priori synthesis capable of linking the understanding to 
sensibility
179
. Only the pure productive synthesis of the imagination can do this. 
Synthesis speciosa is that which, standing over and against apperception, provides the 
latter with the necessary sensibilised ‘rules’ for synthesising the manifold originally 
given as unity, i.e. time. Only a faculty which is both intellectual and sensible can 
provide the necessary sensibilised time determinations sought for in the process of 
determination. These time determinations are the schemata. It was claimed that in 
addition to the logical functions of the understanding they express, categories have 
built into them, insofar as they are schematised, the sensible conditions provided by 
the power of imagination. What guarantees this step refers back to the discussion in 
the first Chapter. In sum, this is found in the difference between general logic and 
transcendental logic: whereas the former deals with possible relations within the 
understanding, the latter deals with those possible relations in their object-relatedness. 
Now, since the schemata are introduced as transcendental instances, then it must 
follow, according to what was seen, that they are the procedures which ground the 
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object-relatedness of categories. As the transcendental products of the power of 
imagination, schemata are homogeneous with concepts insofar as their universality is 
concerned, but they are homogeneous with appearances insofar as their singularity is 
concerned. They sensibilise the universal functions of the understanding in their 
object-relatedness while, at the same time, delineating particular sensible images. 
  
It was therefore argued, in the second section of this chapter, that the precise 
topological configuration, as it were, of the sensibilised portrayal of the categories 
answers to the moments into which Kant divides, initially, the Table of Judgments: 
quantity, quality, relation and modality. The schematic temporal division, in turn, into 
the time series, the time content, the time order and the time paradigm was shown to 
correspond to the first and indeed expand on it: a close interdependency between the 
modes of judgment and categories, and the modes of schemata and principles, has to 
be presupposed in order to account for the constitution of objectivity. It is this what 
Kant means when, speaking of the principles specifically, he says that “In the 
principle itself we do make use of the category, but in applying it to appearances we 
substitute for it its schema as the key to its employment, or rather set it alongside the 
category, as its restricting condition, and as being what may be called its formula”180. 
 
To anyone familiar with transcendental philosophy the above claim must have 
seemed, initially, somewhat puzzling. There are, without a doubt, four kinds of 
categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) and to each kind pertain three 
categories. There are, however, only eight transcendental schemata listed by Kant in 
both editions of the first Critique and only as many principles and, so, the reason for 
this had to be clarified (presupposing that the relatively asymmetrical division of the 
schemata and the principles cannot be due to Kant’s arbitrary whim). It was argued 
that it answers, instead, to a rather fundamental distinction between the mathematical 
and dynamical nature of judgments, categories, schemata and principles. Quantity and 
quality are mathematical insofar as they are concerned with objects of intuition; 
relation and modality are dynamical insofar as they are concerned with the existence 
of these objects in relation to the understanding
181
. In other words: the mathematical 
categories, schemata and principles are constitutive since, in their application, one 
quite literally constructs in time the magnitude in question (extensive or intensive). 
The dynamical categories, schemata and principles, unlike those, do not construct 
                                                            
180 (A181/B224) 
181 (B110) 
- 131 - 
 
anything, since existence can in no way be constructed
182
, but are only regulative of 
the relations of existent objects
183
. Indeed, this is why Kant divides the schemata the 
way he does in the first place –in accordance with the order of the categories, but also 
in accordance with the kind of structural and structuring relation in which thought 
stands to objects. Whereas the first two are magnitudes, the first extensive and the 
second intensive, the third and fourth articulate the relations of objects, as existent, to 
one another and to the understanding, respectively. 
 
This conclusion demands that one recall an important issue, left wholly 
undecided, brought about in the first Chapter
184
. It was claimed there, that overly 
epistemological readings of Kant would find it impossible to justify the distinction 
Kant draws between what is composed in time and what objectively exists in time
185
. 
It was claimed, moreover, that these readings will seek, in vain, some ground for 
differentiating between a subjective and an objective time. But the temptation to find 
such ground has misled even some of the most sophisticated commentators on the 
matter. Klaus Düsing, for example, in an influential piece from the 1980s notes that 
there is a distinction to be drawn between a ‘subjective’ and an ‘objective’ time in 
Kant’s philosophy. Whereas, he claims, the first is immediate and closely associated 
to experience [Erleben], the second is closely associated to mathematical and physical 
processes and to the permanence of material traits
186
. Noting that Kant never says 
what time is in the Aesthetic, Düsing draws attention, instead, to the fact that a 
thorough account of the distinction is only found in the Analogies
187
. Thus, if the 
Aesthetic presents the objective side of a unified time the nature of which is 
independent of any particular intuition within it, the possibility of sufficient 
determinations in time, and therefore the comprehensive account of time developed 
by Kant, will only be found in the Deduction, the Schematism, and the Principles. 
This is not to say however, according to Düsing, that Kant does have an account of 
subjective time, for he does not (this is a point about which Düsing is unequivocal: 
                                                            
182 (B222) 
183 (A178-179/B221) 
184 (Ch. I, pp. 45-46) 
185 The quoted fragment, from the opening paragraphs of the Analogies, reads: “since experience is a 
knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation in the existence of the manifold has to be 
represented in experience, not as it is com-posed in time [wie es in der Zeit zusammengestellt ist], but 
as it ojectively exists in time [modified]” (B219). 
186 Düsing, Klaus. “Objektive und subjektive Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Kants Zeittheorie und zu ihrer 
modernen kritischen Rezeption” in Kant-Studien, Vol. 71. 1-4, Jan. 1980, pp. 1-6. 
187 Ibid. pp. 3-5. 
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Kant was completely unable to produce an account of subjective time
188
). It is to say, 
nevertheless, that even if Kant’s ultimate ambition concerning time is to ground a 
Newtonian physicalist theory of absolute time
189
, one ought to recognise the basic 
foundation of it as being in the subject
190
. 
 
 According to the account so far developed, however, distinguishing between a 
subjective and an objective time simpliciter is as inadequate as it is misleading. Time 
is not ‘objective’ in any conventional sense but, rather, the objectivising subjective 
activity that brings about the possibility of constituting objectivity, i.e. the activity 
through which the self displays the conditions for anything to be an object. What one 
may want to distinguish is a subjective succession of representations from an 
objective succession of representations, as Kant himself does when discussing the 
second Analogy
191
. Thus, subjective succession would refer simply to the order in 
which representations follow one after another but objective succession would refer 
to “the order of the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a 
rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the apprehension of that 
which precedes”192. In light of the discussion above, this should be understood as 
saying that, even if one were to ‘bracket’, as it were, the dynamical-regulative 
judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, one could nonetheless witness 
subjective succession in intuition to the extent that one’s own representations could 
continue changing but without a rule to provide those alterations with order and 
regularity (representations would only be, briefly put, subject to the mathematical-
constitutive judgments, categories, schemata, and principles). Dreams are a 
paradigmatic example of this: irrespective of any relationality or modality, things still 
‘happen’ in one’s consciousness while one dreams. The story is completely different 
with objective succession, however, insofar as here one simply cannot ‘bracket out’ 
the dynamical-regulative judgments, categories, schemata, and principles and must, 
instead, witness succession as being subordinated to a rule that provides an order in 
accordance with which things happen
193
. Here, the existence of several objects in 
                                                            
188 Ibid. p. 19.   But see, also, “hat [Kant] keine eigene Analyse der subjektiven Zeit geliefert” (Ibid.  p. 
22) Or again later but in relation to self-affection: “Die psychologische Deskription des empirischen 
Vorgangs der Selbstaffektion bleibt schemenhaft” (Ibid. p. 26). 
189 “Diese Kantische Lehre von der Zeit ist nun eine philosophische Grundlegung von Newtons Theorie 
der absoluten Zeit” Ibid. p. 12. 
190 Ibid. p. 5. 
191 (B233-244) 
192 (A193/B238) 
193 Interestingly, in the metaphysics lecture, Kant distinguishes between ‘course of nature’ and ‘order 
of nature’. The course of nature refers to “the series [Reihe] of the alterations of events” that can be 
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relation to one another and in relation to thought overrides, as it were, one’s own 
imaginary, contrived subjective succession. A different way of putting this thought is 
by saying that, whereas everything in intuition will be associated in accordance with 
subjective succession, only that which counts as experience will be associated, or 
connected, in accordance with a rule of objective succession. In experience, strictly so 
called, the objective succession of things imposes itself to the extent that it is the 
existence of things that is at stake
194
. What this comes to show, therefore, is not that 
Kant was unable to ground an objective conception of time in his originally 
subjective conception of time, as Düsing claims
195
 but, rather, that Kant needs to 
show how, with time being irremediably subjective, one can account for an objective 
and necessary order of nature. Although complex, Kant’s response may be succinctly 
phrased as follows: the time series and the time content are constitutive for intuition, 
but the time order and the time paradigm are regulative for experience. 
 
One last thing should be briefly mentioned, because of what has been 
developed so far, that is to say, because of how the myriad elements that have been 
presented here relate to, and interact with one another, a path linking the unity of 
apperception and the multiplicity of intuition is disclosed: by means of affecting itself 
apperception transcends itself. Instead of sounding like some enigmatic, oracular 
apothegm, hopefully the previous remark betrays by now the importance of having to 
understand this portion of the Critical System, the portion that articulates judgments, 
categories, schemata, principles and intuition, as one whole. To the question about the 
way in which the activity of affecting one’s self constitutes objectivity, Kant responds 
by means of a thorough account of ‘determination’, i.e. a thorough account of the 
processes of sensibilisation that make up the whole within which objectivity comes to 
be constituted. It is only in this whole and its almost indissoluble articulation that the 
transcendental power of imagination will be able to display, simply put, “the unity of 
all the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and so indirectly the unity of apperception 
which as a function corresponds to the receptivity of inner sense [time]”196. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
cognised empirically. The order of nature, however, refers to those alterations “but only to the extent 
that they stand under a general rule” and can only be cognised by means of the understanding (AA 
28:216). The course of nature should not, therefore, be confused with subjective succession –the 
former is empirical, the latter is not necessarily. 
194 (AA 18:116) 
195 Düsing, Klaus. Op. Cit. pp. 26-27. 
196 (A145-146/B185) 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment Universal Particular Singular Affirmative Negative In(de)finite Categorical Hypothetical Disjunctive Problematic Assertoric Apodeictic
Metaphysical Doctrine
Definition
General Meaphysical 
Principle
Metaphysical Propositions
"The real in space (a 
body) is the filling of 
space through a 
repulsive force"
"That which in relation 
to the first [the real], as 
the proper object of our 
outer perception, is 
negative, namely, 
attractive force, 
whereby, for its own 
part, all space would be 
penetrated, and thus 
the solid would be 
completely destroyed"
"The limitation of the 
first force by the 
second, and the 
determination
of the degree of filling 
of a space that rests on 
this"
1st Law of Mechanics: "In 
all changes of corporeal 
nature, the total quantity of 
matter remains the same, 
neither increased nor 
diminished"
2nd Law of 
Mechanics: "Every 
change in matter has 
an external cause. 
(Every body persists 
in its state of rest or 
motion, in the same 
direction, and with 
the same speed, if it 
is not compelled by 
an external cause to 
leave this state)"
3rd Law of 
Mechanics: "In all 
communication of 
motion, aciton and 
reaction are equal to 
one another"
"The rectilinear 
motion of a matter 
with respect to an 
empirical space, as 
distinct from the 
oppostite motion of 
the space, is a 
merely possible 
predicate. The 
same when thought 
in no relation at all 
to a matter external 
to it, that is, as 
absolute motion, is 
impossible"
"The circular 
motion of a matter, 
as distinct from the 
opposite motion of 
the space, is an 
actual predicate of 
this matter; by 
contrast, the 
opposite motion of 
a relative space, 
assumed instead of 
the motion of the 
body, is no actual 
motion of the 
latter, but, if taken 
to be such, is mere 
semblance"
"In every motion of 
a body, whereby it 
is moving relative to 
another, an opposite 
and equal motion of 
the latter is 
necessary"
Transitional (problematic) 
Judgments - Problematic 
Anticipations of Nature 
Moving Forces of Matter
"As to quantity: a given matter can 
be ponderable or imponderable"
"As to its quality: a given matter can be coercible or incohercible"
"As to its relation: a given matter can be cohesible (coalescible)  or 
incohesible (incoalescible)"
"As to its modality: a given matter can be exhaustible or 
inechaustible"
"As to their direction: Attraction and 
repulsion"
"As to their degree: Momentum and finite velocity" "As to ther relation: Superficial force or penetrative force"
"As to their modality: Originary motor force and derivative 
motor force"
"The composition of two motions of 
one and the same point can only be 
thought in such a way that one of 
them is represented in absolute 
space, and, instead of the other, a 
motion of the relative space with the 
same speed occurring in the 
opposite direction is represented as 
the same as the latter"
"The quantity of matter can only be thought as the aggregate of 
movables (external to one another)"
"Motion, like everything that is represented through the 
senses, is given only as appearance. For its representation to 
become experience, we require, in addition, that something 
be thought through the understanding – namely, besides the 
mode in which the representation inheres in the subject, also 
the determination of an object thereby"
"Matter is the movable in space"
"Matter is the movable insofar as it fills a space. To fill a space is to 
resist every movable that strives through its motion to penetrate into a 
certain space. A space that is not filled is an empty space"
"Matter is the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, has moving force"
"Matter is the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, can be 
an object of experience""
Phoronomy Dynamics Mechanics Phenomenology
"Everything real in the objects of the outer senses, which is not merely a 
determination of space (place, extension, and figure), must be viewed as 
moving force"
"Every motion, as object of a 
possible experience, can be viewed 
arbitrarily as motion of the body in a 
space at rest, or else as rest of the 
body, and, instead, as motion of the 
space in the opposite direction with 
the same speed"
Of Inherence and 
Subsistence
Of Causality and 
Dependence
Quantity Quality Relation
Community Agreement Actuality Eternity
Realm
Family Mathematical
The Transcendental
Dynamical
Kind
Category
Schema Number Sensation Persistence Causality
Modality
Time-relation Time-Series Time-Content Time-Order Time-Scope
Of Community
Possibility and 
Impossibility
Existence and Non-
Existence
Necessity and 
Contingency
Unity Plurality Totality Reality Negation Limitation
1
st Postulate: “that 
which agrees with 
the formal 
conditions of 
experience, that is, 
with the conditions 
of intuition and of 
concepts is 
possible”
2
nd
 Postulate: 
“That which is 
bound up with the 
material conditions 
of experience, that 
is, with sensation, 
is actual”
3
rd Postulate: “That 
which in its 
connection with the 
actual is determined 
in accordance with 
universal conditions 
of experience is 
(that is, exists as) 
necessary”
Transcendental Principle
Axioms of Intuition: “All intuitions 
are extensive magnitudes” 
Anticipations of Perception: “In all appearances, the real that is an 
object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, degree”
1
st Analogy: “In all change 
of appearances substance 
is permanent; its quantum 
in nature is neither 
increased not diminished”
2
nd
 Analogy: 
“Everything that 
happens, that is, 
begins to be, 
presupposes 
something upon 
which it follows 
according to a rule”
3
rd Analogy: “All 
substances, insofar 
as they can be 
perceived to coexist 
in space, are in 
thoroughgoing 
reciprocity”
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Chapter IV 
  
So far it has been argued, in the first and second Chapters, that time, 
understood as self-affection, is the primary form of intuition and that its “primary” 
character is, first,  due to time’s universality concerning appearances and, second, due 
to its closeness to subjectivity. It was shown, logically, that the universality of time 
regarding appearances allows for this form of intuition to be able to account for all 
that appears: including, but not limited to, the representation of space and, more 
importantly, the representation of the self. In this way, then, the conclusion that time 
is logically prior to space was reached. But it was also shown, ontologically, that 
time’s closeness to subjectivity allows for this form of intuition to exhibit the self as 
synthesising activity: time is the form in which the self affects itself. From this, then, 
the conclusion that time is ontologically prior to space was also reached. 
 
 The previous conclusions were summarised in the statement that the unity of 
consciousness grounds and, in a way, ‘calls’ for the consciousness of unity to be 
time-mediated while nonetheless remaining pure in a narrow sense. Whatever 
appears, including time itself, appears as having inherited the numerical identity of 
the synthesising unity of apperception (there is only one time
1
, after all). And 
whatever appears, will do so as enduring as well precisely because it will have to 
appear for the finite mind as lasting through time: this ‘enduring’ of whatever 
appears, it was argued, is the necessary and fundamental relation that subjectivity 
holds to all possible objectivity and what Kant refers to as ‘time’. This is why the 
expression ‘movement from unity of consciousness to consciousness of unity’ is 
being used for summarising the previous argument: one sees one’s self as a unity 
because, and not in spite of, the fact that the transcendental unity’s reflection in the 
flux of time is successive. That one thinks of one’s own identity as necessarily 
abiding and unchanging, especially when being conscious of the diverse synthetic 
activities being carried out (apprehension, reproduction, recognition), could in no way 
have been derived from the experience of one’s empirical self. It was shown that the 
case must be, rather, that the empirical self is the temporally constituted correlate of 
an assumed transcendental unity that is necessarily self-same. Following Kant’s own 
formulation of the process, and putting it as simply as possible: the unity of 
                                                            
1 “The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is 
possible only through limitations of one single time that underlies it” (A32/B47-48). 
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consciousness just is the act of determining itself as consciousness of unity in pure, 
i.e. not attached to any external representation, succession
2
. 
 
 But beyond this, it was also argued, in the third Chapter, that time provides 
the self, by means of the transcendental power of imagination, with a specific 
configuring frame for the constitution and regulation of possible experience. This is 
to say that it is not enough to regard time as the general form of self-affection and the 
facilitator of that self’s own identification –the only thing that had been established 
up until the end of the second Chapter–. Rather, taking that as the departure point, it 
was argued in the third Chapter that by means of the transcendental power of 
imagination not only does the self relate to objects through concepts and their 
respective schemata and principles, but, also, the self is capable of relating objects to 
one another and to thought in an objectively valid way. 
 
 In saying that time is self-affection, by the transitive property, one is saying 
that in at least some way, even if very minimal, the self provides itself with the 
possibility of being affected by objects: the ground for the possibility of empirical 
concepts, what warrants that our empirical concepts are not haphazard and arbitrary, 
is an ‘x’ the concept of which allows cognition to firmly establish that if there is such 
a thing as an empirical concept, then it is so because of a certain correlate of intuition. 
The ‘object in general = x’, then, is nothing but the objective side of the coin that has, 
as the subjective side, the unity of consciousness. This means, in turn, that the unity 
of consciousness, grounding the consciousness of synthetic unity, begins determining 
the object of intuition in such a way as to allow for any object to be set in necessary 
relation to the rule whereby it was given and in necessary relation to other objects
3
. 
The concept of the ‘object in general = x’ works, therefore, as a warrant that justifies 
that cognition perceives things as necessarily connected. But, evidently, one can 
associate things that are not necessarily connected, e.g. one could identify one’s self 
with a Minotaur –on what grounds, though? Associations carried out by the power of 
imagination, Kant tells us, are the product of an a priori synthesis that allows for the 
relation of present perceptions
4
 with other, absent ones.  On those grounds, it was 
previously concluded, one can relate particulars with one another in one cognition. 
With empirical concepts this process is very clear: we can associate without a 
                                                            
2 (B158)  
3 (A108) 
4 Perception [Wahrnehmung] taken here to mean “'that which is immediately represented, through 
sensation, as actual in space and time” (B147). 
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problem the concept ‘dog’ and the concept ‘mammal’ in one judgment, e.g. dogs are 
mammals.  
 
But the process whereby associations are established amongst particulars is 
slightly less straightforward with pure concepts of the understanding: here, it was 
seen that a process of sensibilisation [Versinnlichung] for the pure concept is required 
if the concept is to relate to intuition in a meaningful sense. This is what Kant takes 
the schemata to be: processes that provide the sensible conditions for the application 
of pure concepts. It was argued, then, that the schematism, in providing the sensible 
conditions under which pure concepts of the understanding apply, is the name Kant 
gives to a necessary temporal opening, by means of the imagination, for synthetic a 
priori judgments to be validated. All synthetic a priori judgments, all judgments 
which expand our knowledge beyond the mere concept without deriving their 
predicate from experience, operate at two levels: they operate, first, at the level of the 
conjunction of appearances in intuition, i.e. that two things be related one to the 
other
5
; but these judgments operate, as well, at the level of relating the product of that 
conjoining to the understanding or reason, i.e. that the relation of those two things be 
articulated with the knowing subject. Consequently, synthetic a priori judgments are 
necessary and universal: that all ‘intuitions are extensive magnitudes’, for instance, 
appeals to the concept of appearances in intuition and to the concept of extension. 
Synthetic a priori judgments are, therefore, manifestations of associations carried out 
by the imagination insofar as the imagination is acting in the conjoining of individual 
appearances in intuition. Because of this, synthetic a priori judgments can relate to 
particulars in the way they do: in the affirmation that all intuitions are extensive 
magnitudes one is implying that every single intuition, if it is such, must be extended. 
The necessary imaginative reproduction one carries out of any intuition whatsoever, 
must conform to a rule for its association with anything else. This applies as much for 
empirical concepts as it does for pure concepts: if they will be objectively validated
6
, 
then they will be so in the imagination’s opening of a temporal, schematic field of 
objectivity. Seen from ‘within’, as it were, pure concepts of the understanding must 
undergo a process of sensibilisation that will allow them to determine something (and 
anything) in relation to self-affection. 
 
                                                            
5 This is a relatively uncontroversial point that Dickerson, for example, analyses in great detail. Vid. 
Dickerson, A. B. Op. Cit. pp. 8-11. 
6 (A113) 
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And yet, now, after having analysed the way in which judgments, categories, 
schemata, and principles are articulated with one another, or exploring the 
aforementioned ‘field of objectivity’, the following becomes evident: the set of 
synthetic a priori principles expounded in the first Critique aims at accounting for a 
certain kind of objectivity, i.e. categorial-mechanical objectivity. Proof for this was 
found in the admittedly difficult, but sufficiently demonstrated interconnectedness of 
the first Critique’s Table of Categories, schemata, set of a priori Principles and the 
doctrines found in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The Axioms of 
Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Analogies of Experience, and the 
Postulates of Empirical Thought correspond to the doctrines of Phoronomy, 
Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology, respectively. The correspondence 
between the transcendental and the metaphysical doctrines, between the System of 
Principles of Pure Understanding and the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, 
does not merely betray Kant’s enthusiasm for architecture, it also follows naturally 
from the premises laid out in the first Critique. Simply put: matter is thus configured 
for the self because the self is thus configuring it. 
 
Having securely established not only the possibility, but also the actuality of 
pure a priori content in intuition provided by self-affection, perhaps it is time to 
broaden the philosophical scope of the question to be asked since, as the Introduction 
to this work announced, of concern is the relation of time to general metaphysics and 
not only its relation to special metaphysics. Indeed, Kant is rather emphatic in 
claiming that there are appearances in intuition wholly detached from the rules of the 
understanding, or even its concepts,  that “appearances can certainly [allerdings] be 
given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding”7. Throughout this 
work, however, what has been claimed and, to some extent presupposed, is that 
appearances, if there will be such, require a set of synthetic a priori principles that 
                                                            
7 The whole fragment, in different translation, reads: “Appearances could (…) be so constituted that 
the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would 
then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that 
would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this 
concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would 
nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” 
(A90-91/B122). That, together with the following fragment, from Metaphysik L, “Every appearance is, 
as representation in the mind, under the form of inner sense, which is time. Every representation is so 
constituted that the mind goes through it in time; that is, the mind expounds the appearance, thus, 
every appearance is expoundable” (AA 28:202) yields the following, relatively simple argument: If 
appearances can appear independently of the functions of judgment, but all appearances are in time, 
and time is an intuition, then intuition is not exhausted by the functions of judgment. Alternatively: 
appearances can be without concepts, but not without time, therefore, some of things present to the 
mind although being temporal, are nonetheless uncategorial. 
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either constitute (as in the mathematical principles) or regulate (as in the regulative 
principles) their appearing. What, then, is one to think of when speaking of an 
‘uncategorised’ appearance? Furthermore, the analyses thus far carried out have 
focused primarily on the fundamental form of intuition and the opening it generates 
for the self through intuition. But early on it was claimed that the primary concern of 
this investigation is the role time plays in Kant’s general and not special metaphysics 
and in this vein, building on previous discussions, the question as to whether time 
must be limited to what was previously referred to as ‘material or mechanical 
objectivity’ ensues: is it the case that time, and its determinations by means of the 
transcendental power of imagination, are restricted in what they can present in 
intuition? Are they incapable of providing the configuration, schematic or otherwise, 
for something other than this categorial material or mechanical objectivity? Or, yet 
more precisely, is not another set of synthetic a priori principles possible? Is the 
‘opening’ referred to in the second Chapter, the opening of affection by means of 
spontaneous receptivity, exhausted by the configuration it adopts in determining 
judgment? If the opening is not, indeed, exhausted but is capable, rather, of providing 
something other than the merely categorial-mechanical, how would that ‘other’ relate 
to time and the imagination? In sum, if there were uncategorised appearances in time, 
would that mean that the possibility of such a thing as an ‘uncategorised schema’ 
exists in Kant’s transcendental philosophy? 
 
It is important to note that the previous questions have not arisen, let alone 
been ‘answered’, in Kant scholarship. They cannot arise because the literature often 
tends to link the pure concepts of the understanding directly to the principles without 
due care for the role that self-affection and imagination –the latter as provider of the 
sensible conditions for the application of those concepts– are playing. After all, the 
assumption is that Kant is solely concerned with constructing a metaphysics of some 
artificially elucubrated Newtonian natural science and, if this is the case, then it must 
follow that as soon as one has provided the transcendental synthetic a priori 
principles that allow for such construction, one’s work is done –all that would be left 
would be ‘filling the gaps’. But in the previous Chapter it was shown that one cannot 
neglect the role that the transcendental power of imagination is playing, through its 
time-determinations, insofar as one wants to provide a transcendental account of 
experience. Indeed, it was conclusively shown that if one were to link the categories 
directly to the principles, then, one would have to remain with those principles’ 
- 141 - 
 
logical validity, but incapable of showing their transcendental validity, i.e. how they 
constitute and regulate experience. 
 
The problem being addressed here, however, is not completely foreign to all 
secondary literature –and certainly not to Kant himself as will be shortly seen. Paul 
Franks, for example, understands this issue as being one of the horns of a twofold 
general demand or desideratum apparent to every post-Leibnizian systematic 
philosophy. In All or Nothing Franks writes that Leibniz formulated a problem that 
requires a solution to meet two sides of a crucial demand: a monistic side, i.e. “the 
demand that every genuine grounding participate in a single systematic unity of 
grounds, terminating in a single absolute ground”8 and a dualistic side, i.e. “that 
physical grounding and metaphysical grounding be kept rigorously separate” 9 . 
Although the two are necessarily bound, it is the second of this demands that 
resonates with the problem being addressed here since, using Franks’ terminology, 
having provided an order of physical grounding does not, for Kant, necessarily 
amount to saying that there only is such an order of grounding (even if it does not 
amount to saying the opposite, either). Since the Dissertation and throughout the 
1780s, Franks thinks, Kant was committed to upholding an opposition between a 
logic of truth that pertains solely to the subjective and ideal realm, and a logic of truth 
that pertains solely to the objective and sensible realm. For the second, the internal 
logic of truth that pertains to the objective and sensible realms, the standard of reality 
is found in the Principles: “this standard of reality, articulated as a table of 
categories or corresponding principles, belongs to the understanding, which, 
however, has no objects of knowledge apart from those that are sensibly given”10. 
About the first, namely, the logic of truth that pertains solely to the subjective and 
ideal realm, though, can one provide such a ‘standard of reality’? The answer Franks 
gives is not simple since in order to address the question, he thinks, an essential 
distinction between appearance and the ‘in itself’ needs to be maintained (what he 
calls the two essences interpretation)
11
. Considering the transcendental/empirical 
distinction, for Franks the contrast between, on the one hand, transcendental reality 
and ideality and, on the other hand, empirical reality and ideality is one between 
hierarchies of grounding where each hierarchy ought to be understood in its own 
                                                            
8 Franks, Paul W. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in German 
Idealism. Harvard University Press, MA, 2005, p. 20. 
9 Idem. 
10 Ibid.  p. 37 
11 Ibid. pp. 38-45. 
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‘substantive’ terms: “Put another way, the contrast between the in itself and 
appearances is a contrast between two construals of substantial being or essence”12. 
This, then, opens the door, as it were, for Franks’ interpretation to be able to meet the 
second horn of the second side of the demand: if the hierarchies of grounding are 
indeed being kept separate, and the ‘standard of reality’ for one of these hierarchies 
has been provided, then it would seem to follow that another ‘standard of reality’ 
should be provided for the second of these hierarchies of grounding. This ‘standard’ 
Franks thinks can be found in Kant’s attempt at providing what the former calls a 
‘non-relational’ ground for relational properties –an ens realissimum13. The many 
issues with this kind of response will be addressed later but what is relevant here is 
that, from this, one sees that Franks recognises the limitations inherent to the set of 
synthetic a priori principles presented in the first Critique. These principles, in his 
words, fail in accounting for the metaphysical order of grounding and, instead, only 
provide us with an order of grounding that is solely empirical. 
 
Likewise, Burkhard Tuschling understands the problem of trying to account 
for a different kind of objectivity that exceeds mechanical objectivity –and of having 
to provide transcendental principles that would justify such account. In “The System 
of Transcendental Idealism: Questions Raised and Left Open in the Kritik der 
Urteilskraft” and again in “Appereception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental 
Deduction of Matter in Kant’s Opus Postumum”14 Tuschling shows that the third 
Critique deals mostly with three problems: first, whether organic life can be 
accounted for in terms of the transcendental principles; second, whether nature and 
freedom can be reconciled with one another; and, third, whether it is possible to 
construct one system of nature, i.e. one system of objects and laws of nature which at 
the same time is one system of experience
15
. Tuschling thinks that the role the third 
Critique and the Opus Postumum are playing, along with Kant’s use of the intuitive, 
non-human understanding, is what will supposedly provide some kind of solution to 
these three problems. Kant asserts, in the third Critique, that the forms of nature are 
so varied, that the modifications in the concepts of nature are so many, that a higher 
                                                            
12 Ibid. p. 50. 
13 Ibid. p.65. 
14 Tuschling, Burkhard. “Appereception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of 
Matter in Kant’s Opus Postumum” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the 
Opus Postumum (Ed. Eckart Förster). Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1989, pp. 193-216. 
15 Tuschling, Burkhard. “The System of Transcendental Idealism: Questions Raised and Left Open in 
the Kritik der Urteislkraft” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXX, Supplement, 1991, p. 
115. 
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principle must be sought in order to arrive at some kind of unity of experience
16
. In 
fact, further in this section, Kant explicitly states that without such principle, not even 
the aim of the first Critique would have been reached
17
. Tuschling takes this to imply 
that the whole endeavour of transcendental philosophy becomes to seek the principle 
that will “establish the unity, not only of Nature and Freedom, not only of inorganic 
and organic nature, but also the unity of one and only one nature, one and the same 
universal nature, now considered in particular”18.  
 
Since, Tuschling claims, it is possible for us to consider the world as 
appearance, and to nonetheless think of the idea of things in themselves, and to 
correlate to those things in themselves a super-sensible real ground for nature to 
which we ourselves belong, then, Kant’s point follows: “the material world would 
thus be judged in accordance with two kinds of principles, without the mechanical 
mode of explanation being excluded by the teleological mode, as if they contradicted 
each other”19. And importantly, from this Tuschling infers that by the time of the 
third Critique, Kant had abandoned the notion that a human discursive understanding 
is the supreme ground of the unity of nature (pace Reinhold) and moved on to posit 
some other single ground
20
. This would justify according to Tuschling why Kant was 
so concerned with developing a new transcendental deduction; why he pursued in the 
Opus Postumum to do so through a deduction of matter/ether; why he seeks a 
Schellingian doctrine of self-positing; and, finally, why Kant insists in identifying 
transcendental idealism to Spinozism
21
. 
 
It would be as unwise to overlook the significant differences between Franks’ 
and Tuschling’s accounts, as it would be to overlook the differences between their 
respective positions and the one that will be developed here. It is not the same to ask 
if Kant can provide a synthetic a priori transcendental principle that allows one to 
justify organic matter as organism as it is to ask, as is currently being done, if there 
                                                            
16 (AA 5:179-180) 
17 (AA 5:180) 
18 Tuschling, Burkhard. Op. Cit. 1991, p. 118. 
19 (AA 5:409) 
20 Tuschling does not dwell on the supposed ‘singularity’ of the super-sensible and perhaps this is what 
will later lead him astray: the super-sensible, as is pointed out in the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment 
can be thought of in three interconnected but different ways: “first, the idea of the super-sensible in 
general, not further determined, as the substrate of nature; second, the idea of the same super-sensible 
as the principle of nature’s subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power; third, the idea of the 
same super-sensible as the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the harmony of these purposes 
with nature in the moral sphere” (KU V:346). See: Hughes, Fiona. Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment, Continuum, London, 2010, pp. 134-147. 
21 Tuschling, Burkhard. Op. Cit.1991, pp. 121-22. 
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can be an uncategorised schema –at least not prima facie–. Nor is it the same to ask 
whether Kant can construct a hierarchy of grounding that is wholly detached from the 
physico-mechanical hierarchy as it is to ask whether intuition is, as hinted at in the 
previous Chapter, infinite –or not confined to the categorial–. But the questions are 
not altogether different either. At the very least on can see a parallel between them in 
that both lines of inquiry recognise as indispensable that one acknowledge the need 
for something other than what determining judgment, as understood in the first 
Critique, can provide. Indeed, the parallel goes even further insofar as in both cases it 
is a priority to recognise the inherent limitations of the understanding in the face of 
what self-affection provides. For this reason, it is important to stress how, even in 
Kant’s own writings, such limitations of the understanding are addressed.  
 
Early in the 1770s, Kant only hints at the difficulty but later, in the mid-1780s, 
he wholeheartedly commits to solving the problem. Thus, already in the Dissertation, 
one reads that: “Through the faculty of understanding, we know things as they really 
are in the intelligible or noumenal world, where they constitute a dynamic 
community. Through the faculty of sensibility, we know things as they appear in the 
sensible or phenomenal world”22. If one asks what the principles that ground and 
govern the sensible or phenomenal world are, then, the answer in the Dissertation is 
straightforward: space and time. If, on the other hand, one asks what the principles 
that ground and govern the intelligible or noumenal world are, then, the answer is not 
quite so simple. For if the world is a whole composed of contingent beings, then, 
Kant claims, it must have been caused by something outside the world 
[extramundanum]
23
 –for the relation of ground and consequent to be necessary, one 
needs to posit a necessary being as the ground (this is pre-Critical, after all, where 
Kant had not yet treated causality as a pure concept). And although this would not 
mean that there is only one possible world (for Kant clearly endorses that there could 
be more than one actual world –even if amongst worlds no communication of 
whatever kind would be possible
24
), it would mean that all substances within that one 
world would have to be sustained by a common principle: a generally established 
harmony amongst substances
25
. The emphasis here rests on the generality of the 
                                                            
22 Franks, Paul W. Op. Cit. p. 33. Cf. (AA 2:397). 
23 (AA 2:408) 
24 “Thus, a number of actual worlds existing outside one another is not impossible simply in virtue of 
the concept itself (as Wolff wrongly concluded from the notion of a complex multiplicity, a notion 
which he thought sufficient for a whole as such)” (AA 2:408) 
25 (AA 2:409) 
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harmony itself. A generally established harmony contrasts with an individually 
established harmony that refers only to the mutual adaptations that individual 
substances, and the states of affairs they give rise to, would have to undergo in order 
to be rationally relatable one to another. This is not the case for the generally 
established harmony that refers to the totality of substances: if the ‘conjunction’ of all 
substances were necessary, which is to say having all its conjuncts being related in a 
necessary way, then the world would appear as a ‘real whole’ [totum reale] in virtue 
of the definition of the conjunction itself. But since this is something that Kant does 
not, and cannot prove, then it follows that this general principle, the generally 
established harmony, ought to be entertained only as a possibility
26
. 
 
But in spite of the previous conclusion, not incidentally a merely problematic 
one, the pursuit of a principle that would govern appearances in some non-categorial 
way was not abandoned. Kant does abandon the pursuit for a principle of a generally 
established harmony, if nothing at the very least nominally, but maintains the ‘spirit’, 
so to say, in seeking a principle governing appearances that goes beyond the two 
conditions of sensibility and that goes, furthermore, beyond the determinations 
pertaining to the understanding alone. In fact, through re-phrasings and re-workings 
of a transcendental system of philosophy, the need to provide such a principle only 
became more acute. Following on the example of the first Critique, the pursuit of a 
principle was guided initially by the faculty that enacts principles themselves, i.e. the 
faculty of judgment. Thus, in the hope of achieving a genuine system of philosophy, 
transcendental philosophy had to strive towards the exhibition of the a priori 
principle to which judgment lays claim but, importantly in this context, not deriving 
such exhibition from the understanding’s particular laws. Otherwise the principle 
itself would only be localised and determinate according to concepts
27
, i.e. one would 
end up reproducing the Principles of Pure Understanding. The pursuit, indeed, had to 
go beyond the understanding’s rules. But, how to get started in such quest? What kind 
of principle should one be after and, furthermore, where would it be found?  
 
In answering this last question, by bringing together some pieces that have 
thus far figured only fragmentarily in this investigation, this inquiry will conclude in 
a twofold way. Or, rather, two possibilities will be brought forward, both within reach 
of transcendental philosophy as it has been constructed here, that each in its own way 
                                                            
26 (AA 2:409) 
27 (AA 5:169) 
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could ultimately constitute an answer to the question of whether there is, in fact, a 
synthetic a priori principle that, while being grounded in self-affection, nonetheless 
governs appearances in a non categorial way. The first path that could be taken states 
that the principle is indeed possible –and therefore actual as a constitutive principle 
but only for reflective judgment; that the principle is the law-likeness of nature’s 
behaviour in the diversity of its laws manifest in purposiveness; and that the 
principle’s relation to time just is that of an exhibition [Darstellung] of the latter’s 
futural orientation: the imagination hypotypically provides the form of the sought-for 
principle by exhibiting time symbolically. This first path seems to be more in line 
doxographically, as it were, with the transcendental system as constructed in the B-
Edition of the first Critique, the second Critique, the final version of the third 
Critique, and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The second path that 
could be taken states that the principle is not only possible but necessary –and 
therefore actual, too, that the principle is the motion of forces in a world-system, and 
that the principle’s relation to time is given by the unity of the empirical laws that 
constitute the entirety of the world-system itself as stemming from the unity of 
subjectivity. This second path seems to be more in line, once more doxographically, 
with parts of the A-Edition of the first Critique, with the project of transcendental 
philosophy as presented in the first Introduction to the third Critique, with some late 
Reflexionen, with some minor essays, and with the Opus Postumum
28
.  
 
∵ 
 
§ i 
 
The first path 
 
How does one arrive, then, at a synthetic a priori principle that is not 
constrained by the functions of judgment? As Kant shows in the third Critique, by 
going back to the beginning: “Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the 
particular as contained under the universal”29. And there are two general kinds of 
judgments: first are those where the universal is given alongside the particular, and if 
one judges in subsuming that particular under that universal, then the judgment is 
                                                            
28 For an account of the possible relations between the two paths, see Conclusion. 
29 (AA 5:179) 
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determining [bestimmend]. And, second, there are those kinds of judgments where 
the particular is given and then the faculty of judgment is required to seek a universal 
under which to subsume that particular –these Kant calls reflective [reflektierende] 
judgments
30
. Since, in the case at hand, no universal concept is given (for, as was said 
before, that would lead to the first Critique’s Table of Principles), then it must be the 
case that the a priori principle one is after is such for reflective judgment only.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
The distinction is relatively easy to grasp by means of the ‘movements’ 
performed by the faculty of judgment itself: in determining judgment one subsumes 
the particular under the universal, that is, descends from the genus to the species; in 
reflective judgment one moves in the opposite direction, that is, ascends from the 
particular to the universal, from species to genus (even if that genus is not always 
reached or is, indeed, left wholly indeterminate), in accordance with a rule. And what 
rule is one to use in the movement of ascension? A rule that meets at least two 
distinct criteria: first, that it be not derived from experience –that would render it 
empirical; second, that it aim at some kind of unity
31
 –otherwise it would fail at 
unifying the diversity of experience. Now, the concept of an object contains [enthält] 
the ground for the object’s actuality [Wirklichkeit] and the concept is, therefore, also 
the object’s purpose [Zweck]32. Since the object’s harmony with the character that 
allows it to be purposeful is called the ‘purposiveness of its form’ [Zweckmäßigkeit 
der Form desselben], then, it follows that the principle in question must be the 
principle governing this purposiveness –that is to say, the ‘tendency’ an object has to 
conform to its concept. This then is the connection of reflective judgment to 
purposiveness: the particular the universal of which one must seek, exhibits a certain 
tendency to conform to an order of universality –demanded by the understanding, in 
that it tends to its own subsumption, its telos
33
.  The principle of purposiveness, as 
stated in the second Introduction of the third Critique, is the following:  
 
“[T]hat since universal laws of nature have their ground in our 
understanding, which prescribes them to nature (although only in accordance 
with the universal concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, in 
regard to that which is left undetermined in them by the former, must be 
                                                            
30 “(…) ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben, wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteliskraft 
bloss reflektierend” (AA 5:179). 
31 (AA 5:182) 
32 (AA 5:181) 
33 (AA 5: 187) 
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considered in terms of the sort of unity they would have if an understanding 
(even if not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of our faculty of 
cognition, in order to make possible a system of experience in accordance 
with particular laws of nature”34.  
 
The Principle of the Purposiveness of Nature is transcendental –not 
metaphysical. This means that purposiveness allows one to think the universal a 
priori condition under which things can become objects for cognition in general. 
Unlike metaphysical principles (which would allow one to think the a priori 
condition under which objects whose concept is empirical can be determined a 
priori
35
), transcendental principles do not assume that and what an object is, but 
rather delineate the conditions which must be met for something to be cognised in 
general. One can think of the distinction between transcendental and metaphysical 
principles as parallel to the distinction between cognising a priori through ontological 
predicates and cognising a priori through empirical predicates
36
: the law of continuity 
in nature, for example, is a metaphysical principle insofar as, even though it is 
necessary, its necessity is not established solely from concepts
37
. The law is, in the 
sense delineated above, cognition a priori through empirical predicates. 
Purposiveness, however, does establish its necessity solely from its unity insofar as, 
without it, the virtually infinite empirical laws that determine particulars in nature 
would simply appear as being too heterogeneous for our understanding to grasp: “we 
must necessarily presuppose and assume this unity [the unity in the purposiveness of 
nature], since otherwise, our empirical cognition could not thoroughly cohere with a 
whole of experience”38. 
 
But insofar as an aim [Absicht] or end is at stake in the Principle of 
Purposiveness, one must assume that in its presentation –of the condition of reaching 
the aim or end, that is– purposiveness will give rise to a feeling of pleasure. This 
                                                            
34 (AA 5:180,18-25) 
35  (AA 5:181) An example of such metaphysical principles can be found in Kant’s doctrine of 
mechanics.   
36 (AA 5:182) 
37 In the Metaphysik L, Kant states: “The cause of the law of continuity is time. This law of continuity is 
no metaphysical whim, but rather a law that is spread through the whole of nature” (AA 23:201-202). 
See also (A228/B281). 
38 (AA 5:183) 
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connection of a feeling of pleasure and the concept of purposiveness
39
 is what 
ultimately confers upon the representation of the latter its capacity to determine the 
former a priori: the object, in this case the feeling of pleasure itself, is referred back 
to the cognitive power that makes it possible, i.e. the transcendental principle that acts 
as its universal ground. The harmony elicited in referring back to the cognitive 
powers that gives rise to a feeling of pleasure may be contingent, but even then it 
would nonetheless be indispensable insofar as there is a mutual configuration of the 
feeling elicited and the judgment itself
40
. Purposiveness is, then, that through which 
nature harmonises with its own aim, though only insofar as it is directed to cognition. 
This is why Kant claims in the third Critique that “[t]he universal laws of the 
understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are just as necessary for 
nature (even though they arise from spontaneity) as are the laws of motion regarding 
matter” 41 .  But then, if the presentation of purposiveness occurs solely as this 
‘referring’ of a feeling back to the cognitive power that allowed for its happening, no 
matter how necessary it might seem, still the question of how it presents itself remains 
unanswered.  
 
The beginning of an answer takes here the form of a distinction (as well as the 
form of a division in the general Kantian architectonic, for the third Critique is 
divided accordingly). There is an aesthetic and there is a logical presentation of 
purposiveness. What is merely subjective in the presentation of an object, says Kant, 
is its aesthetic character and what serves to determine its objectivity is its logical 
validity. The aesthetic presentation of purposiveness occurs when pleasure, or lack 
thereof, relates to the apprehension of the form of an object of intuition –in previous 
terms, when the form of the object harmonises or disharmonises with the cognitive 
powers, i.e. apprehension, imagination and understanding. One judges, in the case 
where harmony is awakened, not in reference to the concept but in reference to the 
form or feeling of pleasure elicited by the harmony itself and this leads to the object 
being deemed ‘beautiful’. In the second case, the case where disharmony is 
awakened, one judges an object in reference not to its concept and not to the feeling it 
elicits but only in reference to freedom, in which case one deems the object 
                                                            
39 In the case of teleological judgments it is not a feeling of pleasure that gives rise to the possibility of 
engaging with the object but is, instead, the understanding’s realisation that the object conforms to its 
own end or telos. The dynamic is in the two cases, I take it, the same. Vid. Infra. 
40 (AA 5:184) 
41 (AA 5:186) 
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‘sublime’42. These, then, are the two possible forms in which aesthetic judgment 
occurs. As to the logical presentation of purposiveness, on the other hand, it occurs 
when there is a harmony of the form of the object, again, but this time the harmony is 
with the possibility of the thing itself according to a prior concept of the thing that 
contains the ground of that form –hence ‘formal objective purposiveness’. The logical 
presentation, unlike the aesthetic, does not rest on the pleasure or admiration one 
might take on reflecting on the form of the object but, rather, on the understanding 
judging that object’s form by referring it back to a determinate cognition of the object 
under a concept –in other words, in the object’s form harmonising with its own end, 
hence, Kant terms these judgments ‘teleological’.   
 
This extremely brief presentation yields the question of how, if at all, the 
subjective and aesthetic presentation of purposiveness relates to the objective logical 
presentation of purposiveness. This is an extremely difficult point, but it helps to 
differentiate between modes of presentation of purposiveness, as stated in the 
paragraph above. In the second Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, specifically 
in §§ VI, VII, and VIII, Kant speaks of the difference as residing in that the aesthetic 
presentation of purposiveness rests [beruhe] on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure 
taken from the reflection on the form of the object
43
. Unlike the former, the logical 
presentation of purposiveness does not refer to the object’s form in the first place. 
Instead, it refers to a determinate cognition of the object in accordance with a given 
concept, i.e. it ‘rests’ not on a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, but on the 
understanding’s judging of an object as oriented towards an end. From this very basic 
difference between the two presentations of purposiveness, one might want to derive 
their commonality and, thus, establish the way in which the aesthetic and the logical 
presentations relate to one another: with Franks, whose reading was briefly 
expounded earlier, one might want to say that what the two presentations of 
purposiveness share is their ‘reflectivity’, i.e. that they are both presentations guiding 
reflective judgment only and that, therefore, they bear little or no relation to the 
constitution of knowledge. In this view, both of these are presentations of the 
principle merely guiding the way in which one ‘reflects’ upon things and, therefore, 
only showing the way in which one can conceive of things in accordance to a 
purpose
44
. But as Hughes has noted, the issue is much more complicated
45
 for three 
                                                            
42 (AA 5:189-192) 
43 (AA 5:192) 
44 Franks, Paul W. Op. Cit. pp. 367ff.  
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reasons. It is more complicated, first, because Kant seems to be making two contrary 
claims. He claims, in §VI, that when one discovers a certain homogeneity in laws of 
nature that are unifiable under one principle, a discovery propelled by the logical 
presentation of purposiveness, a feeling of pleasure arises similar to the one in the 
aesthetic presentation of purposiveness
46. But Kant also claims, in §VIII, that “the 
presentation of this [logical] purposiveness has nothing to do with a feeling of 
pleasure in things”47. The issue is further complicated, second, by the fact that if it 
were straightforwardly the case that the principle is merely guiding our reflection on 
things, then Kant’s claim that the presentation of subjective purposiveness is 
indispensable [unentbehrlich] if our understanding will not lose its way in the 
immensity of the laws of nature would have to be dropped
48
. An in case this were not 
enough, things are more complicated because, third, one would also have to drop the 
claim that, insofar as its purpose is concerned, we attribute to nature a ‘regard’ or 
‘concern’ [Rücksicht] for our cognitive faculties49. 
 
 It is this last point, however, that provides a clue as to how the aesthetic and 
logical presentations of purposiveness are related. In the first Critique, and earlier in 
previous Chapters of this work, it has been shown that the laws of the understanding, 
the Principles of the Understanding to be more precise, are necessary for nature 
insofar as they are that which grounds our cognition of nature in the first place. This 
does not mean, however, that the order of the particular laws of nature that we might 
encounter is itself necessary. Rather, Kant repeatedly claims in both the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science and in the third Critique that such order is itself 
contingent insofar as it is conceived as commensurate or even compatible with the 
laws of the understanding
50
. The difference between the necessity of the laws of the 
understanding and the contingency of the order of the laws of nature, seems subtle, 
but it is an important one: the laws of the understanding are necessary insofar as they 
are constitutive of that which they grasp; but that particular laws would appear as 
having to be subsumed under some principle and not another is contingent. It is no 
more necessary, for example, to conceive of Boyle’s Law as subsumable under a 
general gas theory than it is to conceive of Avogadro’s Law as subsumable under a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
45 Hughes, Fiona. “On Aesthetic Judgment and our Relation to Nature: Kant’s Concept of 
Purposiveness” in Inquiry, 49:6, 547-572, p. 555. 
46 (AA 5:187) 
47 (AA 5:192) 
48 (AA 5:186); (AA 5:193) 
49 (AA 5:193) 
50 (AA 4:468-470);  (AA 5:186-187) 
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general gas theory or, indeed, to think of both these laws as having the same unitary 
ground. But this is precisely the point: nature, in its infinite diversity, appears a 
having some kind of ‘regard’ for the understanding; it appears as ‘wanting to have’, 
as it were, its particular empirical laws subsumed in such a way that more general 
principles are attainable. This is why judgment, deriving from freedom the concept of 
a purpose, uses that very concept in the twofold exhibition of purposiveness: if the 
imagination presents us with something beautiful, it is because a feeling of pleasure 
had been aroused in the harmonising of the object’s form with our cognitive powers. 
If nature, through its “power to produce in terms of purposes”51, i.e. through its 
technic, presents us with something teleologically oriented, it is because we judge it -
nature- as displaying a purposeful orientation. Calling it, in this sense, the ‘technic of 
nature’ might be slightly misleading. It would be much more accurate to call it the 
‘technic of judgment for nature’, since “it is actually the power of judgment that is 
technical; nature is presented as technical only insofar as it harmonises with, and 
necessitates, that procedure of judgment”52. It is in the former sense that a relation 
between the aesthetic and the logical presentations of purposiveness seems to hold: 
they appear as two sides of the same coin. One side, the aesthetic presentation of 
purposiveness (that can include the presentation of the whole of nature as a beautiful 
object), shows as the harmony of the form of the object and the faculties of 
imagination and understanding. The other side, the logical presentation of 
purposiveness, although not directly referring to any feeling, shows this 
purposiveness as the principle governing the link between nature and reason and, 
especially, between the particular empirical laws of the former and the general laws 
of the latter. 
 
The previous characterisation and division of the ways in which 
purposiveness is grasped becomes of great help if one looks closely, first, at the 
aesthetic presentation of purposiveness –especially concerning the first kind of 
judgments, i.e. judgments of taste. The beautiful and the sublime are similar in certain 
respects and differ in others. They are similar in that they both presuppose reflective 
judgment rather than determining judgment. They are also similar in that the human 
understanding likes both for their own sake, and in that judgments about the beautiful 
and the sublime are singular and yet lay a claim to universal validity. They differ, 
however, in a relevant feature: whereas the beautiful necessarily concerns the form of 
                                                            
51 (AA 5:390) 
52 (AA 20 [first Intro]: 220) 
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some bounded object, the sublime can concern formless objects insofar as one 
represents to one’s self their unboundedness. So, whereas the beautiful is the 
subjective exhibition of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, the sublime is 
the objective exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason. Ideas are 
“presentations referred to an object according to a certain principle [nach einem 
gewissen Prinzip] (subjective or objective) but are such that they can still never 
become knowledge [Erkenntnis]”53. Ideas referred to an intuition according to the 
subjective side of the principle of mutual harmony of imagination and understanding 
are aesthetic. Ideas referred to a concept according to the objective side of the 
principle, but still incapable of yielding knowledge, are rational. Aesthetic ideas, 
therefore, cannot become knowledge because they are intuitions for which no concept 
can be given; and, unlike concepts of the understanding, rational ideas are 
transcendent and not immanent –for these, no intuition whatsoever can be given54.  
 
This has extremely important consequences for present purposes. Kant had 
established, first in the first Critique and then again in the third, that “Concepts of the 
understanding must, as such, always be demonstrable (…) in an example; and this 
possibility must be there, since otherwise we cannot be certain that the thought is not 
empty, i.e. devoid of any object”55. But in the first Critique it was also established that 
to construct concepts is to “exhibit a priori their corresponding intuition [ihm 
korrespondierende Anschauung a priori darstellen]”56  –thereby showing that, and 
how, exhibiting a priori is not only possible but it is also necessary
57
. But what does 
‘exhibiting’ mean here?  It means rendering intuitable or sensibilising the rule 
according to which a representation comes to be constituted
58
. This is the reason why, 
for example, it was seen in the previous Chapter that ‘magnitude’, extensive or 
intensive, can be given in an a priori intuition
59
 and it is also why philosophy can 
prove its propositions on a priori grounds, but not ‘demonstrate’ them if it is to 
remain pure philosophy
60
. The demonstration would, as was also discussed in the 
previous Chapter, only arise once the metaphysical principle making use of the 
concept were put to the test (what one gets in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
                                                            
53 (AA 5:342) 
54 (AA 5:342) 
55 (AA 5:342-343) 
56 (A713/B741) 
57 (AA 8:242) 
58 (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 99-104) 
59 (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-116) 
60 (AA 5:232); (AA 5:343) 
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Natural Science). The implication arising from this is highly significant: if it 
necessarily is the case that the exhibition of concepts is possible, and it is also the 
case that the exhibition of a concept in intuition brings in something not previously 
contemplated within the concept, as illustrated by aesthetic ideas, then it is guaranteed 
that the imagination’s presentations go far beyond what is determined by means of 
categories alone
61
. The imagination brings in something that concepts themselves, in 
other words, lacked: their intuitional character. This may hardly seem like a 
revelation given what was discussed about the Schematism section of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, but the relevance this has in this context is difficult to overestimate. The 
‘going beyond’ justifies that “we must not judge the beautiful according to concepts, 
but according to the purposive attunement of the imagination that brings it into 
harmony with the power of concepts as such”62 and shows, furthermore, that the 
imagination’s import of content with reflective judgment occurs at a different level 
than with determining judgment. In the latter case it is the attunement with the faculty 
of concepts that does the heavy lifting. 
 
Aesthetic ideas, Kant remarks, are representations provided by the 
imagination that have no adequate concepts to suit them –hence, impossible to 
determine thoroughly. And, while being the counterpart to ideas of reason that have 
no intuitions to suit them, aesthetic ideas exhibit that the power of imagination is in 
fact capable of creating ‘another nature’ [andern Natur] –which may or may not share 
the material conditions of physical nature
63–. This can be made sense of through a 
further distinction Kant makes: “Establishing that our concepts have reality always 
requires intuitions. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If 
they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata”64. 
The process of sensibilisation [Versinnlichung] of concepts referred to in the previous 
Chapter is referred to here as ‘hypotyposis’ (exhibition, subiectio ad adspectum). And 
                                                            
61 Perhaps this is what grounds the possibility of ‘judgments of perception’, as opposed to ‘judgments 
of experience’, that Kant mentions in the Prolegomena: judgments of perception do not require a pure 
concept of the understanding, but only for the perceptions to be ‘logically’ (whatever that could mean 
here) connected to one another in the thinking subject. Thus, judgments of perception, e.g. ‘the room is 
warm’, are only subjectively valid (unlike judgments of experience) and, moreover, lay no claim 
whatsoever to universal validity (unlike aesthetic judgments). But because Kant is inconsistent with the 
distinction and because of how infamously problematic the examples of such judgments that Kant 
provides are, the distinction will not be used or appealed to in this investigation. See (AA 4:297-299). 
62 (AA 5:344)  
63 (AA 5:314) If the focus were solely on subjective purposiveness, for example, then the following 
would be clear: the criterion that renders necessary the universality of judgments of taste is none other 
than ‘nature in the subject’ [was bloss Natur im Subjekte ist] (AA 5:344) that is manifest in that 
subject’s free play of the imagination.  
64 (AA 5:351) 
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hypotyposis can be of two kinds: it is schematic when, as shown before, the intuition 
for a concept is given wholly a priori and solely as a determination of self-affection
65
; 
or it is symbolic when the given intuition is for an idea of reason and, although also 
mediated through the activity of affecting oneself as will be argued shortly, can only 
be arrived at analogically, i.e. by following the rule that should form the intuition, but 
without the process culminating successfully
66
. So, although not through schematic 
hypotyposis, but certainly through symbolic hypotyposis, imagination provides, free 
of the bounds of concepts and purely from the intuitive nature of the subject, a law-
like formal purposiveness in its exhibitions. This entails that imagination breaks free, 
as it were, of the law of association [Verwandschaft] given by the understanding 
through ‘schematising’ without concepts67  and in so doing genuinely restructures 
experience
68
. Or that, alternatively, in allowing itself to be taken over by its own 
spontaneity, the imagination shows reason that determinate concepts do not exhaust 
or encompass all of what can be thought objectively –even if only for reflective 
judgment
69. This is the meaning of what was stated earlier: that understanding’s 
concepts, pure or otherwise, do not seem capable of encompassing all of the content 
in intuition
70
.  
 
But saying that the ‘symbol’ of an idea is exhibited does not amount to saying 
that through that exhibition the imagination provides the self with enough as to 
ground synthetic a priori judgments. To give rise to such judgments a likewise 
synthetic a priori principle is required. In looking at the issue thus, though, a picture 
starts emerging, a picture that shows how the principle of purposiveness, in being 
transcendental, could hypothetically justify that a different kind of objectivity, 
‘another nature’, be thought of if the nature of the objects in question demand it (after 
all, one does not judge the artwork in terms of Newtonian physics only
71
). So, even if 
                                                            
65 In the essay on “What Real Progress Has Been Made in Metaphysics Since Leibniz and Wolff” Kant 
claims that “If we provide the concept with objective reality directly by means of the intuition that 
corresponds to it, rather than mediately, this act is called schematism” (AA 20:279-280) 
66 Not culminating successfully insofar the aim itself, because of its inherent indeterminacy, is not 
reached. Importantly, though, the aim was never meant to be reached for, once more, rational ideas 
have no proper intuitions to suit them. 
67 (AA 5:287)  
68 (AA 5:314) 
69 Although Kant has relatively little to say about symbolic subsumption, in “The End of All Things” 
he claims “so muß die Vorstellung jener letzten Dinge, die nach dem jüngsten Tage kommen sollen, 
nur als eine Versinnlichung des letztern sammt seinen moralischen, uns übrigens nicht theoretisch 
begreiflichen Folgen angesehen werden” (AA 8:328) 
70 (AA 5:344); (AA 5:343); (AA 5:232). 
71 This would hold even if the case were, as Maurice Denis put it in 1890 when trying to define 
painting in relation to Gaugin’s syntheticsm, that first and foremost a painting is its material condition: 
“Se rappeler qu’un tableau –avant d’être un cheval de bataille, une femme nue ou une quelconque 
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it is granted that the principle of purposiveness is transcendental, the questions ‘is it 
nonetheless synthetic?’ and ‘where does its syntheticity come from?’ remain72. In 
other words, even if what has been said is understood as parallel in some way to the 
argument of the third Chapter, where it was shown that time provides a rather specific 
schematic layout according to which the constitution of objectivity and experience 
becomes possible, the question of whether the imaginary symbolic exhibition itself is 
enough as to provide syntheticity to the principle of purposiveness is as of yet 
unanswered. 
 
According to the first path, however, there can indeed be non-categorial 
syntheticity even if according to a merely regulative principle. And one might think 
that the easiest way to show this is, as Hegel does in the Science of Logic
73
, by 
appealing to the synthetic unity of apperception and then showing that it need not 
reflect itself or on itself categorially. This route for answering the question, however, 
has been shown to be doomed: it was argued before, in the second Chapter, that the 
synthetic unity of apperception is synthetic in virtue of its very fundamental relation 
to time, and not because it has objectively valid concepts simpliciter. If that is true, 
then it must also be true that the unity of apperception cannot of itself unfold as 
synthetic in any meaningful way save insofar as time, the primary form of intuition, 
understood as self-affection is posited alongside of it. Stated differently: the 
categories in themselves, contra Hegel, are not synthetic in virtue of having been 
derived from the synthetic unity of apperception. Not at all: the categories are 
synthetic, in fact, only in virtue of being related to time through the schematism by 
means of the imagination and only become synthetic once they are set in motion in 
the principles where it is the schema, and not the category, that is in operation.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
anecdote– est  essentiellement une surface plane recouverte de couleurs en un certain ordre 
assemblées” Deins, Maurice. Théories: 1890-1910. Bibliotheque de l’Occident, Paris, 1913, p. 1. 
72 Hughes, Fiona. Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 103-112. 
73 “It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the 
unity which constitutes the essence of the concept is recognised as the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, the unity of the ‘I think’, or of self-consciousness. –This proposition is all that there is to 
the so called transcendental deduction of the categories which, from the beginning, has however been 
regarded as the most difficult piece of Kantian philosophy –no doubt only because it demands that we 
should transcend the mere representation of the relation of the ‘I’ and the understanding, or of the 
concepts, to a thing and its properties or accidents, and advance to the thought of it. The object, says 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed. P.137), is that, in the concept of which the manifold of a 
given intuition is unified. But every unification of representations requires a unity of consciousness in 
the synthesis of them. Consequently, this unity of consciousness is alone that which constitutes the 
reference of the representations to an object, hence their objective validity, and that on which even the 
possibility of the understanding rests (…) [bu then] The further development, however, did not live up 
to its beginning. The term itself, synthesis, easily conjures up again the picture of an external unity, of 
a mere combination of terms that are intrinsically separate” (Werke 12:18-23). 
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Knowing this, then, leaves open only one other option to answer the question 
at hand: it must be by means of an intuitive/intellectual faculty that the syntheticity of 
the synthetic comes about, i.e. in relating intuition and understanding or intuition and 
reason. The only candidate that fits the definition, as the discussion of hypotyposis 
(schematic or symbolic) illustrated, is the transcendental power of imagination: it 
alone relates intuition and understanding, and intuition and reason, in such a way as 
to give rise to synthetic a priori knowledge. This is exactly what the argument 
developed so far has shown: the imagination, as the essential part in the process of 
cognition that relates the intellectual faculties to intuition, is not constrained in its 
synthesising to the merely categorial or even conceptual and instead can, always in 
accordance with the form of intuition that grounds it, i.e. time, ‘imagine’ or ‘exhibit’ 
that there are manifold beings not reducible to their categorial determinations. Note 
something important, however: what is not being claimed here is that in this 
‘syntheticity’, this other mode of synthesis is wholly independent from the functions 
of judgment. Indeed, not Kant, and not anyone in their right mind would claim that, 
say, Messiaen’s Quatuor pour la fin du Temps is not subject to the laws of physics. 
What is being claimed, however, is that it would be impossible to account for the 
entirety of this piece by giving some infinite description of its mechanical properties. 
This is part of the problem with Franks’ attempt discussed at the beginning: by trying 
to keep the two orders of grounding entirely separate, he commits to the further claim 
that whatever one judges in accordance with one principle cannot be judged in 
accordance with the other. This is problematic however since surely one would like to 
preserve the explanatory power of physical principles when judging, for example, 
artworks, while simultaneously maintaining that physical principles in no way 
determine the object thoroughly. There must be, in other words, room for the physical 
specificities of the object to have some role in our act of judging
74
. 
 
With aesthetic judgments hopefully the following is clear: they cannot be 
carried out solely following the pure concepts of the understanding for, if this were 
the case, the very essence of what they judge would be missed in the act of judging
75
. 
But there is another way to discuss whether the principle of purposiveness is synthetic 
and if it is, then why it is so: by looking at its logical presentation. Recall that earlier 
                                                            
74 Hughes, Fiona. Op. Cit. 2010, viz. pp. 37-41. 
75  For the sublime, specifically, see: Makkreel, Rudolf. “Imagination and Temporality in Kant’s 
Theory of the Sublime” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 42, No. 3, Spring, 1984, 
pp. 303-315. 
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the distinction between the aesthetic and the logical presentation of purposiveness 
was highlighted. It was claimed that there is a subjective and an objective 
presentation of purposiveness to the extent that the first rests on a feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure to which judgment refers while the second rests on judging an object as 
oriented towards an end. Now, is it the case that for the logical presentation of 
purposiveness, too, the synthetiticity of the principle of purposiveness derives from 
the imagination in relation to self-affection? 
 
In the third and last essay of the so-called ‘race series’, entitled “On the Use of 
Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788), Kant writes:  
 
“If one understands by nature the sum-total of all that exists as determined by 
laws, taking together the world (as nature properly so called) and its supreme 
cause, then the investigation of nature (which in the first case is called 
physics, in the second metaphysics) can pursue two paths: either the merely 
theoretical path or the teleological path”76.  
 
The latter path, the teleological, when using ends provided to us through 
experience is again called physics; and when using an end fixed through pure reason, 
in accordance with its calling [Berufe], is again called metaphysics. The first Critique 
showed that in the theoretical path, metaphysics is incapable of reaching the call of 
reason because of the constraints the understanding has placed upon the latter and 
that, for certain inquiries, only the teleological path remains. But this one, too, can 
only be reached through an end that is given and determined a priori through pure 
practical reason (the highest good). It was claimed before that the representation of 
the condition for reaching an aim or end, that is to say judging in accordance with the 
form of purposiveness, gives rise to a feeling of pleasure. This is the case because, 
once more, the concept of an object contains the ground for that object’s actuality, 
and since the concept itself is also called the object’s ‘purpose’, the relation between 
ground and concept, the purposiveness of the object’s form, shows structural 
similarities to those seen in practical causation
77
. That one is able to perceive the 
                                                            
76 (AA 8:157) 
77 Although there is a great gulf that separates the realm of the sensible from the realm of the concept 
of freedom, and although the former can in no way affect the latter, “still the latter is meant to 
influence the former –that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the sensible world 
the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such 
a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonises with the possibility of the ends to 
be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom” (AA 5:175-176). 
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constitution of an object in purposive terms (and, by implication, in teleological 
terms) stems, therefore, from an analogical
78
 intimation of freedom and its inner 
dynamic: the categories of freedom are directed to the determination of a free 
choice
79
 and, unbound by the forms of sensibility, bring content immediately under 
themselves. These categories, the Types, Kant claims, produce the actuality of that to 
which they refer (the disposition of the will)
80
 insofar as they, as concepts, contain the 
ground for the determination of their object through the Typic of Practical Reason. 
Just like these latter categories, or to be more precise because of them, the principle 
of purposiveness for reflective judgment contains the ground for the determination of 
its object as an end
81
. Without being able to go into the problem of universal 
communicability
82
, however, suffice it for now to say that the same occurs when one 
judges in accordance with the form of purposiveness: such judgment gives rise to a 
pleasurable state of mind in the determination of the will to the extent that an end is 
contained in it
83
.  
 
What does it mean, however, to contain a ground for the determination of an 
object as an end? It has been an important contention of this work so far that time, 
pure time, provides the condition under which any representation can be thought. This 
includes, but is certainly not limited to, the representation of a condition for the 
realisation, or achievement of something that has as of yet not been fulfilled. The 
principle of purposiveness acts as a principle for judgment precisely because one 
represents to one’s self the procedure in accordance with which something strives to 
realise itself –aesthetically or teleologically. This procedure is ‘visible’, as it were, 
because one is free, i.e. because “We must therefore regard future actions as 
undetermined through everything that belongs to the phaenomenis”84. And here is the 
crux of the matter: in this last quote, it would be tempting to read the stress as 
residing on the indeterminacy of such actions. Now, although that certainly matters, 
                                                            
78 On how it is possible to extend pure reason for practical purposes: “In order to extend a pure 
cognition practically there must be a purpose given a priori, that is, an end as object (of the will) that, 
independently of all theoretical principles, is represented as practically necessary by an imperative 
determining the will” (AA 5:134). 
79 (AA 5:66) 
80 (AA 5:66-67) For a thorough discussion of the Types, see: Bader, Ralf. “Categories of Freedom” in 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17:4, 2009, pp. 799-820. 
81  Practical purposiveness, though, unlike purposiveness of nature, is not transcendental but only 
metaphysical: it is the purposiveness that must be thought in the idea of the determination of a free will 
and it is metaphysical because the concept of a power of desire, taken as will, has to first be given 
empirically (KU 5:182). 
82 (AA 5:216-219) 
83 (AA 5:222) 
84 (AA 18:253) 
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the present point would nonetheless stress the futurity of actions insofar as that, too, is 
essential for those actions to be called ‘free’. Kant affirms this in several different 
places and in several different ways. In the Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, for example,  
he claims that if  a doctrine of freedom can indeed indicate the ultimate ground of 
purposiveness, if, that is, the possibility of ends realising themselves exists in the 
world, it is only because of the capacity to represent to one’s self the future 
[Zukunft]
85
. Also there, he claims that the ground for the determination of an action 
will be considered a priori (as it must if it is truly free) only “if the action is 
represented as futural (antecedenter) [künftig], [and] we will feel ourselves as 
undetermined with respect to it and as capable of making a first beginning of the 
series of appearances”86. Or yet, and finally, that a feeling of pleasure alone would 
not be sufficient to sway us into any particular moral act “(…) unless the 
representation of a future condition of the duration of such a moral beauty and of the 
happiness that will thereby be increased comes to its assistance, so that one will 
thereby find oneself more capable of so acting”87. 
 
This is important for present purposes: by ‘future’ Kant understands “what is 
not yet present [was noch nicht gegenwärtig ist]”88 and only the representation of a 
future condition can act as the ground for something to be thought of as an end for 
two relatively simple reasons. The first simply is that the orientation of practical 
judgment, that it will something, can only be justified if that something is not already 
in its possession –i.e. if that something is not itself present. One does not will what 
one already has, simply put. The second, and more important for practical purposes, 
is that if practical judgment were indeed oriented to something which is itself already 
present to the will, then ex definitio, the will would have no choice but to determine 
itself in a heteronomous way in virtue of having to mediate its own determination 
through something that already is a representation, and hence have to determine itself 
                                                            
85 (AA 17:516) 
86 (AA 18:256) The full quote reads: “The higher power of choice is the capacity to make use of the 
incentives or sensible stimuli in accordance with their laws yet always in accord with the 
representation of the understanding (in relation to the ultimate and universal ends of sensibility). A 
posteriori, therefore, we will have cause a posteriori to find the ground of the action, namely the 
ground of its explanation but not its determination, in sensibility; but a priori, if the action is 
represented as futural (antecedenter), we will feel ourselves as undetermined with respect to it and as 
capable of making a first beginning of the series of appearances. If there is free will, then the 
appearances of rational beings do not constitute a continuum except in the case of firm principles of 
the understanding”. 
87 (Ri, i5) (Note on the obverse to AA: 2:207) 
88 (AA 7:187) 
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a posteriori
89
. This is clearly unacceptable: only the representation of something 
which is not yet, but which can be in some future time, can act as a ground for the a 
priori determination of the will. For these reasons practical judgment is inherently 
future oriented and so is any judgment in accordance with a principle of 
purposiveness: something will appear as a purpose if, but only if, that which strives to 
realise itself into that purpose has not yet achieved its goal.  
 
This is partly why Kant claims that ends have a direct relation to reason. 
Natural ends cannot be known a priori even when one can know that there must be a 
connection of ground and effect in nature a priori. This means that the use of a 
teleological principle for nature, for example, will necessarily be empirically 
conditioned (and the same would go for ends of freedom were it not because there are 
pure practical principles). Teleology in nature cannot therefore indicate the ultimate 
ground of purposiveness –but a doctrine of freedom can. And since morality strives 
to realise itself in the world, it cannot overlook the fact that at least the possibility of 
ends exists in the world, and this is what makes a natural teleology and the possibility 
of nature in general, i.e. transcendental philosophy
90, possible: “This serves to secure 
objective reality to the doctrine of practically pure ends with respect to the possibility 
of the object in the exercise, namely the objective reality of the end that this doctrine 
prescribes as to be effectuated in the world”91. 
 
 Earlier it was asked how the principle of purposiveness, in being 
transcendental, could hypothetically justify that a different kind of objectivity be 
thought of if the nature of the objects in question demanded it. The question, as Kant 
would phrase it, is about the warrant “of being allowed to use the teleological 
principle where sources of theoretical cognition are not sufficient”92. But when is this 
case? When are the sources of theoretical cognition insufficient as for judgment to 
have to make an appeal to a wholly different principle regulating the appearing of an 
object? This right is restricted, Kant claims, to that instance where the theoretical 
means have been exhausted (as with artworks)
93
 –but then, again, the question would 
                                                            
89 (AA 5:33-34) 
90 (AA 8:183) 
91 (AA 8:183) 
92 (AA 8:160) 
93 (AA 8: 160-161) This is not to say, however, that aesthetic judgments are a subset of teleological 
judgments but, rather, that aesthetic and teleological judgments are homogeneous in that they are both 
reflective judgments in accordance with a principle of purposiveness that is instantiated in two 
different ways. 
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remain: when is it appropriate, even rightful to use a teleological means of 
explanation? 
 
There is apart from artworks another kind of beings that demand to be judged 
reflectively in accordance with the principle of purposiveness –but in this case their 
presentation is logical and not aesthetic
94
. These beings, living beings or organisms, 
although material and therefore subordinated to the principles of the understanding, 
appear also as defying these very principles. Individuals within organised matter are 
indeed thought of as “material being[s] which [are] possible only through the relation 
of everything contained in [them] to each other as end and means”95. If these are to 
be accounted for, either in terms of a teleology or in terms of a physiognomy
96
, then 
one must assume an intrinsic purposiveness in nature. For example, says Kant, if one 
endeavoured to find whether there is kinship between different specimens of the 
human species, one would have to appeal to their common phyletic origin (thereby 
making it clear that one must be guided by a principle even to be able to observe the 
differences
97
):  
 
“The variety amongst human beings of the same race is in all 
likelihood just as purposively supplied in the original phylum in order 
to ground and subsequently develop the greatest degree of 
manifoldness for the sake of infinitely many ends, as is the difference 
of the races, in order to ground and subsequently develop the fitness to 
fewer but more essential ends”98. 
 
 In the context of a famous dispute with Herder, as Beth Lord has shown
99
, 
Kant engaged a certain naturalist, Georg Forster, who had criticised transcendental 
philosophy for granting precedence to theory over observation in the construction of a 
                                                            
94 ‘Logical’ in the sense described above, i.e. as related to teleology, but not in the sense of logical 
related to the technic of nature for the latter is concerned primarily with systematicity of nature as a 
whole, and not with organisms as such. 
95 (AA 8:181) 
96 As opposed to physiography. This echoes Lichtenberg’s position regarding a possible science of 
teleology and of the rule-bound future evolution of nature: “Das Zukünftige sehen ist ebenfalls 
Physiognomik” [F22]. 
97 (AA 8:165) This is all that ‘species’ or ‘kind’ refers to: “the hereditary peculiarity that is not 
consistent with a common phyletic origination” (AA 8:165). 
98 (AA 8:166) 
99 Lord, Beth. Kant and Spinozism. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2011, pp. 72-79. 
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system of nature
100
. Forster argued that it is climatic influences, exclusively, that 
determine skin coloration and straightforwardly denied that what Kant, in a previous 
essay, had termed ‘predispositional germs’ had any effect on this particular 
phenotypic trait. Kant reduces Forster’s criticism as stating “that everything in 
natural science must be explained naturally”101. But, asks Kant, does not making this 
statement show that one has reached the limits of natural explanations insofar as one 
wants to subsume all explanatory grounds to experience of the physical-mechanical? 
In answer to this self-directed question, Kant replies: 
 
“Since the concept of an organised being already includes that it is some 
matter in which everything is mutually related to each other as end and 
means, which can only be thought as a system of final causes, and since 
therefore their possibility only leaves the teleological but not the physical-
mechanical mode of explanation, at least as far as human reason is 
concerned, there can be no investigation in physics about the origin of all 
organization itself. The answer to this question, provided it is at all accessible 
to us, obviously would lie outside of natural science, in metaphysics. I myself 
derive all organization from organic beings (through generation [Zeugung]) 
and all later forms (of this kind of natural things) from laws of the gradual 
development of original predispositions, which were to be found in the 
organization of its phylum”102. 
 
In response to Forster’s objection, but also as a development of the premises 
of the first Critique
103
, Kant is saying here that the infinite variation found in nature is 
not accountable for in terms of chance but neither is it in terms of universal laws. 
Indeed, not chance in the form of external influences, but an inherent teleological 
predisposition within each living organism is what accounts for genetic variation. 
Likewise, not universal laws for which one would have to find particulars, as stated in 
the Critique of Pure Reason
104
, but rather the positing of a unity the future existence 
                                                            
100 See Günter Zöller’s and Robert Louden’s Introduction, pp. 192-195, to “On the Use of Teleological 
Principles in Philosophy” in Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology, History and Education.  Cambrige 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 
101 (AA 8:178-179) 
102 (AA 8:179) 
103 (A687/B715ff) 
104 (A647/B675) 
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of which is enough to warrant the regulative systematicity of nature
105
. What makes, 
then, teleological judgments synthetic becomes rather evident: the syntheticity of 
synthetic a priori teleological judgments arises, in short, in virtue of the futural unity 
towards which these judgments are oriented –the unity presupposed by the 
systematicity of nature. This, in turn, can be extrapolated to the principle of 
purposiveness assuming that teleology is but an instance of the former: the 
syntheticity, and transcendentality, as it were, of the principle of purposiveness arises 
in virtue of the future aim towards which judgments made on its behalf will seek to 
achieve. 
 
In light of the previous answer, then, the conclusion to the first path can be 
reached. The principle of purposiveness, it has been seen, was brought about 
precisely in contradistinction to that which can be grasped through the pure concepts 
of the understanding in relation to the pure forms of intuition (this is precisely the 
meaning of the claim that teleology comes to supplement physical-mechanical 
explanations and also the reason why Kant thinks ‘teleology’ itself is not a science 
but is, rather, ‘only critique’106). It has been shown in the course of this section that 
the principle of purposiveness can be understood as the indirect, future oriented 
relation between imagination and reason where pure exhibition in intuition, i.e. 
exhibition not constrained by concepts, takes place and does so in accordance with 
the form of a movement towards an end. So, unlike the determination of self-affection 
through the schematism of pure understanding, what one gets through purposiveness 
is the exhibition of a unified ‘tendency’ that is symbolically exhibited via 
hypotyposis: a future oriented quasi-schema for which there is no determinate 
concept but only the form of a telos, regulates and unifies the manifold expressions of 
nature. The quasi-schema of purposiveness, operating on the basis of the future 
orientation it derives from practical causation, takes the form of a procedure whereby 
something becomes possible even if it is cause and effect of itself
107
. In the previous 
chapter it was seen that if the imagination and the understanding are paired together, 
then one gets the local systematic of the first part of the first Critique. But now it has 
been seen that if the imagination and reason are paired together (when imagination is 
                                                            
105 It is a matter of further enquiry what the relation between empirical systematicity and teleology is. 
For the time being, systematicity as understood in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the 
first Critique should be taken as grounding the empirical systematicity spoken of in the third Critique 
(A647/B675ff); (A681/B709); (AA 5:379). As the discussion above should make clear this does not 
mean, however, that empirical systematicity ought to be equated with teleology. 
106 (AA 5:416ff) 
107 (AA 5:370)  
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understood as “the power of a priori intuitions”108) then one gets the principle of 
purposiveness as the validating unity through which the pure form of intuition is 
manifest. Only reflective, and not determining judgment, has the capacity to 
recognise this. 
 
At the beginning of this whole investigation it was asked what role time, 
understood as self-affection, plays concerning the constitution of objectivity. If the 
answer of the first Critique came in the form of delineating a temporal field of 
objectivity articulated in the interconnectedness of judgments, categories, schemata, 
and principles, in the third Critique this is complemented by delineating a separate 
objectivity that answers to its own principle. This is to say that, if one asks whether 
the Kantian project could allow for more than one kind of objectivity, the clear 
answer, in light of the understanding of time and its relation to the imagination, is 
affirmative: purposiveness is the symbolic exhibition of future-orientation and the 
imagination can, in light of this symbol, reconfigure, as it were, the structural 
relations that make up the whole of any particular object as to render it not 
categorially bound. Instead, in virtue of the form of the subjective faculties and by 
means of referring back to its own activity, the imagination provides room for an 
alternative objectivity, ‘another nature’, that has more in common with freedom and 
its spontaneous capacity of production than it does with the understanding. It is in 
light of the imagination’s free relation to self-affection that artworks and living beings 
become what they are. 
 
§ ii 
 
The second path 
 
And yet, the previous conclusion was characterised in the introduction to this 
Chapter as the ‘weaker’ of the two. It was thus characterised because in answer to the 
question of when one is allowed, of when one has the right to judge in accordance 
with the principle of purposiveness, only a formal negative answer was given: 
whenever the theoretical means of cognition fail to suffice in capturing the essence of 
that which is being judged. In other words, by following the previous conclusion one 
is committed to admitting that, although there is an ontology that pertains to the 
                                                            
108 (AA 5:190) 
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categorial and a distinct ontology that pertains to the practical, and although both 
relate to self-affection in their own unique way, one is nonetheless incapable of going 
beyond a merely phenomenological
109
 criterion that constitutes the object of judging. 
In answer to a question such as when is one supposed to grasp an object according to 
either one of the formal presentations of purposiveness, the reply can go no further 
than ‘when the object thus demands it’ thus remaining dependent on an a posteriori 
judgment. But this is not satisfactory by transcendental philosophy’s standards. 
Loosely prefiguring Meinong’s Jungle problem, whereby nothing prevents non-
existent or ‘sosein’ beings from multiplying ad infinitum110, in the previous answer 
nothing prevents the diversity of empirical laws that should become unified under one 
purposive principle from multiplying endlessly. The formality, in other words, of the 
principle of purposiveness (that it is a principle of ‘purposiveness’ and not a principle 
of ‘purpose(s)’) does not preclude the possibility of there being ‘false positives’ that 
will require the faculty of judgment to judge it purposively: there is no reason, in 
principle, why one ought not to judge, for example, an average brick wall as a self-
organising being. It is, in sum, as if one had to choose between the synthetic character 
of the principle of purposiveness and its a priori character. If this is the case, 
however, any systematisation would be rendered impossible and, so, another answer 
must be pursued. 
 
Now, at the beginning of this chapter it was asked whether the possibility of 
an uncategorised schema exists in transcendental philosophy. This question came to 
summarise a set of interconnected notions: that there might be time determinations 
not necessarily bound by the specific functions of the understanding derived from 
judgment; that the set of synthetic a priori principles constituting and regulating 
experience, as understood in the first Critique, might not cover the whole of 
appearances; that, perhaps, time as the fundamental form of intuition provided an 
opening wide enough as to be able to accommodate another kind of synthetic a priori 
transcendental principle that would either constitute or regulate some other form of 
objectivity, etc. The answer provided by the path developed in the second and third 
Critiques in the last section addresses some of these worries and ultimately states that 
time does, indeed, provide an opening wide enough as to accommodate more than 
                                                            
109 ‘Phenomenological’ taken to mean here, with Lambert, grounded on that which appears and in the 
way that it appears: “Die Theorie des Scheins und ſeines Einfluſſes in die Richtigkeit und Unrichtigkeit 
der menſchlichen Erkenntniß, macht demnach den Theil der Grundwiſſenſchaft aus, den wir die 
Phaͤnomenologie nennen” (NO: Phänomenologie, iv.i.§1). 
110 Meinong, Alexius. Über Gegenstandstheorie. Meiner V. Hamburg, 1988, pp.8ff. 
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one kind of objectivity. That, in fact, the other kind of objectivity, one that derived 
from the temporal relation between imagination and reason, arises from the 
equivalent of the schema, the symbol of the unity of systematicity, and that it does so 
in in accordance to a principle of purposiveness. 
 
Does this mean that an uncategorised schema has been found? The answer to 
this last, and most important question, is not that straightforward. Schemata, apart 
from arising out of time or being determinations of self-affection, provide the sensible 
conditions under which the application of particular functions of judgment becomes 
objectively valid. The symbol of the unity of systematicity, likewise, exhibits 
purposiveness in the face of time, but only analogically and indirectly –and, 
furthermore, only in its link to an end as an idea of reason
111
. This presents a problem 
for transcendental philosophy in general and for the interpretation of transcendental 
philosophy presented here. The problem is being able to reconcile the synthetic a 
priori status of the principle of purposiveness and the synthetic a posteriori claim that 
certain objects will in, and out of, themselves, demand to be judged in accordance 
with the principle of purposiveness. The weaker conclusion, in other words, seems 
too weak for the desideratum placed by transcendental philosophy unto itself
112
. 
Partly due to the ideal status of purposiveness
113
, and partly due to the fact that the 
principle arrived at is a constitutive principle only for reflective and not determining 
judgment, it would seem as if the comparison of the symbol to an uncategorised 
schema were, simply speaking, unfitting. As time-determination schemata condition 
anything and everything that can become an object of knowledge –this is certainly not 
the case, as the previous discussion illustrated, with purposiveness as constructed 
before. It is not the case because the principle of purposiveness is solely constitutive 
of reflective judgment and not of judgment in general
114
. But if this is the case, does 
that mean that no uncategorised schema can be provided at all? 
 
                                                            
111 (AA 5:351-353) 
112 This desideratum being, as Horstmann has made clear, showing that the knowledge we can have of 
the manifold, perhaps infinite empirical laws of specific objects of nature is possible in the first place. 
If one relied solely on the principles of pure understanding and an infinite amount of empirical laws in 
one’s interpretation of nature, according to Horstmann, one would not have any systematic knowledge 
of nature at all (See (AA 5:179-180) and (AA 5:185)). A connected and unified experience 
presupposes, says Kant, a “nature [that] specifies itself with regard to its empirical laws” in a way that 
corresponds to conditions of knowledge (AA 5:186). Vid. Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. “Why Must There be 
a Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Judgment?” in Förster, E. (ed.) Kant’s 
Transncendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum. Stanford University Press, 
CA, 1989. 
113 (AA 5:188) 
114 (AA 5:404) 
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As early as the Dissertation Kant speaks, indeed, of schemata without 
concepts: space and time are such in that they are ‘conditions under which the 
sensible appears’ in the first place115, but this would not seem like the kind of schema 
one would have to be after in order to answer the question. As it was seen when 
discussing Franks’ interpretation, space and time are the principles governing the 
categorial-mechanical order of grounding, and cannot therefore be used to justify a 
separate, parallel order of grounding (if there were one in the first place). In fact, 
when seen this way, the following becomes rather clear: if the uncategorised schema 
is to be found, it will not be found in either one Franks’ orders of grounding but 
rather behind both of them insofar as it has to, by definition, be a determination of 
self-affection that acts as a sensible condition for the application of concepts
116
. 
 
This, then, seems to open the second path. What granted the syntheticity of 
the synthetic a priori principle of purposiveness was, ultimately, the unity towards 
which the manifold empirical laws of nature are oriented and, even if time mediated, 
this unity proves insufficient insofar as it is only available as a presupposition for 
reflective and not determining judgment. Since this unity is nowhere to be found save 
in reason, the outcome is that one cannot have a criterion that will a priori yield what 
constitutes an object worthy of being judged in accordance with the purposiveness of 
its form. What, now, if such unity were moved? What if instead of being a 
‘presupposition’ the unity became a constitutive feature of a system of transcendental 
philosophy? Would that then prove sufficient to justify there being an uncategorised 
schema that acts as the condition under which concepts, theoretical and practical, 
acquire objective validity? Would, finally, the demonstration of the existence of an 
empirical system of laws warrant that even without categories there is nonetheless a 
schematic, or schema-like, structure conditioning experience at both theoretical and 
practical levels? 
 
The second path takes the form of an answer to the last question. Although 
one might think that in the way presented here, the question is alien to the 
transcendental system, perhaps because of the seeming oxymoron in the expression 
‘empirical system’, if one goes to the first introduction to the third Critique, this does 
not seem so alien. There, one reads: 
                                                            
115 (AA 2:398-401) 
116 Somewhat surprisingly in the first Critique, too, Kant speaks of space and time as schemata: “Their 
[space and time’s] representation is a mere schema which always stands in relation to the imagination 
that calls up and assembles the objects of experience” (A156/B195). 
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“For unity of nature in time and space, and unity of experience possible for 
us, are one and the same, since nature is the sum total of mere appearances, a 
concept which can have its objective reality solely in experience; if we think of 
nature as a system (as indeed we must), then experience must be possible as a 
system even in terms of empirical laws. Therefore it is a subjectively 
necessary transcendental presupposition that nature does not have this 
disturbing boundless heterogeneity of natural forms, but that, rather, through 
the affinity of its particular laws under more general ones it takes on the 
quality of experience as an empirical system”117. 
 
If, Kant is saying, there will be such a thing as experience, then, it must be the 
case that the multiple empirical laws to be met with in experience itself are not 
wholly different in kind. This is so precisely because radical difference in kind, when 
it comes to laws, would mean no common condition under which to subsume them –
precisely what was discussed as an unavoidable difficulty to the first path. As to 
avoid the infinite multiplication of empirical laws, Kant’s Jungle as it were, a 
common condition has to be in place: such common condition is the unity of nature 
and it is precisely the exploration into the essence of ‘nature’ that will grant what one 
is after. This is not how nature had been conceived before. In the Prolegomena, for 
example, Kant says the highest question for transcendental philosophy contains, in 
turn, two distinct questions: the first asks how nature is possible in the material sense, 
the second asks how nature is possible in the formal sense
118
; alternatively, the first 
asks how time and space and all that ‘fills’ them are possible, the second asks how the 
manifold rules of understanding can possibly be unified. The answer provided for 
these two questions, in the critical period, had been that nature is “the whole of all 
appearances, that is, the sensible world, excluding all nonsensible objects” in 
material terms and “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the existence of a 
thing”119 in formal terms. According to the preceding discussions of this investigation 
this meant that something like Mahler’s Auferstehungssinfonie belongs to material 
nature to the extent that it consists of waves displacing particles in a certain medium, 
but has a formal nature that differs from its merely physical-mechanical 
determinations. By the time Kant drafted the first introduction to the third Critique, 
                                                            
117 (AA 8:209 [first Intro]) 
118 (AA 4:110) 
119 (AA 4:467) 
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however, the distinction between material and formal nature is being collapsed into 
one single question about the condition that unifies, as system, the diversity intrinsic 
to the condition itself, i.e. ‘nature’. Not only have the answers to these questions 
changed scope, but also the questions themselves change: the two start being 
inseparable one from the other to the point where no longer can one distinguish 
between nature in the ‘formal’ and nature in the ‘material’ sense. Rather, nature itself 
morphs into the intelligible unity of rules, of laws even, that provides the 
systematicity of knowledge. 
 
But by the same token, the argument applies not only to ‘nature’ but to 
transcendental philosophy itself. If in the first Critique and Prolegomena 
transcendental philosophy was the discipline delineating the boundaries of synthetic a 
priori judgments
120
, while drafting the Opus Postumum Kant is claiming something 
rather different: “Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the 
subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, also of the whole object of 
technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system”121. The aim of this 
shift is twofold, as will be seen: on the one hand Kant is trying to overcome a paradox 
concerning the concept of ‘matter’ yielded by the combination of transcendental 
philosophy as understood in the critical period and the principles laid out in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. On the other hand, Kant is trying to 
find a way of justifying an empirical unity that will warrant the systematicity of 
nature. These will elaborated on in what follows. 
 
Beginning with the paradox, in the third Chapter
122
 of this dissertation it was 
mentioned how curious it was that Kant would articulate, in the first Critique, the 
principle behind the Anticipations of Perception as follows: “In all appearances 
sensation, and the real [das Reale] which corresponds to it in the object (realitas 
phaenomenon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree”123. It was characterised 
as curious because it is difficult to see, given that one is dealing with a synthetic a 
priori judgment, in what sense this could constitute an ‘anticipation’ in the first place. 
Back in that discussion, little depended on this. Now, however, it can be seen that this 
curiosity echoed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is not just as a 
                                                            
120 (AA 4:279) 
121 (AA 21:78) 
122 (Ch. III, §ii, p. 115) 
123 (A 166) 
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poor choice of words but, rather, as a flagrant inconsistency
124
. As Sebastian Rand 
has pointed out, the 1786 work departs with an obvious contradiction
125
: on the one 
hand Kant asserts that metaphysics, as presented there, is a wholly a priori science
126
; 
on the other, he asserts that such science takes the empirical concept of matter as its 
basis
127
. But how are these two compatible, if at all? If one departs from an empirical 
concept, of whatever, it will be impossible to, then, grant an a priori status to 
whichever claims one appends to that concept (indeed, a lot of the second Critique’s 
arguments depend on this being true
128
). Conversely, if one departs from a purely a 
priori concept, it is close to impossible to see how one will get empirical content into 
it and still maintain that concept as being a priori save insofar as one introduces 
something like a doctrine of sensibilisation, as this investigation has shown. 
 
But this problem is not completely unrelated to the further issue of 
systematising the entirety of transcendental and empirical knowledge under the 
heading of a unity. In the critical period the unity of the various operations carried out 
by the understanding according to its functions of unifications was warranted by the 
synthetic unity of apperception and the fundamental role the power of imagination 
played in delineating the temporal structure of the categories. But as mentioned 
before, in the new characterisation of transcendental philosophy, ‘the act of 
consciousness whereby the subject becomes originator of itself’ is supposed to 
provide the unity of the system. In the Analogies of Experience, along with the 
Refutation of Idealism, the categories of relation govern things as appearances and 
space was only a way for finite reason to represent things as ‘outside of itself’129 –
things that are nonetheless “in uns”130  –. ‘Consciousness of our own existence’, 
however, was what proved that “only through things outside me and not through the 
mere representation of a thing outside me”131 does one have experience. But this, as 
Burkhard Tuschling puts it, boils down the whole problem to the following question: 
 
                                                            
124 Kant himself recognises this, as expressed in a letter to Beck from October 16, 1792, where Kant 
admits that his argument for the construction of matter in the MFNS moves in a circle (AA 11:376-
377). 
125 Rand, Sebastian. “Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant’s Theory of Matter” in 
Kantian Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 109-134. 
126 (AA 4:469); (A847/B875) 
127 (AA 4:470); (A848/B876) 
128Amongst others the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy (AA 5:33-34). 
129 “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence [Daseins] proves the 
existence of objects [Gegenstände] in space outside me” (B275). 
130 (A370) 
131 (B275) 
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“How can an existent independent of us as knowing subjects be, nevertheless, 
nothing but an existent only ‘in appearance’ or ‘for us’? (…) Or, what is the 
same thing from the standpoint of transcendental idealism, how can ‘the 
original apperception’ through a priori reference to the mere form of inner 
sense alone determine the existence of appearances in such a way that ‘a 
priori determined synthetic unity’ is produced ‘in the time-relation of all 
perceptions’? (A177/B220)”132.  
 
It had been apperception in relation to intuitions by means of time that had 
been enough to warrant that objects ‘ausser uns’ are objects ‘in uns’ –even if not 
being only objects in us–. But this, because of the paradox of matter mentioned 
before, does not seem to suffice anymore. Instead, now Kant needs to show that 
apperception is essentially related to intuitions and needs to be thus through the 
fundamental form of sensibility and its content. In other words, Kant needs to argue 
that the form of intuition by itself is no longer sufficient as a warrant and needs to 
show, instead, that the entirety of content of intuition is somehow also in the 
subject
133
. This is why Kant emphasises in the Opus Postumum that the unity of time 
would remain completely empty were it not because of a dynamic continuum, i.e. the 
ether
134
. 
 
The combination of these factors, points to a new and more specific phrasing 
of the problem stated at the beginning of this section. In the post-critical period, the 
need is to show that the synthetic unity of apperception, through the same forms of 
intuition developed before, relates to the empirical manifold thought of as a system in 
itself. This newly discovered empirical system, to which Kant refers as the world-
system
135
, the dynamic continuum
136
, the system of elementary forces
137
, and even the 
cosmic whole
138
, is supposed to provide the empirical self, in its relation to the unity 
of apperception, with the possibility of unified experience. The way in which the 
                                                            
132 Tuschling, Burkhard. “Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of 
Matter in Kant’s Opus Postumum” in Foerster, Eckart. Kant’s Transcendental Deductions. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, CA, 1989, p. 199. 
133 Ibid. p. 199. 
134 “Now what is at issue in the question whether there is an all-penetrating elementary material is the 
subjective element of receptivity to the sense-object, [necessary] for this material to be the object of a 
synthetic universal experience (…) Hence, the material must be valid both subjectively, as the basis of 
the representation of the whole of experience, and objectively, as a principle for the unification of the 
moving forces of matter” (AA 20:554). 
135 (AA 22:200) 
136 (AA 21:194) 
137 (AA 22:193) 
138 (AA 21:217) 
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Opus Postumum does this, is by means of an all pervading force  that is as an “a 
priori demonstrable material”, a “primordial material [the reality of which] can only 
be verified by reason”139, or “the real and objective principle of experience”140. It is 
therefore clear that the ‘proof’ or deduction for this “cosmic whole from single 
matter”141 is of crucial importance. From the Metaphysical Foundations one knows 
that, in whatever way physical bodies are formed, they will nonetheless presuppose 
moving forces for their formation. In the Opus Postumum, the world-system is 
supposed to transform the forms of intuition into a unified object of possible 
experience. In fact, the world-system becomes the objective pole that acts as the 
sensible condition under which the application of a notion as basic as ‘matter’ will 
arise: 
 
“Such a system cannot arise from mere experiences, for that would yield only 
aggregates which lack the completeness of a whole; nor can it come about 
solely a priori, for that would be metaphysical foundations, which however, 
contained no moving forces”142. 
 
Or, yet more precisely put: 
 
“The determinability of space and time, a priori by the understanding, in 
respect of the moving forces of matter, is the tendency of the metaphysical 
foundations of natural science towards physics; and the transition to it is the 
filling of the void by means of those forms which regard all objects of 
experience in their unity. It [the filling of the void] is the product of the idea 
of the whole, in the thoroughgoing, self-determining intuition of oneself”143. 
 
If indeed the world-system or continuum provides a solution to the problem of 
being able to account for unified experience by means of an empirical system, then, 
the whole notion of ‘object of possible experience’ must have shifted: an object is no 
longer “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united”144 but, 
instead, is the product of having blurred the boundaries that distinguished space and 
                                                            
139 (AA 21:219) 
140 (AA 21:224) 
141 (AA 21:217) 
142 (AA 21:478) 
143 (AA 22:193) 
144 (B137) 
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time from each other, and of having blurred the boundary of what is ‘in uns’ and what 
‘ausser uns’145. The outer and the inner, becoming almost indistinguishable from each 
other, thus make room for the notion of a fundamental force. When Kant says that 
“The material which, with its agitating forces (…) carries with it in its concept unity 
of the whole of all possible experience (according to the principle of identity)”146, a 
new relation between apperception and the empirical is constructed: the only object of 
possible experience is matter (organic and inorganic) as it is constituted in the world-
system. This is extremely important to bear in mind: the world-system just is the 
combination of time and space, once these have been extended beyond intuition itself 
and transformed into the loci of forces. If this is neglected, then one would end up, 
like Tuschling, having to criticise Kant for asserting that the only object of possible 
experience is primordial matter. In doing so, Tuschling thinks, Kant is downgrading 
space and time to merely relational determinations of things (they, themselves, are no 
longer objects of possible experience, after all)
147
. But in this regard Tuschling is 
mistaken: Kant has certainly drifted from the commitments found in the first Critique 
but not so much as to make of space and time solely relational determinations. 
Instead, Kant is temporalising (and to some extent spatialising) the systematicity of 
nature as a unity. How this happens, however, remains to be seen. 
 
 In order to see how Kant spatio-temporalises the systematicity of nature, and 
to be able to come to an end, it will be important to bear in mind the questions with 
which this section began (of whether an uncategorised schema was possible in 
transcendental philosophy and whether, if it were, it would be able to ground a 
synthetic a priori principle that would justify the unity of experience). What was just 
seen is that: 
 
“The transition to physics, consequently, is the predetermination 
(praedeterminatio) of the inner active relations of the subject that combines 
perceptions to the unity of experience (…) namely, [through] a principle of the 
a priori division of the moving forces according to their relations –as 
ponderable or imponderable, coercible or incoercible, cohesible or 
                                                            
145 “Space and time are products (but primitive products) of our own imagination, hence self-created 
intuitions, inasmuch as the subject affects itself and is thereby appearance, not thing in intself. The 
material element –the thing in itself- is=x, the mere representation of one’s own activity” (AA22:37); 
(AA 22:439-442); 
146 (AA 21:551) 
147 Tuschling, Burkhard. Op. Cit. p. 207. 
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incohesible, finally as exhaustible or inexhaustible matter with its moving 
forces”148.  
 
What then is that supposed principle of the a priori division of moving forces? 
As Eckart Förster has argued, it is in answer to this question that Kant’s doctrine of 
self-positing, the infamous Selbstsetzungslehre, comes in
149
. It was seen in the second 
Chapter that the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of unity are 
interdependent. This meant that even if the ‘I think’ preceded experience in some 
way, it still would be the case that empirical experience would have to be given of 
one’s self as carrying out some kind of synthesis. But as Förster notes150, in the Opus 
Postumum, this is shifted slightly: “The first act of the faculty of representation is the 
consciousness of oneself through which the subject makes itself into an object”151. 
This is to say that the very act of transforming one’s self into an object is pure self-
consciousness. Kant then goes on: “The consciousness of oneself (apperceptio) is the 
act of the subject to make itself into an object”152. Now, since pure apperception is not 
yet a given object at all but rather only the act of transforming one’s self into a give-
able object in the first place, Kant thinks the task is to show how exactly the ‘I’ as 
object of thought (cogitabile) becomes an empirical object (dabile). In words more in 
line with the second Chapter’s discussion of self-affection, the question to be asked 
becomes ‘how does one move from the ‘analyticity’ of the ‘I’ to the ‘syntheticity’ of 
the ‘I’?’ 
 
 Note that, again with Förster
153
, the first, the analytic unity of self-
consciousness, would not take place were it not because of the second, the synthetic 
unity of consciousness. Förster calls the first step ‘explicative’, insofar as it implies 
the determinability of self-consciousness, but the second step he calls ‘ampliative’, 
insofar as it implies that one posits one’s self in space-time relations as pure 
intuition
154
. But even looking at the movement thus, the question, even if moved, 
would remain for, how exactly does one go from a synthetic unity in pure intuition to 
any kind of empirical knowledge? In Kant’s doctrine of self-positing, the world-
system is posited alongside the self: since being is not a ‘real’ predicate, knowledge 
                                                            
148 (AA 22:337) 
149 Förster, Eckart. Kant’s Final Synthesis. Harvard University Press, MA, 2000, pp. 94-98. 
150 Ibid. pp. 102ff. 
151 (AA 22:77) 
152 (AA 22: 413) 
153 Förster, Eckart. Op. Cit. p. 105. 
154 (AA 22:420) 
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of one’s own being must consist in determining the manifold, positing a series of 
representations, under the concept of one’s empirical self while maintaining 
something ‘outside the concept’. That ‘outside the concept’ are the forces which 
make up the world-system in relation to the self. But if this ‘outside the concept’ 
status of forces is not to breach the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, then it 
needs justification. By this point, in the Opus Postumum that is, Kant has resources 
that were unavailable during the first Critique: organic forces. 
 
 If together with thinking of how to transform the analytic unity of 
consciousness into a synthetic unity of consciousness one questions how is it possible 
to think of the empirical self in the first place, the relevance of organic forces comes 
to the fore: the self will begin thinking of itself as containing intuitable properties of 
its own doing. One can think of spontaneous intentional action by means of organised 
beings, in other words, because one’s self is one such organised being. This provides 
Kant with an answer: “Because man is conscious of himself as a self-moving 
machine, without being able to further understand such a possibility, he can, and is 
entitled to, introduce a priori organic-moving forces of bodies into the classification 
of bodies in general”155 . So, because one is a corporalised or embodied organic 
system, one can be affected by the forces affecting matter in general; but only insofar 
as one represents one’s self as being affected does one appear as an object. In other 
words, these are two sides of the same coin: “Positing and perception, spontaneity 
and receptivity, the objective and subjective relation, are simultaneous; because they 
are identical as to time, as appearances of how the subject is affected –thus are given 
a priori in the same actus”156.  
 
 “The subject –says Kant– affects itself and becomes an object in appearance 
for itself in the composition of the moving forces”157. It affects itself by means of two 
principles: a mechanical one and a dynamical one. The mechanical principle, one 
which seems to presuppose some level of activity even within sensibility, answers to 
pressure (the lever force), traction (the pulley force), and shear (the inclined plane 
force). This is why, and this is crucial, space and time have to become, then, not only 
forms of sensibility but “forms of our effective forces [Formen unserer 
                                                            
155 (AA 21: 212-213)  
156 (AA 22:466) 
157 (AA 21:364) 
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Wirkungskräfte]”158 . In other words, space and time become here forms through 
which one acts and reacts in the affectivity of the senses. The dynamical principle, 
one which seems to presuppose the forces grounding solidity and cohesion, answers 
to ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility, and exhaustibility. And that which grounds 
both principles, as seen before, is the infinite and original continuum known as the 
world-system. This is why Förster characterises the doctrine of self-affection, in this 
sense, as the doctrine of how the logical act of self-consciousness becomes and 
empirically loaded act
159
:  
 
“The representation of apperception which makes itself into an object of 
intuition contains a twofold act: first, that of positing itself (the act of 
spontaneity); and, that of being affected by objects and combining the 
manifold in representation to a priori unity (the act of receptivity)”160.  
 
One posits one’s self as a duplet subject-object, the duplet appears in 
sensibility as attached to mechanical and dynamical forces because it has been posited 
in accordance with four ‘acts’ (ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility and 
exhaustibility), and in doing so, self-affection becomes part of an empirical system of 
representation the unity of which lies, on one side, with pure subjectivity, and on the 
other, with pure objectivity (the world-system or collective unity of the 
continuum)
161
.  
 
The brief sketch given above of the Selbstsetzungslehre illustrates neatly two 
things. It illustrates the newly acquired role of the forms of intuition as unified locus 
of motive forces, first, and it illustrates Kant’s attempt at overcoming the paradox of 
matter enunciated above. This is what makes the Opus Postumum a ‘transition’ from 
the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics: the subject has been 
provided, by itself, with the blueprint or guidelines to continue its investigation of 
nature according to the general categorial distribution of forces manifest in self-
affection
162
. The spontaneity of the understanding willingly
163
 makes itself into an 
object –this is the first step referred to above that ultimately starts everything: “The 
                                                            
158 (AA 21:38) 
159 Förster, Eckart. Op. Cit.  pp. 109-114. 
160 (AA 22:31) 
161 (AA 22:508) 
162 (AA 22:566) 
163 (AA 22:22) 
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understanding begins with the consciousness of itself (apperceptio) and performs 
thereby a logical act. To this the manifold of outer and inner intuition attaches itself 
serially, and the subject makes itself into an object in a limitless sequence”164. 
 
Along with the former, and by implication, if the world-system is the 
“supreme [and in virtue of its essence ‘sensible’] condition of the possibility of 
experience of objects in general” 165  then the answer to whether there is an 
uncategorised schema must be in the affirmative. The unity towards which a system 
of laws is directed is not in this case an idea of reason as it was before but is, rather, 
the objective correlate of the unity of apperception that, in its own self-positing as 
subject-object, constitutes the continuum itself: 
 
“I am an object [Gegenstand] of myself and my representations. That there 
still is something outside of me is only a product of myself. I make myself. 
Space cannot be perceived (but nor can the moving forces in space insofar as 
the body that effects them as products does not represent them). We make it 
all ourselves [Wir machen alles selbst]”166. 
 
By ‘expanding’ or ‘extending’ the spatio-temporal continuum, by 
transforming it from being the form of intuition into being the form of actual effective 
forces, Kant opens transcendental philosophy to the possibility of thinking of nature 
as constitutively systematic –not just for reflective judgment, but for determining 
judgment, too. There is a purpose inherent to matter that can only be made intelligible 
through thinking of the organisation of matter as the systematic and purposeful 
product of a self-affecting subject-object. Because, in other words, the forms of 
intuition have been displaced –moved sideways, as it were, towards the ‘ausser uns’ 
(or, rather, because the ‘ausser uns’ has been moved sideways towards the ‘in uns')167, 
and because the unity to be met with in those forms of intuition just is the unity of 
subjectivity posited as subjective-objective unity, the forces by which matter abides 
                                                            
164 (AA 22:82) Because of the difficulty of the doctrine, a literary image might be helpful. In H.G. 
Wells’ Time Machine, the traveller describes time travelling as “an excessively unpleasant sensation”: 
the intersection of corporality and temporality is beautifully illustrated in these passages: the organic 
body becomes disoriented and nauseated because the progress of its own self-constitution, as it were, 
does not match the immediate progression of time.  
165 (AA 21:554, 551, 559) 
166 (AA 22:82) 
167  It can only be conjectured whether this is the product of the power of imagination since the 
imagination itself loses, in the Opus Postumum, its Critical prevalence. That having been said, Kant 
does claim that “Space and time (…) are only given in the subject, that is, their representation is an 
act of the subject itself and a product of the imagination” (AA 22:76). Vid. (AA 22:37) 
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confer upon it its own aim or end. The world-system is an all-encompassing schema 
the sensible and affective nature of which determines not only the time-relations, as it 
did in the first Critique, of the functions of the understanding; it now, also, 
determines the space-relations that ultimately constitute whatever and however matter 
might be encountered: “The Transition is the Schematism of the composition of 
moving forces insofar as these constitute a system adequate to the form of the a priori 
division of general physics, hence, an architectonic of natural science”168. 
 
This point leads to my last remark in this section. Although in the previous 
reconstruction Förster’s reading of the Selbstsetzungslehre was followed closely, 
there is yet a point to be made: Förster’s interpretation needs to be complemented by 
something Mathieu has rightly mentioned, i.e. the centrality of the schematism in the 
Opus Postumum
169
. Förster is doubtlessly correct, as was mentioned before, in 
pointing out that Mathieu misconstrues the insufficiency of the principle of 
purposiveness. Indeed, it is not the ‘as if’ character of the principle that became 
problematic for Kant but, rather, the fact that the principle fails to grasp the almost 
infinite specificity of natural empirical laws that are supposed to be governed by it
170
. 
In light of the argument developed above, it is also true, however, that it is impossible 
to ignore the aspect of the Opus Postumum whereby Kant seeks to provide a 
“Schematism of the power of judgment through the principles of subsumption of 
appearances under the law of perception”171 (principle through which Kant tries to 
answer the question of how the so-called transition is possible in the first place). 
Indeed, Kant speaks repeatedly of such a thing as a schematism of the system of 
forces
172
, a schematism of concepts
173
, or, even, of a temporally mediated system of 
perceptions
174
. Förster, not unaware of this, claims, first, that a spatial schematism 
had been developed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science because the 
schematism doctrine of the first Critique had only provided the necessary, but not 
sufficient, conditions for the applicability of the categories
175
. And claims, second, 
that because the Metaphysical Foundations failed to provide a non-circular definition 
of matter, Kant would supplement that spatial schematism with the 
                                                            
168 (AA 21:263) 
169 Mathieu, Vittorio. Kants Opus Postumum. Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1989, pp. 137-161. 
170 Förster, Eckart. Op. Cit. p. 7. 
171 (AA 22:491) 
172 (AA 22:265); (AA 22:330); (AA 22:487); (AA 22:505)  
173 (AA 21:169) 
174 (AA 22:466) 
175 Förster, Eckart. Op. Cit. p. 59. 
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Selbstsetzungslehre in the Opus Postumum: that “Selbstsetzung thus provides the 
schema for outer sense, the condition under which something can be given as object, 
or ‘the sensible concept, of an object in agreement with the category ’(A146)”176.  
 
But as was seen moments ago, if self-positing brings anything into the 
equation, it must be by means of blurring the erstwhile ‘clear’ distinction between 
what makes up the spatial and what the temporal as such. That the world-system 
emerged as a schema in the first place answers precisely to the fact that inner and 
outer sense in the Opus Postumum can no longer be clearly distinguished from one 
another: “Space and time are forms of outer an inner intuition, given a priori in one 
synthetic representation; that is, they are inseparable, mutually dependent 
representations”177. It is undoubtedly true that without a schema, understood as the 
temporal determination that works as sensible condition for the validity of concepts, 
transcendental philosophy would be unable to connect the pure concepts of the 
understanding with the general principles. But given the previous argument, from the 
Opus Postumum it seems equally true that without a schema the metaphysical 
principles would moreover be unable to connect to specific empirical laws. In light of 
this, the stronger path answers again the question of whether transcendental 
philosophy allows for an uncategorised schema to ‘govern’ appearances. Unlike the 
weaker path where purposiveness presents a transcendental but only subjectively 
constitutive future-oriented schema for which no concept is suitable, the Opus 
Postumum’s stronger path suggests that the world-system presents an equally 
transcendental but objectively constitutive schema for which, also, no concept is 
suitable
178
. Unlike the first quasi-schematic symbol that is a product of the 
imagination in relation to reason, quasi-schema the nature of which is merely 
problematic; the schematic world-system, the existence of which can be predicated 
categorically, is a product of one’s self-positing as an organic, embodied being. 
 
                                                            
176 Ibid. p. 114. 
177 (AA 22:98) 
178 “There is not a merely regulative, but also constitutive formal principle, existing a priori, of the 
science of nature, for the purpose of a system” (AA 22:240) and “(…) metaphysical principles exhibit 
a tendency towards physics understood as Empirical System to which formal principles a priori 
belong, and to which a Schema that signals beforehand the a priori physical loci for the empirical also 
belongs (…)” (AA 21:485). This is why Duque characterises the general task of the Opus Postumum as 
follows: “La tarea que el O. P. se propone, consecuentemente, es la de hacer pasar a la física de 
agregado a sistema. Lo cual quiere decir, en profundidad, demostrar la validez y fecundidad de la 
filosofía kantiana” Duque, Félix. “Física y filosofía en el último Kant” Logos: Anales del Seminario de 
Metafísica, Vol. 9, No.9, 1974, pp. 61-74, p. 65. 
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∴ 
 
 This chapter departed from noting that, while transcendental philosophy 
maintains that time is the form of all appearances whatsoever, it also maintains that 
there are appearances independently from the functions of the understanding. This 
was taken to signify, in accordance with the general spirit of a critical project, that 
one must be able to provide an a priori synthetic principle governing such appearing 
without necessarily appealing to the pure concepts of the understanding. Based on 
Franks’ and Tuschling’s readings of the aftermath of the Critique of Pure Reason, it 
was argued, therefore, that critical philosophy found itself in the position of having to 
justify an uncategorial mode of appearing and that it pursued such justification in two 
distinct ways. 
 
The first of these ways, characterised as the weaker of the two, departed from 
looking back at the nature of judgment itself and askedwhether or not judgment has, 
in its reflective capacity, resources to justify the syntheticity of its own principle. It 
was argued that, because the principle of purposiveness is brought about by Kant 
precisely in opposition to the principles of the understanding, and because the former 
is itself a synthetic a priori principle that partakes in the form of striving towards an 
end, the exhibition of a future oriented tendency is manifest in purposiveness 
hypotypically. Indeed, the principle of purposiveness was seen to be grounded on the 
symbolic exhibition of future orientation derived from the spontaneity of the will. It 
was seen, moreover, that the imagination ‘uses’ this principle to reconfigure the 
structural relations in which it will find appearances and allows judgment to engage 
with such appearances by referring back to its own activity. Thus, in virtue of the 
form of the subjective faculties and by means of referring back to its own activity, the 
imagination makes way for an alternate set of relations in which one can inscribe 
objects such as living beings and artworks. From this it was seen, finally, that 
although something schema-like is in fact operating as the validating condition for 
reflective judgment (without being subordinate to the concepts of the understanding), 
the case remains nonetheless that the most one can say about the principle that makes 
use of such uncategorised schema is that it might be constitutive, but for reflective 
judgment only. 
 
The second way, characterised in this Chapter as the stronger of the two, does 
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not postulate a synthetic a priori principle problematically but offers, instead, a 
unitary system of nature that acts as the validating condition for the transition from 
metaphysical principles to empirical laws. It was argued that, partly in response to a 
paradoxical definition of matter, and partly in an effort to account not for the 
aggregative, but for the systematic unity of the laws of nature, Kant introduces the 
world-system as the schema-like structure that confers matter itself with objective 
validity as it is constituted through forces. In this sense, the relevance of the Opus 
Postumum’s doctrine of self-positing is difficult to overestimate: in showing how the 
‘I’ goes from being the subject of thought to being an empirical object, Kant is forced 
to introduce an empirical unity that is divided systematically in accordance with the 
divisions of the understanding. Thus, in this account, the systematic division of forces 
follows the systematic division of the understanding. This implies, in turn, that the 
locus of those systematic forces can no longer be characterised merely as a form of 
intuition in the subject and must, instead, be characterised as a spatio-temporal 
empirical continuum within which forces first and foremost come to constitute matter. 
Even though this makes it, as an outcome, increasingly complicated to distinguish 
between the spatial and the temporal in the world-system, it is warranted to speak of 
this world-system itself as a schema to the extent that, in spite of the shifts through 
which it undergoes, it still operates as the sensible condition that grants objective 
validity to concepts. The question after these elucidations is not so much whether 
transcendental philosophy manages to accommodate such a thing as an uncategorised 
schema. The question, in light of the stronger path developed in the second section of 
this last chapter is rather whether transcendental philosophy can indeed accommodate 
such a notion –or if, alternatively, this already falls beyond its limits–. 
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Conclusion 
  
For an investigation that defends the triple thesis that time is affection of the 
self, that in the activity of affecting one’s self there is positive determination of 
content, and, finally, that this determined content may exceed what is captured in the 
concept, a problem looms on the horizon. The issue is related to the permanence of 
the matter of appearances and the exact nature of the content, as opposed to the form, 
of objects. The problem resides, specifically, in that transcendental philosophy 
requires that something be permanent in perception if it is not to descend into 
absolute idealism. In what follows, by making use of the conclusions reached so far, 
it will be seen that the preceding investigation illuminates Kant’s often obscure 
remarks about this supposed subsistent but it will be seen, also, that this interpretation 
has limitations. Whereas adequately conceiving of time in transcendental philosophy 
helps in dissipating some of the worries related to Kant’s doctrine of permanence and 
matter, it will be noted that, in fact, the doctrine confirms more than anything the 
importance of receptivity in the subjective constitution of objectivity. But from this 
limitation an interesting question will be seen to arise for further philosophical 
investigation. The fourth Chapter bracketed the discussion of the way in which one 
ought to conceive of the relation between the two possible paths, the weaker and the 
stronger, articulating uncategorised appearances, or the supposed ‘excess’ of content 
in intuition provided by self-affection. This issue is directly related, as will be seen 
below, to the problem of the permanence or subsistence of something that lies beyond 
intuition. It will be seen in what follows, and to be able to come to an end, that 
conceiving of self-affection as a provider of content in and for experience can orient 
inquiries into the relation between Critical and post-Critical philosophy in new, 
philosophically interesting directions
1
. 
 
Soon after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, an anonymous 
review appeared in the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen explicitly likening Kant’s and 
Berkley’s idealisms. In 1782 Christian Garve wrote, and Johann Feder endorsed by 
editing, that a “(…) basic pillar of the Kantian system rests on these concepts of 
sensations as mere modifications of ourselves (on which Berkeley, too, principally 
                                                            
1 One can think, therefore, of the problem of permanence as being most immediately related to what 
was defended in the second and third Chapters and think of the questions this problem elicits as being 
most immediately related that what was defended in the fourth Chapter of this Dissertation. 
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builds his idealism), and of space and time”2. Because the Critique defends that both 
time and space are merely subjective forms of intuition, the reviewer reasoned, the 
same work must also be committed to accepting the further thesis that no external 
criterion for determining the veracity of sensations exists. This, in turn, although 
problematic at the level of being unable to differentiate between reverie and reality, is 
devastating when one wants to uphold a division between inner and outer sense. If all 
is but a modification of the mind, or so the argument goes, what difference is there 
between something occurring in one’s self and something occurring out of one’s self? 
The incapacity to uphold the distinction, the reviewer pointed out, inevitably led Kant 
to confuse what legitimately pertains to inner sense and what pertains to outer sense 
and, ultimately, led him to confuse transcendental idealism and any other form of 
idealism that preceded it
3
. 
 
To say that Kant was unimpressed with the review, in light of the Appendix to 
the Prolegomena
4
, is somewhat of an understatement. Kant thought the reviewer had 
completely misconstrued transcendental philosophy
5
, had failed to understand exactly 
in what way transcendental idealism opposes traditional idealisms
6
, had passed 
judgment on the Critique ‘en gros’ and not ‘en détail’ –as would have been fair in 
Kant’s view–7, and overall “understood nothing of the work and perhaps of the spirit 
and nature of metaphysics itself”8. The worries enunciated by Garve, after all, had 
been rendered neutral, in Kant’s view, precisely by having articulated the problem of 
general metaphysics as being reducible to demonstrating the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgments. Indeed, the Critique had shown that “metaphysics is absolutely 
nothing [ganz und gar nichts ist] without the apodictic certainty of these [synthetic a 
priori] propositions”9. 
 
Garve’s gross misinterpretation of the general aim of transcendental 
philosophy, a misinterpretation that confuses the thesis that “All cognition through 
the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in the 
                                                            
2 Feder/Garve “The Göttingen Review” in Sassen, Brigitte (ed.), Kant’s Early Critics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 53-54. It was Christian Garve that wrote the review, but 
Johann G.H. Feder edited the original version for printing. 
3 Ibid. p. 58. 
4 (AA 4:372-383 ) 
5 (AA 4:374) 
6 (AA 4:374-375) 
7 (AA 4:376) 
8 (AA 4:376) 
9 (AA 4:378) 
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ideas of pure understanding and reason” with its opposite, namely that “All cognition 
of things out of mere pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, 
and there is truth only in experience”10, merited in Kant’s eyes an elaborate response. 
Thus, in answer to Garve and to similar worries that might have emerged from 
misconstruing transcendental idealism, Kant responds in the Introduction to the 
second edition of the first Critique, in reformulating the fourth Paralogism, in the 
aforementioned Appendix (‘On what can be done in order to make Metaphysics as 
Science actual’) of the Prolegomena, and, briefly but crucially, in the Refutation of 
Idealism (the only “new argument, properly so-called, in the new edition of the 
Critique”11). 
 
Because of its conciseness, elegance, and power, and because the argument 
presented there can be read as most directly challenging the interpretation developed 
in Chapters II and III of this dissertation, the discussion of the problem will centre on 
the Refutation. The thesis for which Kant offers a one paragraph proof reads thus: 
“The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the 
existence of objects in space outside me”12. This is the case because consciousness of 
one’s own existence is determined in time and determination in time presupposes 
permanence in perception. Now, since permanence itself is not something one can 
derive solely from within one’s self, and instead is something the nature of which 
appeals to something without one’s self, it then follows that determination of one’s 
own existence in time is possible only through the actual, or real, existence of 
something beyond mere representations. 
 
From a first reading the challenge that the Refutation of Idealism poses for the 
argument developed in the preceding investigation is obvious: time, it was defended 
in the second Chapter, is affection of the self through that self’s own activity of 
synthesis. In the third Chapter it was further defended that this activity is 
objectivising in the sense that it provides the understanding with a specific 
configuring frame that renders objects possible. If that is the case, then, it surely must 
be the case that anything beyond representations must be altogether forfeited on the 
grounds that, again, inner sense is the form of all intuition. The Refutation, however, 
claims that there is indeed something beyond one’s representations, i.e. permanence, 
                                                            
10 (AA 4:374) 
11 (Bxxxixfn) 
12 (B275) 
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and that only that permanence provides the sufficient condition for empirical 
determination in time. It would seem, furthermore, that if the Refutation advocates 
anything, at the very least it must advocate the dependence of inner sense on outer 
sense. As the B-Introduction makes clear, “outer sense is already in itself a relation 
of intuition to something actual outside me, and the reality of outer sense, in its 
distinction from imagination, rests simply on that which is here found to take place, 
namely, its being inseparably bound with inner experience, as the condition for its 
possibility”13. This amounts to saying, in short, that inner experience is possible only 
mediately so, that is, mediated through outer sense or experience of something that 
lies beyond one’s own mere activity14. How is this, therefore, compatible, if at all, 
with what has been argued throughout this investigation? 
  
Before addressing the challenge ‘frontally’, it is worth making three 
contextual remarks about the Refutation of Idealism
15
. The first is that the Refutation 
has a history behind it that justifies its existence. As was mentioned above, the 
Garve/Feder review of the first Critique’s A-Edition tended to overemphasise 
transcendental idealism’s idealist claims (it made Kant sound Berkleian by referring 
to the former’s system as an idealist of the ‘higher order’16). In response to that, Kant 
downplayed the idealist claims in the Prolegomena by addressing Berkleian idealism 
and in the B-Edition of the Critique by addressing problematic, i.e. Cartesian, 
idealism. This matters because it shows that Kant thought, by 1787, that dogmatic 
idealism had been dealt with already (in the Aesthetic of the first Critique and, 
presumably, in the Prolegomena) and considered it pertinent to address problematic 
idealism only. The second contextual remark has to do with the location of the 
Refutation in relation to the rest of the Analytic: it appears as a corollary to the 
second Postulate that, importantly, reads as follows: “That which hangs together 
[zusammenhängt] with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, 
is actual [modified]”17. This is related to the previous point but is worth mentioning 
independently because in the 1782 review, Garve had written that he was unable to 
comprehend “how the distinction of what is actual from what is imagined and merely 
                                                            
13 (Bxlfn) 
14 (B277) 
15 For good contextual literature on the Refutation of Idealism specifically, see Bader, Ralf. “The Role 
of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94:1, 2012, pp. 53-73. For 
a good reconstruction of the argument see Förster, Eckart “Kant’s Refutation of Idealism” in Holland, 
A.J. (ed.). Philosophy, its History and Historiography. Reidel, Dodrecht, 1985, pp. 287-304. 
16 Feder/Garve Op. Cit. pp. 53-54. 
17 (A218/B266) 
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possible, a distinction that is generally so easy for human understanding, could be 
sufficiently grounded in the mere application of concepts of understanding without 
assuming one mark of actuality in sensation itself [my emphasis]”18. Because of the 
terminology employed by Garve (e.g. actuality/possibility), and because of the 
specific problem he is raising here, it is important to note where Kant thought it 
adequate to add the Refutation of Idealism, viz. after the second Postulate. Indeed, the 
Refutation accompanies the Postulate of Empirical Thought that relates to the schema 
of actuality and does not accompany, in spite of what the Refutation itself discusses, 
the Analogy that relates to the schema of permanence. Lastly, the third contextual 
remark, and the most important to bear in mind, is that what Kant is discussing in the 
Refutation is not the possibility of perceiving things outside of one’s self, but the 
possibility of experience. Kant describes ‘perception’ as “consciousness in which 
sensation can be found”19 and describes ‘experience’ as “a synthesis of perceptions, 
not contained in perception but itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic 
unity of the manifold of perceptions”20. Experience, that is, is rendered possible in the 
first place through representing a necessary connection of perceptions. This means, in 
turn, that Kant’s concern in the Refutation ought to be understood as partly 
addressing the problem of the external correlate of perception but partly addressing, 
also, the problem of being able to transform such perceptions into actual, objectively 
valid experience.  
 
With the previous remarks in mind, the challenge posed by the Refutation of 
Idealism is not rendered inert, certainly, but it does become easier to tackle. The 
Refutation departs from announcing that “The required proof must, therefore, show 
that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things; and this, it 
would seem, cannot be achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, which 
for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only under the assumption of outer 
experience [Kant’s emphasis]”21. What, then, does experience mean here? And why 
would Kant feel the need to emphasise that specific noun? It was argued earlier
22
, in 
relation to the distinction between mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-
regulative judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, that Kant considers 
                                                            
18 Feder/Garve. Op. Cit. pp. 54-55. 
19  (A166/B207) Kant is ambiguous with the term ‘perception’, but the above definition may be 
corroborated in (A120); (B147); (A225;B272). 
20 (A177/B219) 
21 (B275) 
22 (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 116-120) 
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‘experience’ only that which is governed by the four subsets of principles. This ruled 
out, for example, figments of the imagination that do not necessarily abide by the 
regularity imposed by the Analogies. It did not rule out but reinforce, however, that 
whenever there is a relation of two or more existing appearances at stake, the 
relational and modal judgments, categories, schemata, and principles must be in 
operation. In this light, what the Refutation is stating is that if (note the hypothetical) 
experience will be had, then, it will be had only on the assumption [Voraussetzung] of 
an externally existing correlate of one’s representations. If the question were, as it 
was discussed in Chapter II, about merely affecting one’s self then, as was proved 
before, the problem would not arise since one need not differentiate between 
concoctions of imagination and an external realm. After all, Kant is clear in the fourth 
Paralogism (re-written for the second edition of the Critique) that “External objects 
(bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of 
my representations”23. The question in the Refutation, however, is not about merely 
affecting one’s self but about having secure experience of outer things and, in this 
sense, mere perception of external objects does not suffice. Instead, the claim must be 
much stronger: for experience to arise, the existence of these objects must factor in 
the equation –factored in, in fact, in a peculiar way: namely by assuming their 
existence–. The bar for something to count as experience, strictly speaking, is set very 
high by Kant: not all imaginative association amounts to experience and thinking that 
it did would have catastrophic consequences for transcendental philosophy. Only 
orderly, i.e. Analogy- and Postulate-governed, appearances amount to experience. 
This is why Kant draws a contrast between experience and representation in the 
Introduction when he claims that “through inner experience I am conscious of my 
existence in time (consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more 
than to be conscious merely of a representation of myself [modified]”24. Kant, in 
other words, does not think that dreams and perceptions of outer things differ 
essentially, for they do not
25
. They differ, rather, in that dreams lack the order and 
regularity generated in the rule according to which one combines several different 
representations that will eventually transform mere perception into full-blooded 
experience
26
. In sum, the argument in the Refutation should be read as providing 
proof that, to have experience even of one’s self –but, again, only experience of one’s 
                                                            
23 (A370) 
24 (Bxxxix-xlfn) 
25 (A375-376) 
26 (AA 4:290) 
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self–, existence and permanence must be assumed as adding something to the 
associations of the a priori relations in the imagination. 
 
And what about the claim that outer sense is ‘the condition for the possibility 
of inner experience’ cited above? In a note to himself Kant made in relation to the 
Refutation, note that has come to be known as the Leningrad Fragment, Kant claims 
“I am immediately and originally conscious of myself as a being in the world and 
only thereby is my own existence determinable as a magnitude in time”27. Unlike pure 
apperception, empirical apperception includes existence in its determination: if pure 
apperception “merely asserts ‘I am’”, empirical apperception asserts “that I was, I 
am, and I will be, i.e., I am a thing of past, present, and future time”28. The claim 
about outer sense being the condition for the possibility of inner experience, 
therefore, cannot mean that one must presuppose outer sense or, rather, the matter that 
belongs to it as conditioning a priori all that may appear in inner sense. It must mean, 
instead, that insofar as empirical determination is concerned, a material correlate must 
be posited alongside the act of determining if one is to account for experience (inner 
or outer). As soon as existence is factored in, that is, the ‘externality’ of the empirical 
has to also be factored in.  This is why keeping in mind that Kant is addressing 
problematic, and not dogmatic, idealism was important. Descartes himself had linked 
experience and externality by affirming, in the Règles pour la direction de l'esprit, 
that the matter of experience consists of both what one perceives from the outside and 
what one derives from reflection
29
. But this is also why it was equally as important to 
bear in mind the position of the Refutation of Idealism in relation to the rest of the 
Analytic. Although appearing as a corollary to the second Postulate, the Refutation 
appeals to permanence, itself the schema of a relational, and not a modal, category. 
This should be telling of the fact that, although certainly concerned with the way in 
which appearances relate to one another, as Heidegger says in Being and Time
30
, the 
Refutation itself is more concerned with differentiating actuality in relation to thought 
than permanence of an appearance in relation to other appearances. Differently put, 
although it certainly is the case that the Refutation of Idealism presupposes the 
Analogies of Experience and the way in which these dynamically regulate experience 
                                                            
27 (Leningrad Fragment I, P.i) Kant, Immanuel. Notes and Fragments (ed. Guyer, P.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 364-366 
28 (Leningrad Fragment I, P.i) 
29 “The matter of experience is what we perceive by sense, what we hear from the lips of others, and 
generally whatever reaches our understanding either from external sources or from that contemplation 
which our mind directs backwards on itself” (Descartes,  Oeuvres, p.422). 
30 (GA 2, §43) 
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of several objects, it is also the case that the Refutation is concerned with those 
objects’ relation to thought. In this sense, what the Refutation of Idealism adds to the 
discussion that comes before it is important: the Postulates govern the way in which 
existents relate, not to one another for that is Analogical, but to the thinking subject 
(and yet adding nothing to the intuition of that existent)
31
.  
 
It was important for Kant, when discussing the proper meaning of actuality, to 
bring in what the material conditions of thought should amount to because otherwise, 
he would have risked being misinterpreted as claiming that existence of things in 
themselves was dependent on what appears as actual to thought. Philosophical 
tradition, from Aristotle onward
32
, thought of the modal predicates of possibility, 
actuality, and necessity as being at the same level. This is to say that of any given 
thing one may predicate its modality in relation to thought as being possible, or 
actual, or necessary –but not all at the same time–. Kant, however, does not think this 
is the case. As the Appendix to the third Chapter illustrates, the category that lies 
between possibility and necessity, according to Kant, is not actuality but existence. 
Actuality is, instead, a schema, i.e. a determination of self-affection that works as the 
sensible condition for the application of the predicate ‘existence’. That schema, in 
turn, finds its culmination in the Postulate of Empirical Thought that links the 
connection amongst appearances to the thinking subject that is doing the connecting. 
Specifically, it states that one will be entitled to claim something as existing if, but 
only if, that something hangs together with the material conditions of experience.  
 
Thus, Kant could have answered to Garve’s criticism about the impossibility 
of distinguishing between the actual and the imagined in two ways. The first, if 
somewhat facetious way would be by simply stating that, in the strictest of terms, 
because of the fundamental role of the power of imagination in both its transcendental 
and empirical guises, the actual is imaginary –to the extent that schemata are 
products of the power of imagination–. This answer, however, is insufficient. A 
hypothetical Garve could have simply responded that, even if it were true that 
actuality is an imaginary determination of self-affection, it still is the case that an 
appeal to something permanent in perception is necessary for the argument in the 
Refutation to work. A hypothetical Kant could respond, in similar veins to before, 
that permanence itself is imaginary to the extent that permanence is the schema of 
                                                            
31 (Ch. III, §ii, p. 125-129) 
32 (Metaphysics, Δ, 1017a) 
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substance but, yet again, this would be problematic since the permanent in perception 
spoken of, and appealed to, in the Refutation of Idealism is not itself an intuition or in 
any way in us
33
. The second way in which Kant, specifically the interpretation of 
Kant developed in this investigation, could answer the charge is by referring the 
accuser back to the first analogy and its respective schema, i.e. subsistence. Self-
affection provides the condition under which the application of the concept of 
substance takes hold. But this is not the only identifiable condition for the application 
of the concept. That something exist is, also, a condition for the applicability of the 
category of substance to the extent that the first analogy is not mathematical-
constitutive but dynamical-regulative. Thus, two seemingly different conditions are 
necessary in order to be able to predicate substantiality: the temporal, schematic 
subsistence and the categorial, modal existence of something. But, because substance 
is a relational category, it presupposes existence. It thus turns out that the modal 
category of existence is the pre-condition for the schematic, relational condition of 
subsistence to be able to do the conditioning in the first place
34
. This, in turn, yields 
that Kant is using ‘permanence’ in two clearly distinct ways: permanence understood 
as subsistence, i.e. the schema that works as the sensible condition for the application 
of the category of substance, and permanence understood as the external enduring 
correlate of the pre-condition of existence that warrants determination in perception. 
Although the investigation developed here can, and does shed much needed light on 
the first use of ‘permanence’, it is limited in what it may say about the second. 
Indeed, the most it can say is that the permanent in perception that does not reside in 
us, while being radically other to the self and self’s activity, is that to which  
cognition is receptive. 
 
The results of this investigation, especially the thesis that self-affection 
provides determinate content in intuition, should not be read, therefore, as defending 
that Kant is committed to an Ovidian “est deus in nobis”35. It should be read, instead, 
as indeed defending that “All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of 
something real in space, or rather, as being the real itself”36 but only to the extent 
that the finitude and receptivity of subjectivity are acknowledged. If the game 
                                                            
33 (B275) 
34  The relation between the Analogies and the Postulates is explained by Kant when 
discussing the first Postulate in (A221/B268). 
35 (Ovid, Fasti, VI, 5-6) 
36 (A375) 
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idealists play
37
, of only granting immediacy and reality to inner experience, has been 
turned against itself, it is only because inner experience itself consists of a complex 
bundle of activity and passivity. It would be wholly in line with the basic tenets of the 
present investigation to advocate in favour of an infinitely creative imagination bound 
only by the condition of time insofar as the latter characterises the activity through 
which subjectivity gives rise to its own affectivity. It would be a mistake, however, to 
think that this investigation is committed to accepting that subjectivity generates ex 
nihilo the totality that affects it. The departure point was, from the very outset, that of 
a receptive subject the nature of which precludes it from creating that which it intuits. 
Claiming, therefore, that such subject’s activity provides some content, indeed 
content that structures all further content to be met with, does not amount to saying 
that the subject’s activity provides all content. 
 
This last point leads, however, to an important avenue for further 
philosophical inquiry. Although there is much ongoing debate in the literature 
concerning the kind of relation that Kant’s transitional project holds to critical 
philosophy
38
, and although the debate is of extreme importance, engaging with it in 
much detail falls beyond the scope of this Conclusion. Yet, a few remarks on the 
matter are pertinent for two reasons. The first reason is, as the discussion in Chapter 
IV made obvious, that the Transition as such is difficult to separate from Kant’s 
earlier critical works. The second reason is that this admittedly difficult point is 
related to what was just discussed about the Refutation. The first thing to note 
regarding the first is something Jean Grondin insisted on when reviewing François 
Marty’s French edition and translation of the Opus Postumum: because of the scope 
and size of the work, because also of its systematic pretentions, it is clear the Opus 
Postumum stems from worries left unresolved by critical philosophy and especially 
by the Metaphysical Foundations programme
39
. This should not be taken to mean, 
however, that the Opus Postumum must therefore be a necessarily smooth, organic 
continuation of what had come before or to mean, as Félix Duque reminds anyone 
approaching the work, that the Opus Postumum is successful in providing the sought-
for transition to physics
40
. It should be taken to mean, however, that even Kant 
                                                            
37 (B276) 
38 A clear picture of the dimensions and importance of the debate emerges from the following, few 
sources: Tuschling, Mathieu, Förster, Friedman, Duque, and Hall. See Bibliography. 
39 Grondin, Jean “Kant, Emmanuel, Opus postumum: passage des príncipes métaphysiques de la 
science de la nature à la physique”,  Laval théologique et philosophique, 433, 1987, pp. 425–426. 
40 Duque, Félix. “Física y filosofía en el último Kant” Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica, Vol. 
9, No.9, 1974. 
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himself perceived some kind of deficiency or inadequacy in the 1786 Metaphysical 
Foundations and that, moreover, such deficiency must have been present, even 
minimally, in the propaedeutic project undertaken in the three Critiques. 
 
 The question may be boiled down to one about the compatibility between the 
regulative systematicity of nature as it is conceived in the third Critique and the 
systematic unity of nature as it is conceived in the Opus Postumum. The 
interpretation developed in this Dissertation offers a way to approach this extremely 
difficult problem
41
. Recently, Bryan Hall has identified a dilemma that emerges from 
a twofold desideratum in Kant’s critical doctrine of substance. The twofold 
desideratum consists in that Kant needs to maintain, both, that empirical objects are 
substances to the extent that they endure and are subordinated to causality, and that 
there must be a general Substance the lasting of which guarantees that empirical 
substances do not arise or disappear outside of the unity of time. The desideratum, in 
turn, gives rise to the following dilemma: if the general Substance is substantive in 
the categorial sense, then there would seem to be little resources, in Critical 
philosophy as Hall conceives it, to then go on and identify individual empirical 
substances; but if it is substances that are substantive in the categorial sense, then 
there would be no resources to conceive of the general Substance as a single 
substantive whole
42. The dilemma will be resolved by Kant, in Hall’s view, by trying 
to overcome the infamous ‘gap’43 generated by the dilemma through positing a new a 
priori concept of general Substance in the Opus Postumum, namely, the ether.  
 
 This general reading of what the ether deduction in the Opus Postumum is 
supposed to be doing is directly connected to the Refutation of Idealism as it was 
reconstructed above. Hall cites, in fact, the second note that accompanies the small 
addendum to the second Postulate as support for his argument that Kant not only was 
aware of the dilemma, but was perhaps, also, trying to think of the solution
44
. Thus, 
when in that note Kant claims that “(…) we do not even have anything persistent on 
                                                            
41 Which is not to say that the Opus Postumum is a monolithic endeavour, for it is not. There are 
significant variations within the work and it would be foolish to overlook the several ways in which 
Kant articulated his theses on, e.g. the system of elementary forces. On this point and also on the 
relation of the different doctrines contained in the Opus Postumum with those found in the third 
Critique see Rueger, Alexander. “Brain Water, the Ether, and the Art of Constructing Systems” in 
Kant-Studien, 86, 1995, pp. 26-40. 
42 Hall, Bryan W. The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy through the Opus 
Postumum. Routledge, New York, 2015, pp. 50-54. 
43 A lot of what one takes the Opus Postumum to be addressing depends on where one decides to place 
the ‘gap’ in transcendental philosophy. Contrast, for example, Hall’s reading with Förster’s. 
44 Hall, Bryan W. Op. Cit. pp. 52-53. 
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which we could base the concept of a substance, as intuition, except merely matter, 
and even this persistence is not drawn from outer experience, but rather presupposed 
a priori as the necessary condition for all time-determination (…)”45, Hall takes him 
to be anticipating the dilemma that the Transition would be addressing a few years 
later. If Hall is correct in this regard, and if the reading of the Refutation developed 
above holds, then important philosophical questions arise that need to be explored. Is 
it, first and foremost, adequate to characterise the Refutation of Idealism as Kant’s 
anticipation of a theory of general Substance? It would seem as if the reading 
developed towards the end of this Dissertation showed that Kant’s concern is not so 
much with elaborating a coherent theory of Substance but, rather, with providing a 
spatio-temporal continuum able to justify the constitutive and not only regulative 
systematicity of nature. To the extent that one can differentiate between the two, then, 
it is not so much by means of positing an all-pervasive Substance as such that Kant 
seeks to accomplish such justification, but by means of externalising the subjective 
forms of intuition and merging them as to form one world-whole. But how can Kant, 
achieve such externalisation without doing violence to some of transcendental 
philosophy’s basic commitments? Would the transcendental ideality and empirical 
reality theses of the forms of intuition have to be sacrificed in the endeavour? 
Moreover, space and time were characterised in the section of Chapter IV discussing 
the Opus Postumum as themselves products of the power of imagination. If this is 
right, does that mean that this power is being characterised anew? And, if so, is Kant 
revising the general doctrine of self-affection that he had developed in between 1781 
and 1790? 
 
Without being able to go further –for now– in the direction these questions 
indicate, it is worth noting, nonetheless, how closely intertwined the original 
restriction placed by transcendental philosophy onto itself and transcendental 
idealism’s subsequent development are. A clear thread links the idea that “if all that is 
manifold in the subject were given by the activity of the self, then inner intuition 
would be intellectual intuition”46 with the further thought of a systematic unity that 
ought to be posited for nature, properly so called, to arise. The terrain gained in this 
investigation –by means of elucidating the possibility of affectivity, exhibiting the 
specific layout transcendental philosophy displays for understanding the constitution 
of objectivity, and clarifying, lastly, the conditions that would have to be in place to 
                                                            
45 (B277) 
46 (B68) 
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go beyond the singularity of that objectivity–, this terrain, then, offers a new way to 
conceive of that thread and to think, in following it, of the role self-affection plays in 
the process whereby “the understading makes the cogitabile a dabile”47. 
 
At the beginning it was stated that this investigation would be answering to a 
Heideggerian challenge. Heidegger’s challenge consisted in the need to show that 
Kant not only envisaged the possibility of general metaphysics but to show that he 
managed to solidify such possibility. What the preceding investigation showed is that 
it is indeed the case that Kant actualised his general metaphysical project: the system 
of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles found in the Critique of Pure 
Reason is not itself derived from any special metaphysical domain but is, instead, 
derived from the activity of subjectivity when this activity is understood as self-
affection, i.e. understood as time. This insight, in turn, yielded a prospect for 
inquiring as to whether such activity might provide subjectivity with other content, 
beyond that of the schematism and principles, exceeding the concept. It was seen that 
towards the end of the Critical period Kant responds affirmatively, but 
problematically, by articulating a principle of purposiveness derived from the future 
orientation of freedom. But it was seen, further, that Kant’s post-Critical answer, 
unsatisfied with the problematic nature of the principle of purposiveness, seeks to 
unearth a determination of self-affection in answering affirmatively again: the world-
system is a schema the existence of which has to be affirmed categorically. Much 
work remains in trying to clarify the nature of each one of these two possible answers, 
no doubt, but already a stride forward has been made –stride made possible, in the 
first place, by having recognised that “without the presupposition of time, nothing can 
be thought of/ohne ihre Voraussetzung gar nicht denkbar ist”48. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
47 (AA 22:385) 
48 (AA 8:333) 
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Kant’s Works Referenced49 
AA 1: Vorkritische Schriften I: 1747–1756 
AA 2: Vorkritische Schriften II: 1757–1777 
AA 3: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2. Aufl. 1787) 
AA 4: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Aufl. 1781), Prolegomena, Grundlegung zur 
Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 
AA 5: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kritik der Urteilskraft 
AA 6: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Die Metaphysik der 
Sitten 
AA 7: Der Streit der Fakultäten, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 
AA 8: Abhandlungen nach 1781 
AA 9: Logik, Physische Geographie, Pädagogik 
AA 10: Briefwechsel 1747–1788 
AA 11: Briefwechsel 1789–1794 
AA 12: Briefwechsel 1795–1803 
AA 16: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Logik 
AA 17: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Metaphysik 
AA 18: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Metaphysik 
AA 20: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das 
Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, Rostocker Kantnachlass, Preisschrift über die 
Fortschritte der Metaphysik 
AA 21: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Opus postumum  
AA 22: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Opus postumum 
AA 23: Handschriftlicher Nachlass: Vorarbeiten und Nachträge 
AA 24: Vorlesungen: Logik 
AA 28: Vorlesungen: Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie 
AA 29: Vorlesungen: Kleinere Vorlesungen und Ergänzungen I 
                                                            
49  List of Kant’s works referenced following the Prussian Academy of Sciences edition (cited 
throughout this work as ‘Akademieausgabe’ or ‘AA’). The exception is the Critique of Pure Reason 
where the standard A- & B- format for referencing was followed. 
- 197 - 
 
Bibliography 
ADICKES, Erich. Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres Ichs als Schlüssel 
zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie. Mohr, Tübingen, 1929. 
ALLAIS, Lucy. Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
ALLISON, Henry. “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object” in Kant-Studien, 
59, 1-4, 1968, pp. 165-186. 
ALLISON, Henry. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990. 
ALLISON, Henry. Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
ALLISON, Henry. Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical 
Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015. 
ALLISON, Henry. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. 
Yale University Press, New York, 1983/2004. 
ALLISON, Henry. “Transcendental Schematism and the Problem of the Synthetic A 
Priori” in Dialectica, Vol. 35, No. ½, 1981, pp. 57-83. 
AMERIKS, Karl. “Understanding Apperception Today” in PARRINI, Paolo (ed.). 
Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. Kluwer, Dodrecht, 1994, pp. 331-347. 
ARIAS ALBISU, Martin. “On Two Different Lines of Argumentation in Kant’s 
Theory of Schematism of Empirical and Mathematical Concepts”, in Kant Studies 
Online, 2014, pp. 1-42.  
ARIEU, Roger (ed). Leibniz and Clarke Correspondence. Hackett, Indianapolis, 
2000. 
ARISTOTLE. Metaphysics (Tredennick trans.). Loeb/Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA,  1933. 
BADER, Ralf. “Categories of Freedom” in British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 17:4, 2009, pp. 799-820. 
- 198 - 
 
BADER, Ralf. “Inner Sense and Time” in GOMES, A. & STEPHENSON, A. (eds.). 
Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2017, pp. 124-137. 
BADER, Ralf. “The Role of the Refutation of Idealism” in Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, Vol. 94-1, Mar-2012, 53-73. 
BAIASU, Roxana, BIRD, Graham, & MOORE, A. W (eds.). Contemporary Kantian 
Metaphysics: New Essays on Space and Time. Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2012. 
BAUMGARTEN, Alexander. Metaphysics (Fugate, C. & Hymers, J. trans.). 
Bloomsbury, London, 2013. 
BEISER, Frederick. “Darks Days: Anglophone Scholarship Since the 1960s” in 
HAMMER, Espen (ed.) German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge, 
London, 2007. 
BEISER, Frederick. The Fate of Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 
1987. 
BEISER, Frederick. The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism (1796-1880). Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2014. 
BELL, David. “The Art of Judgment” in Mind, 96, 1987, p. 239. 
BLATTNER, William. Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
BLATTNER, William. “Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice” in 
Transcendental Heidegger (eds. CROWELL & MALPAS), Stanford University 
Press, 2007, pp. 10-11. 
BLATTNER, William.“Is Heidegger a Representationalist?” in Philosophical Topics, 
27, 1999, pp. 179–204 
BLATTNER, William. “The Primacy of Practice and Assertoric Truth: Dewey and 
Heidegger,” in (eds. WRATHALL and MALPAS) Heidegger, Authenticity and 
Modernity: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, vol. 1, MIT Press, 2000, pp. 231–
249. 
- 199 - 
 
BLATTNER, William. “Laying the Ground for Metaphysics: Heidegger’s 
Appropriation of Kant,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (ed. 
GUIGNON, C.), Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 149–176. 
BOER, Karin de. “Categories versus Schemata: Kant’s Two-Aspect Theory of Pure 
Concepts and his Critique of Wolffian Metaphysics” in Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 3, July. 2016, pp. 441-468. 
BUBNER, Rudiger (ed.). German Idealist Philosophy. Penguin Books, New York, 
1997. 
BUCHDAHL, Gerd. Kant and the Dynamics of Reason. Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. 
BUTTS, Robert E. Kant and the Double Government Methodology. Reidel Publishing 
Co, Boston, 1984. 
CAIMI, Mario. “The Logical Structure of Time According to the Chapter on 
Schematism” in Kant-Studien, 103. Jahrg., 2012, pp. 415–428. 
CALLANAN, John. “Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts” in Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, 44:5-6, 580-604, 2014. 
CARMAN, Taylor.  Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and 
Authenticity in Being and Time. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
CARMAN, Taylor “Heidegger’s Concept of Presence” in Inquiry, 1995, 38:4, 431-
453. 
CASSIRER, Ernst. An Essay on Man. Double Day/Yale University Press, New York, 
1944. 
CASSIRER, Ernst. “Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik: Bemerkungen zu Martin 
Heideggers Kant-Interpretation” in Kant-Studien, Vol. 36, 1931, pp. 1-26. 
CASSIRER, Ernst. Kants Leben und Lehre. Verlegt bei Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1921. 
CASSIRER, Ernst. Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Two Essays. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1963. 
CAYGILL, Howard. A Kant Dictionary. Blackwell, Malden, MA, 1995. 
CHIPMAN, Lauchlan. “Kant’s Categories and their Schematism” in Kant-Studien, 
Vol. 63, 1-4, 1972, pp. 36-50. 
- 200 - 
 
COHEN, Hermann. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, Berlin, 
1885.  
COLLINS, Arthur. Possible Experience. University of California Press, L.A., 1999. 
CONRAD, Mark. “Allison’s Reading of Kant’s Paradox of Inner Sense” in 
Philosophy Today, 38, 3-4, 1994, pp. 317-325. 
COUTO-SOLARES, Maria. “Sobre la Reflexión de Leningrado” in Anuario 
Filosófico, Vol. XXXVII/3, 2004, pp. 841-850. 
CREUZER, Leonhard. Betrachtungen Über die Freiheit des Willens. Giessen, 1793. 
CROSBY-GRAYSON, Nicola Jane. Schematic and Symbolic Hypotyposis in Kant’s 
Critical Works (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from Manchester Metropolitan 
University, 2015. 
CROWELL, Steven (ed.). Transcendental Heidegger. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 2007. 
DAHLSTROM, Daniel. “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal 
Indications” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 47, No. 4, Jun. 1994, pp. 775-795. 
DAHLSTROM, Daniel. “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism” in Research in 
Phenomenology, No. 35, 2005, pp. 29-54. 
DASTUR, Françoise. Dire le Temps: Esquisse d’une Chronologie 
Phénoménologique. Encre Marine, Paris, 2001.  
DELEUZE, Gilles. La Philosophie Critique de Kant. Quadrige/PUF, Paris, 1963. 
DESCARTES, René. Oeuvres et Lettres. Gallimard, Paris, 1953. 
DEWS, Peter. “Imagination and the Symbolic: Castoriadis and Lacan” in 
Constellations, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2002, pp. 516-521. 
DICKERSON, A. B. Kant on Representation and Objectivity. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
DIETRICH, Albert J. Kants Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum-Zeitlehre und das 
Verhältnis zu Leibniz. Olms Verlag, Zurich, 1997. 
- 201 - 
 
DUQUE, Félix. “Física y Filosofía en el Último Kant” in Logos: Anales del 
Seminario de Metafísica, Nº 9, 1974, pp. 61-74. 
DUQUE, Félix. “Schelling. La Naturaleza – En Dios, o los Problemas de un Guión” 
in Daimon, Revista de Filosofía, nº 40, 2007, 7-27. 
DÜSING, Klaus. “Objektive und Subjektive Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Kants 
Zeittheorie und zu ihrer modernen kritischen Rezeption” in Kant-Studien, Vol. 71, 1-
4, 1980, pp. 1-34. 
DYCK, Corey. “Spontaneity before the Critical Turn: The Spontaneity of the Mind in 
Crusius, the pre-Critical Kant, and Tetens” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
Vol. 54, No. 4, Oct. 2016, pp.625-648. 
DYCK, Corey. “The Scope of Inner Sense: The Development of Kant’s Psychology 
in the Silent Decade” in Con-Textos Kantianos, No. 3, Jun. 2016, pp. 326-344. 
EARMAN, John. World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute versus Relational 
Theories of Space and Time. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989. 
ENGELLAND, Chad. “The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in 
Transcendental Philosophy” in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 41, 
2010, pp. 150-169. 
ENGSTROM, Stephen P. “The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism” in 
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 32, No. 3, Jul. 1994, pp. 359-380. 
ERDMANN, Benno. Kants Kritizismus in der 1. und 2. Auflage der Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft. Leipzig, 1878. 
ESCHENMAYER, A.K.A. “Spontaneität = Weltseele” in SCHELLING, F. W. J. 
(ed.) Zeitschrift für Spekulative Physik, T. 2.Meiner, 2001. 
EULER, Leonhard. Vollständige Anleitung zur Algebra. B.G.Teubner, Berlin, 1911. 
FALKENSTEIN, Lorne. Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995. 
FICHTE, J. G. Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794). Meiner V. 
Hamburg, 1997. 
- 202 - 
 
FICHTE, J. G. Die Wissenschaftslehre (Zweiter Vortrag -1804). Meiner V. Hamburg, 
1986. 
FINK-EITEL, Hinrich. “Kants transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien als Theorie 
des Selbstbewußtseins” in Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Bd. 32, H.2, Jun. 
1978, pp. 211-238. 
FINKE, Ståle R.S. Transcendental Affinities: Judgment and Experience in Kant 
(Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from University of Essex, 1998. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart. “Is There ‘A Gap’ in Kant’s Critical System?” in Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 4, Oct. 1987, pp. 533-555. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart. Kant’s Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum. 
Harvard University Press, MA, 2000. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart. “Reply to Friedman and Guyer” in Inquiry, 46:2, 2010, 228-238. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 2012. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart. “’To Lend Wings to Physics Once Again’: Holderlin and the 
‘Oldest System-Programme of German Idealism’” in European Journal of 
Philosophy, 3:2, 1995, pp. 174-198. 
FÖRSTER, Eckart (ed.). Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and 
the Opus Postumum. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989. 
FORSTER, Michael. “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?” in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 
74, 2012, pp. 485-511. 
FRANK, Manfred. The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism. 
State University of New York Press, New York, 2008. 
FRANKS, Paul W. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and 
Skepticism in German Idealism. Harvard University Press, MA, 2005. 
FRANKS, Paul. “Transcendental Arguments, Reason, and Scepticism: Contemporary 
Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantianism” in STERN, Robert (ed.). 
Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999. 
- 203 - 
 
FRENCH, Stanley. “Kant’s Constitutive-Regulative Distinction” in The Monist, Vol. 
51, No. 4, 1967, pp. 623-639. 
FREYDBERG, Bernard. Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 2005. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. “Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger: The Davos Disputation” in 
European Journal of Philosophy, 10:3, 2002, pp. 263-274. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. “Eckart Förster and Kant’s Opus Postumum” in Inquiry, 46:2, 
2003, pp.215-227. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. Kant and the Exact Sciences. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1998. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. “Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition” in Synthese, 186, 
2012, 231-255. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. “The Prolegomena and Natural Science” in LYRE, H & 
SHLIEMANN, O. (eds.). Kants Prolegomena: Ein kooperative Kommentar.  
Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2012. 
FRIEDMAN, Michael. “Regulative and Constitutive” in The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. XXX, Sup. 1991, pp. 73-102. 
GARDNER, Sebastian. Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge, Abingdon, 
1999. 
GARDNER, Sebastian. “Kant’s Practical Postulates and the Limits of the Critical 
System” in Hegel Bulletin, Vol. 32, 1-2, Jan. 2011, pp. 187-215. 
GARDNER, Sebastian. “Kant’s Third Critique: The Project of Unification” in Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 78, 2016, pp. 161-185. 
GARDNER, Sebastian. “The Metaphysics of Human Freedom: From Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism to Schelling’s Freiheitschrift” in British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 25, 1, 2017, pp. 133-156. 
- 204 - 
 
GARDNER, Sebastian. “Transcendental Philosophy  and the Possibility of the 
Given” in SCHEAR, J. (ed.) Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-
Dreyfus Debate. Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 110-142. 
GIBBONS, Sarah. Kant’s Theory of Imagination. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. 
GIOVANELLI, Marco. Reality and Negation: Kant’s Principle of Anticipations of 
Perception. Springer/Studies in German Idealism, Dordrecht, 2011. 
GOLOB, Sacha. “Heidegger on Kant, Time, and the 'Form' of Intentionality” in 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 21, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 345-367. 
GOLOB, Sacha. “Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude and the Unity of Perception” in 
European Journal of Philosophy, N/A, 2011, pp. N/A. 
GOMES, A. & STEPHENSON, A. (eds.). Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: 
Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017. 
GOY, Ina & Watkins, Eric. Kant’s Theory of Biology. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2014. 
GRAM, Moltke (ed.). Interpreting Kant. University of Iowa Press, Iowa, 1982. 
GRANT, James. The Critical Imagination. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. 
GRIER, Michellle. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
GRONDIN, Jean. “Kant, Emmanuel, Opus postumum: passage des príncipes 
métaphysiques de la science de la nature à la physique”.  Laval théologique et 
philosophique, 433, 1987, pp. 425–426. 
GUYER, Paul. Kant. Routledge, Oxford, 2006. 
GUYER, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997. 
GUYER, Paul. “Kant on Apperception and ‘a priori’ Synthesis” in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3, Jul., 1980, pp. 205-212. 
HALL, Bryan W. The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy 
through the Opus Postumum. Routledge, New York, 2015. 
- 205 - 
 
HAMMER, Espen. Philosophy and Temporality from Kant to Critical Theory. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 
HAMMER, Espen (ed.). German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2007. 
HARTMANN, Nicolai. “Alte und Neue Ontologie” in Actas del Primer Congreso 
Nacional de Filosofía (Mendoza, Argentina), T. 2, Apr. 1949, pp. 782-791. 
HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Faith and Knowledge (Cerf & Harris trans.). 
State University of New York Press, Albany, 1970. 
HEGEL, G. W. F. Gesamelte Werke 12: Wissenschaft der Logik, B. II.  Meiner V. 
Hamburg, 1981. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 41) Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kant Lehre von den 
transzendentalen Grundsaetzen. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfort am Main, 2010. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 24) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfort am Main, 1927. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 27) Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfort am Main, 1929. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 3) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfort am Main, 2010. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 21) Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfort am Main, 1995. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 25) Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik 
der Reinen Vernunft. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfort am Main, 1927. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 2) Sein und Zeit. Max Biemeyer erlag, Tübingen, 2006.  
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 9) Vom Wesen des Grundes. Vittorio Klostermann, 
Frankfort am Main, 1995. 
HEIDEGGER, Martin. (GA 9) Wegmarken. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfort am 
Main, 2004. 
HENRICH, Dieter. Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 
1967. 
- 206 - 
 
HENRICH, Dieter. “The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction” in The 
Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4, Jun., 1969, pp. 640-659. 
HENRICH, Dieter. The Unity of Reason. Harvard University Press, Cam. MA, 1994. 
HÖFFE, Otfried (ed.). Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 
2002. 
HÖFFE, Otfried (ed.). Kritik der Urteilskraft. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2008. 
HOLLAND, A. J. (ed.) Philosophy, its History and Historiography. Reidl, Dordrecht, 
1985. 
HORSTMANN, Rolf-Peter. “Why Must There be a Transcendental Deduction in 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment?” in FÖRSTER, E. (ed.) Kant’s Transcendental 
Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum. Stanford University Press, 
CA, 1989. 
HUGHES, Fiona. Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Continuum, London, 2010. 
HUGHES, Fiona. Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World. Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 2007. 
HUGHES, Fiona. “On Aesthetic Judgment and Our Relation to Nature” in Inquiry, 
49:6, 2006, 547-572. 
HUSSERL, Edmund. Logische Untersuchungen Bd. I. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
Tübingen, 1968. 
HUSSERL, Edmund. Logische Untersuchungen Bd. II.i. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
Tübingen, 1968. 
HUSSERL, Edmund. Logische Untersuchungen Bd. II.ii. Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
Tübingen, 1968. 
HUSSERL, Edmund. Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung (ed. MARBACH, E). 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1980. 
HUSSERL, Edmund. Vorlesungen Zur Phänomenologie des Inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins (ed. Heidegger, M.). Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 2000. 
JOHNSON, Gregory (ed.). From Kant and Royce to Heidegger. The Catholic 
University of America Press, DC, 2003. 
- 207 - 
 
JØRGENSEN, Klaus. Kants Schematism and the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from Roskilde University, 2005.  
KANT, Immanuel. Akademie-Ausgabe, Bände I-XXIX. De Gruyter, Berlin und 
Leipzig, 1900- 
KANT, Immanuel. Anthropology, History and Education (eds. ZÖLLER, G. & 
LOUDEN, R.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 
KANT, Immanuel. Correspondence (ed. ZWEIG, A). Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
KANT, Immanuel. Crítica de la Razón Pura (Caimi, M. trans.). FCE, México, 2009. 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (Guyer & Wood trans.). Cambridge 
University Pres, Cambridge, 1998. 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason (Kemp Smith trans.). 
Palgrave/Macmillan, China, 1929/2007. 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment (Pluhar trans.). Hackett, Indiana, 1987. 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment (Guyer & Matthews trans.). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
KANT, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics (eds. HEATH, P. & SCHNEEWIND, J.B). 
Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
KANT, Immanuel. Lectures on Logic (ed. YOUNG, M.). Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1992. 
KANT, Immanuel. Lectures on Metaphysics (eds. AMERIKS, K. & NARAGON, S.). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
KANT, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Friedman trans.). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
KANT, Immanuel. Natural Science (ed. WATKINS, E.). Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012. 
KANT, Immanuel. Notes and Fragments (ed. GUYER, P.). Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
- 208 - 
 
KANT, Immanuel. Opus Postumum (ed. DUQUE, F.). Anthropos, Barcelona, 1991. 
KANT, Immanuel. Opus Postumum (ed. FÖRSTER, E.), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
KANT, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy (ed. GREGOR, M. J.). Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
KANT, Immanuel. Religion and Rational Theology (eds. WOOD, P & DI 
GIOVANNI, G.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  
KANT, Immanuel. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 (eds. WALFORD & 
MEERBOTE). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 
KANT, Immanuel. Theoretical philosophy, 1781- (eds. ALLISON & HEATH). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. 
KÄUFER, Stephan. “Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger’s Two Derivations 
of Judgment” in Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, Vol. 22, 2003, pp. 
79-91. 
KÄUFER, Stephan. “On Heidegger On Logic” in Continental Philosophy Review 34, 
2001, pp. 455–476 
KELLER, Pierre. Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
KEMP SMITH, Norman. A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd Ed. 
MacMillan, London, 1923. 
KEMP SMITH, Norman. “The Present Situation in Philosophy” in The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, Jan, 1920, pp. 1-26. 
KHURANA, Thomas. “Schema und Bild: Kant, Heidegger und das Verhältnis von 
Repräsentation und Abstraktion,” in Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft, 58:2, 2013, pp. 203–224. 
KITCHER, Patricia. “The Unity of Kant’s Active Thinker” in SMITH, Joel & 
SULLIVAN, Peter (eds.). Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2011. 
- 209 - 
 
KNELLER, Jane. Kant and the Power of Imagination. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009. 
KÜHN, Manfred. Kant. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 
Kneller, Jane. Kant and the Power of Imagination. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007. 
LAMBERT, Johann Heinrich. Neues Organon. Wendler, Leipzig, 1764. 
LANGTON, Rae. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998. 
LAYWINE, Allison. “Kant on the Self as Model of Experience” in Kantian Review, 
Vol. 9, 1, 2005, pp. 1-29.  
LEAVITT, Frank. “Kant’s Schematism and his Philosophy of Geometry” in Studies 
in the History of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1991, pp. 647-659. 
LEBRUN, Gerard. Kant et la Fin de la Métaphysique. Colin, Barcelone, 1970. 
LICHTENBERG, Georg Christoph. Aphorismes. Pauvert Editeur, Hollande, 1966. 
LISS, Jeffrey. “Kant’s Transcendental Object and the Two Senses of the Noumenon: 
a Problem in Imagination” in Man and World, 13, 1980, pp.133-153. 
LONGUENESSE, Béatrice. Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1998. 
LONGUENESSE, Béatrice. Kant on the Human Standpoint. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
LONGUENESSE, Béatrice. “Kant’s Deconstruction of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason” in The Harvard Review of Philosophy, IX, 2001, pp. 67-87. 
LORD, Beth. Kant and Spinozism: Transcendental Idealism and Immanence from 
Jacobi to Deleuze. Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2011. 
LORINI, Gualtiero. “O Papel da Affinidade Transcendental entre os Fenomenos na 
Teoria do Conhecimento Kantiana” in Estudios Kantianos, Marilia, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
Jun. 2017, pp. 215-230. 
- 210 - 
 
MAKKREEL, Rudolf. Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical 
Import of the Critique of Judgment. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990. 
MAKKREEL, Rudolf. “Imagination and Temporality in Kant’s Theory of the 
Sublime” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 42, No. 3, Spring, 
1984, pp. 303-315. 
MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, Felipe. Desconocida Raíz Común. La Balsa de Medusa, 
Madrid, 1987. 
MARTÍNEZ MARZOA, Felipe. Releer a Kant. Anthropos, Barcelona, 1992. 
MATHERNE, Samantha. “Kant and the Art of Schematism” in Kantian Review, 19, 
2014, pp. 181-205. 
MATHIEU, Vittorio. Kants Opus Postumum. Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1989. 
MCROBERT, Jennifer N. Concept Construction in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from The University of Western 
Ontario, 1994. 
MEINONG, Alexius. Über Gegenstandstheorie. Meiner V. Hamburg, 1988. 
MENDIOLA-MEJÍA, Carlos. El Poder de Juzgar en Kant. Universidad 
Iberoamericana, Mexico, 2008.  
MOHR, Georg & WILLASCHEK, Marcus (eds.). Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1998. 
MONCK, William H. S. An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy. University Press, 
Dublin, 1874. 
MÖRCHEN, Hermann. Die Einbildungskraft bei Kant. De Gruyter/Max Niemeyer, 
Tübingen, 1970. 
MUNK, Reinier (ed.). Hermann Cohen’s Critical Idealism. Springer, Netherlands, 
2005. 
NEWTON, Isaac. Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Cohen & Whitman 
trans.). University of California Press, L.A., 1999. 
Novalis. Werke Bd. 2: Das philosophisch-theoretische Werk (Hg. Mähl). Hanser, 
München, 2005. 
- 211 - 
 
OKSENBERG RORTY, A & SCHMIDT, J. (eds.). Kant’s Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan View. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 
ONNASCH, Ernst-Otto. “The Role of the Organism in the Transcendental 
Philosophy of Kant’s Opus Postumum” in GOY, Ina & WATKINS, Eric. Kant’s 
Theory of Biology. De Gruyter, Berlin, 2014. 
PARRINI, Paolo (ed.). Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 
1994. 
PATON, H. J. Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience Vols.I-II . Allen and Unwin, 
Osmania, 1936. 
PECERE, Paolo. “The Systematical Role of Kant’s Opus Postumum: ‘Exhibition’ of 
Concepts and the Defense of Transcendental Philosophy” in Con-Textos Kantianos, 
No. 1, Jun. 2015, pp. 156-177. 
PENDLEBURY, Michael.  “Making Sense of Kant’s Schematism” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. LV, No. 4, December, 1995. 
PICHÉ, Claude. “Le Schématisme de la Raison Pure” in Les Études philosophiques, 
No. 1, Mar. 1986, pp. 79-99. 
PINKARD, Terry. German Philosophy 1760-1860 : The Legacy of Idealism. 
Cambrdige University Press, Cambridge, 2002. 
PIPPIN, Robert. “Kant on Empirical Concepts” in Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1979, pp. 1-19. 
PIPPIN, Robert. Kant’s Theory of Form. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982. 
POLLOK, Konstantin. “An Almost Single Inference – Kant’s Deduction of the 
Categories Reconsidered” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 90, 2008, pp. 
323-345. 
POLLOK, Konstantin. “Fabricating a World in Accordance with mere Fantasy? The 
Origins of Kant’s Critical Theory of Matter” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 56, 
No. 1, Sep. 2002, pp. 61-97. 
POLLOK, Konstantin. Kant’s Theory of Normativity. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002. 
- 212 - 
 
POLLOK, Konstantin. “The Understanding prescribes laws to Nature: Spontaneity, 
Legislation, and Kant’s Transcendental Hylomorphism” in Kant-Studien, 105-4, 
2014, pp. 509-530. 
POSY, C.J. (ed). Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992. 
PRICHARD, Harold Arthur. Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford/Clarendon, 1909. 
PRAUSS, Gerold. Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. Bouvier Verlag, 1974. 
RAFFOUL, François. “Heidegger and Kant: The Question of Idealism” in Philosophy 
Today, 40:4, 1996, p.531. 
RAND, Sebastian. “Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant’s Theory 
of Matter” in Kantian Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2012, pp. 109-134. 
REICH, Klaus. The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments. Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, 1992. 
REINHOLD, Karl Leonhard. Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie. Reclam, 
Leipzig, 1923. 
RISJORD, Mark. “The Sensible Foundation for Mathematics: A Defence of Kant’s 
View” in Studies in the History of Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1990, pp. 
123-143. 
RIVERA DE ROSALES, Jacinto. Kant: La Crítica del Juicio Teleológico y la 
Corporalidad del Sujeto. Uned Ediciones, Madrid, 2002. 
RÖDL, Sebastian. “Logical Form as a Relation to the Object” in Philosophical 
Topics, Vol. 34, No. 1 & 2, Sp. & Fall, 2006, pp. 345-369. 
ROJAS JIMÉNEZ, Alejandro. “La Libertad en la Filosofía de la Cuadratura de 
Heidegger” in Thémata, No. 41, 2009, pp. 525-531. 
RUEGER, Alexander. “Brain Water, the Ether, and the Art of Constructing Systems” 
in Kant-Studien, 86, 1995, pp. 26-40. 
SÁ PEREIRA, Roberto. “Non-Conceptual Content or Singular Thought?” in Kant 
Studies Online, 2014, pp. 210-239. 
SALLIS, John. Spacings – of Reason and Imagination. The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1987. 
- 213 - 
 
SANTOIANNI, Flavia (ed.). The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century 
Philosophy. Springer, Heidelberg, 2016. 
SARTRE, Jean-Paul. L'Être et le Néant. Tel/Gallimard, Paris, 1943. 
SASSEN, Brigitte. Kant’s Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical 
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
SCHAPER, Eva. “Kant’s Schematism Reconsidered” in Review of Metaphysics, 8, 
1964, pp. 267-292. 
SCHAPER, Eva. Studies in Kant’s Aesthetics. Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 1979. 
SCHAPER, Eva (ed.). Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental 
Arguments. Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. 
SCHELLING, F. W.  J. Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Meiner V. 
Hamburg, 2011. 
SEEL, Gerhard. “Schematismus und oberste Grundsätze” in Kants Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft (MOHR & WILLASCHEK eds.), Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1998. 
SELLARS, Wilfrid. “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience” in 
SICHA ,J. F. (ed.) Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics. Ridgeview Publishing, 
California, 2002. 
SHABEL, Lisa. “Kant’s Argument from Geometry” in Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 42, no. 2, 2004, 195–215. 
SHEROVER, Charles M. “Heidegger’s Ontology and the Copernican Revolution” in 
JOHNSON, G. (ed.) From Kant and Royce to Heidegger. The Catholic University of 
America Press, DC, 2003. 
SHEROVER, Charles M. “Heidegger’s Use of Kant in Being and Time” in 
JOHNSON, G. (ed.) From Kant and Royce to Heidegger. The Catholic University of 
America Press, DC, 2003. 
SHEROVER, Charles. Heidegger, Kant and Time. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1972. 
- 214 - 
 
STANG, Nicholas. “Who’s Afraid of Double Affection?” in Philosophers’ Imprint, 
Vol. 15, No. 18, Jul. 2015, pp. 1-28. 
STERN, Robert (ed.). Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999. 
STRAWSON, Peter. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. Routledge, 
London, 1959. 
STRAWSON, Peter. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. Routledge, London, 1975. 
TESTER, Steven. “Georg Cristoph Lichtenberg’s Idealism” in Journal of the History 
of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 2, Apr. 2016, pp. 283-306. 
TOLLEY, Clinton. “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic” in Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2012, pp. 417-446. 
TUSCHLING, Burkhard. “Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental 
Deduction of Matter in Kant’s Opus Postumum” in FÖRSTER, E. (ed.) Kant’s 
Transcendental Deductions. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1989. 
TUSCHLING, Burkhard. “The System of Transcendental Idealism: Questions Raised 
and Left Open in the Kritik der Urteislkraft” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XXX, Sup. 1991, pp. 109-127. 
VALARIS, Markos. “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” n Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 8, No. 4, May 2008, 
pp. 1-18. 
VLEESCHAUWER, Hermann de."La Déduction Transcendentale dans l' Oeuvre de 
Kant" in Werken uitgegeven door de Faculten der Wijsbegeerte en Letteren, Vol. 3. 
Ghent, 1937. 
WALDEMAR, Rohloff. “Kant’s Argument from the Applicability of Geometry” in 
Kant Studies Online, 2012, pp. 23-50. 
WARNOCK, G.J. “Concepts and Schematism” in Analysis, Vol. 9, 5, 1949, pp. 77-
82. 
WATKINS, Eric. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2005. 
- 215 - 
 
WATKINS, Eric (ed.). Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source 
Materials. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. 
WEINERT, Friedel. The March of Time: Evolving Conceptions of Time in the Light 
of Scientific Discoveries. Springer, Berlin, 2013. 
WHITE-BECK, Lewis. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960. 
WILLASCHEK, M., Stolzenberg, J., MOHR, G. & BACIN, S. Kant-Lexikon Bd.1. 
De Gruyter, Berlin, 2015. 
WINTERBOURNE, A. T. “Construction and the Role of Schematism in Kant’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics” Studies in the History of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 
12, No. 1, 1981, pp. 33-46. 
WOLFF, Christian. Erste Philosophie oder Ontologie. Meiner V. Hamburg, 2005. 
YANOFSKI, Noson. The Outer Limits of Reason. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013. 
YOUNG, J. W. “Construction, Schematism, and Imagination” in POSY, C.J. (ed). 
Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992. 
ZÖLLER, Günter. “Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking” in Journal of 
the History of Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 3, Jul. 1992, pp. 417-441. 
ZUCKERT, Rachel. Kant on Beauty and Biology. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007. 
ZUCKERT, Rachel. “The Purposiveness of Form: A Reading of Kant’s Aesthetic 
Formalism” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 4, Oct. 2006, pp. 
599-622. 
 
